It is shown that both universal and non-universal correlations must exist between classical periodic orbits in order that Gutzwiller's semiclassical trace formula is consistent with a real, discrete quantum energy spectrum. Formulae for the two-point correlations are derived. The universal correlations are consistent with those conjectured by Argaman et al. (1993). Likewise, both universal and non-universal correlations must exist between quantum energy levels in order that the trace formula be consistent with the fact that periodic orbit actions are real and (...) discrete. In this case, the two-point correlations implied are consistent with random matrix theory and previous semiclassical calculations. These ideas are illustrated with reference to the primes and the Riemann zeros. (shrink)
This paper is a defense of John Duns Scotus’s theory of individuation against one of William of Ockham’s objections. In the Ordinatio II. D.3. P. 1, John Duns Scotus argues for the existence of haecceity, a positive, indivisible distinction which makes an individual an individual rather than a kind of thing. He argues for the existence of haecceity by arguing for a form which is a “real less than numerical unity” and is neither universal nor singular. In the Summa Logicae, (...) William of Ockham objects to Scotus’s theory of haecceity by attacking his theory of universals, claiming that the same thing would be proper and common simultaneously. The basis of Ockham’s objections is that only a real distinction is possible: if things are distinct, then they can exist separately. Without universals, a principle of individuation is unnecessary. To defend Scotus’s principle of individuation, an account and defense of the formal distinction is necessary. Without the formal distinction, metaphysical categories, such as being and one, are incoherent or contradictory. The formal distinction gives rise to a new law of contradiction:two or more entities are formally distinct if and only if contradiction or non-being results from their separation and the properties of one being do not match theproperties of the other being(s). (shrink)
In this reply I consider David O’Connor’s article “A Variation on the Free Will Defense” in which he tries to show that natural evil is necessary for free will by showing that it is required for the possibility of “morally creditable free choice.” I argue that O’Connor’s reply to an anticipated objection was unsuccessful in showing that humans can be moral without the property he calls “p.” that an altered understanding of what “morally creditable free choice” is would not help. (...) and finally, that if God’s moral condition is fundamentally different than ours, it could not be used as an example of p being inessential for humans being moral. (shrink)
This essay attempts to interpret John Rawls's concept of the state in hisTheory of Justice. His concept is not an analysis of the existing monopoly capitalist state. Such an analysis can be found in, for example,The Fiscal Crisis of the State by James O'Connor. Rawls's concept is, by contrast, not one of the actual state but of an idealized state. Ideals, though, touch reality at some point. At what point does Rawls's concept of the state touch reality?The market is (...) the key to a realistic interpretation of Rawls's concept of the state. His view of the market is even at the basis of his renowned principles of justice. (shrink)
Political Freedom By George G. Brenkert Routledge, 1991. Pp. 278. ISBN 0?415?03372?1. £35 hbk. Wittgenstein: A Bibliographical Guide By Guido Frongia and Brian McGuinness Basil Blackwell, 1990. Pp. x + 438. ISBN 00631?13765?3. £60.00. Metaphysics By Peter van Inwagen Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. xiii + 222. ISBN 0?19?8751400. £11.95 pbk. The Nature of Moral Thinking By Francis Snare Routledge, 1992. Pp. 187. ISBN 0?415?04709?9. £9.99 pbk. Filosofía analitica hoy: Encuentro de tradiciones Edited by Mercedes Torrevejano Servicio de Publications Universidade (...) de Santiago de Compostela, 1991. Pp. 284. ISBN 84?7191?722?X. $15.5 pbk. The Puzzle of Experience By J.J. Valberg Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. 227. ISBN 0?19?824291?3. £25. Religion and Philosophy Edited by Martin Warner Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 31 Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. vi + 155. ISBN 0?521?42951?X. £10.95 pbk. The Uses of Philosophy By Mary Warnock Blackwell, 1992. Pp. 256. ISBN 0?631?18038?9. £35.00 hbk. £11.95 pbk. The Disappearance of Time: Kurt Godel and the Idealistic Tradition in Philosophy By Palle Yourgrau Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. x + 182. ISBN 0?521?41012?6. £27.50. (shrink)
Universals: Loux, M. J. The existence of universals. Russell, B. The world of universals. Quine, W. V. O. On what there is. Pears, D. F. Universals. Strawson, P. F. Particular and general. Wolterstorff, N. Qualities. Bambrough, R. Universals and family resemblances. Donagan, A. Universals and metaphysical realism. Sellars, W. Abstract entities. Wolterstorff, N. On the nature of universals.--Particulars: Loux, M. J. Particulars and their individuation. Black. M. The identity of indiscernibles. Ayer, A. J. The identity of indiscernibles. O'Connor, D. J. (...) The identity of indiscernibles. Allaire, E. B. Bare particulars. Chappell, V. C. Particulars re-clothed. Allaire, E. B. Another look at bare particulars. Meiland, J. W. Do relations individuate? Long, D. C. Particulars and their qualities. Copi, I. Essence and accident. Chandler, H. S. Essence and accident. Plantinga, A. World and essence. (shrink)
Reading James O'apos;Connor's Accumulation Crisis is very confusing. At certain junctures, it reads like the “sequel” to The Fiscal Crisis of the State, elaborating the expanding of his 1973 critique of modem macroeconomic management as a spoils system of special interests. At odier turns, it comes across as a “prequel” to the earlier work, oudining a tortuous logic for the underproduction and accumulation crises that set off the “fiscal crises” he described over a decade earlier. Although not all that (...) new, the plot of the sequel is occasionally interesting. The prequel side of the narrative, however, is very questionable and as old as the hills because, once again, the ancient apparatus of theories of surplus value is trundled out and fired up to “explain” the roots of the current crisis. (shrink)
Everywhere I go, I'm asked if I think the universities stifle writers. My opinion is that they don't stifle enough of them. ---Flannery O'Connor, Mystery and Manners, p. 84, as quoted by Frederick Crews, The Critics Bear it Away, pp. 143--144..
The epistemic backdrop for locating consciousness in a naturalist ontology -- The argument from consciousness -- John Searle and contingent correlation -- Timothy O'Connor and emergent necessitation -- Colin McGinn and mysterian ?naturalism? -- David Skrbina and panpsychism -- Philip Clayton and pluralistic emergentist monism -- Science and strong physicalism -- AC, dualism and the fear of god.
Self-control has been described as the ability to master motivation that is contrary to one’s better judgement; that is, an ability that prevents such motivation from resulting in behaviour that is contrary to one’s overall better judgement (Mele, Irrationality: An essay on Akrasia, self-deception and self-control, p. 54, 1987). Recent discussions in philosophy have centred on the question of whether synchronic self-control, in which one exercises self-control whilst one is currently experiencing opposing motivation, is actional or non-actional. The actional theorist (...) maintains that such exercises are actions, whilst the non-actional theorist claims that synchronic self-control consists in the having of unmotivated thoughts which occur at times when agents experience recalcitrant motivations and which serve to attenuate the strength of those motivations. In this paper I discuss a class of cases which has been largely ignored in these discussions, cases which I argue are common synchronic self-control problems, but in which a lack of motivation is the characteristic symptom. I argue that such cases present problems for actional accounts and add some support to the non-actional approach. (shrink)
Against recent commentators such as Annstrong, D’Arcy, Copleston, O’Connor, Bourke, and Grisez, I argue that the logic referred to by Thomas in his “Treatise on Law” should not be understood metaphorically. Instead, it involves a chain of syllogisms, beginning with the synderesis principle, followed by primary, secondary, and tertiary principles, and ends with a practical syllogism. In showing this, I attack the view that the synderesis principle, “good ought to be done and evil avoided,” is tautological . Second, I show (...) the syllogistic relation between this and the more subordinate moral principIes. Finally, I argue that the practical syllogism also involves a logical deduction, where the minor premise is a propositional attitude of perception, and the conclusion is an action which expresses a proposition. What emerges is a more precise account of how actions are related to natural law. (shrink)
This essay traces Newman’s rich legacy in modern American literature in the writings of three prominent American writers of the last century: F. Scott Fitzgerald, who plays off of Newman’s definition of a gentleman in his The Beautiful and Damned (1922); Sinclair Lewis, who connects the figure of Carlyle Vesper to Newman in Gideon Planish (1943); and Flannery O’Connor, who mentioned Newman in four published letters, and whose artistic vision was shaped appreciably by Newman’s Apologia and his Grammar of Assent.