23 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
James Pryor [23]James Vincent Pryor [1]
See also:
Profile: James Pryor (New York University)
  1. James Pryor, Is There Non-Inferential Justification?
    I want to talk about a certain epistemic quality that I call “justification,” and inquire whether that quality can ever be had “immediately” or “non-inferentially.” Before we get into substantive issues, we need first to agree about what epistemic quality it is we’ll be talking about, and then we need to clarify what it is to have that quality immediately or non-inferentially. When I say I call this epistemic quality “justification,” you’re liable to think, “Oh I know what that is.” (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. James Pryor, Uncertainty and Undermining.
    Dogmatism is a claim about a possible epistemic position, not about the metaphysics of what puts us in that position. So, for example, it leaves it open whether the intrinsic nature of a perceiving subject’s state is the same as that of a hallucinating subject’s state.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. James Pryor, More on Hyper-Reliability and a Priority.
    In section III of Pryor 2006a, I argued against the view that the mere fact that a thought- type is hyper-reliable directly gives one justification to believe a thought of that type. A close alternative says that our merely appreciating that the thought-type is hyper-reliable directly gives us that justification.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. James Pryor (forthcoming). Como se escreve um ensaio de filosofia. Critica.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. James Pryor (2013). Problems for Credulism. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism.
    We have several intuitive paradigms of defeating evidence. For example, let E be the fact that Ernie tells me that the notorious pet Precious is a bird. This supports the premise F, that Precious can fly. However, Orna gives me *opposing* evidence. She says that Precious (the same Precious) is a dog. Alternatively, defeating evidence might not oppose Ernie's testimony in that direct way. There might be other ways for it to weaken the support that Ernie's testimony gives me for (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. James Pryor (2013). Reply to Comesaña. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 235.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. James Pryor (2012). When Warrant Transmits. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    Consider the argument: Circus-1 Men in clown suits are handing out tickets. So, probably: Circus-2 There’s a circus in town. So: Circus-3 There’s an entertainment venue in town. Presumably you’d be able to warrantedly believe Circus-2 on the basis of Circus-1. And we can suppose you’re reasonably certain that wherever there are circuses, there are entertainment venues. So you’d seem to be in a position to reasonably go on to infer Circus-3.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. James Pryor (2007). What's Wrong with McKinsey-Style Reasoning? In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 177--200.
    (revisions posted 12/5/2006) to appear in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, ed. by Sanford Goldberg (to be published by Oxford in 2006 or 2007) Michael McKinsey formulated an argument that raises a puzzle about the relation between externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The puzzle goes like this: it seems like I can know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection tells me that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. James Pryor (2007). Externalism About Content and McKinsey-Style Reasoning? In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. James Pryor (2007). Reasons and That‐Clauses. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):217-244.
    What are reasons? For example, if you’re aware that your secretary plans to expose you, and you resign to avoid a scandal, what is your reason for resigning? Is your reason the fact that your secretary plans to expose you? If so, what kinds of facts are eligible to be reasons? Can merely possible facts be reasons (for actual subjects)? Can merely apparent facts? Or are reasons rather attitudes? Are your reasons for resigning your belief that your secretary plans to (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Alex Byrne & James Pryor (2006). Bad Intensions. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Maci (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press. 38--54.
    _the a priori role_ (for word T). For instance, perhaps anyone who understands the word _water_ is able to know, without appeal to any further a posteriori information, that _water_ refers to the clear, drinkable natural kind whose instances are predominant in our oceans and lakes (if _water_ refers at all.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. James Pryor (2006). Hyper-Reliability and Apriority. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344.
    I argue that beliefs that are true whenever held-like I exist, I am thinking about myself, and (in an object-dependent framework) Jack = Jack-needn't on that account be a priori. It does however seem possible to remove the existential commitment from the last example, to get a belief that is knowable a priori. I discuss some difficulties concerning how to do that.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. James Pryor (2005). There is Immediate Justification. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 181--202.
  14. James Pryor (2005). Whai's so Bad Aboutttvtwtt in the Matrix? In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford University Press. 40.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. James Pryor (2005). What's So Bad About Living in the Matrix? In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford University Press. 40.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. James Pryor (2004). Comments on Sosa's “Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included”. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):67-72.
    There is much I agree with in Sosa’s paper. His discussion of Stine and Peirce is quite useful; so too his discussion of Dretske in Appendix II. A further issue he focuses on concerns how Contextualists are to give full endorsement to the knowledge-claims of ordinary subjects. Just saying, metalinguistically, that.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349-378.
    Consider the following well-worn example, first put forward by Fred Dretske. You’re at the zoo, and in the pen in front of you is a striped horse-like animal. The sign on the pen says “Zebra.” Assuming that animal really is a zebra, it would seem that your evidence is perfectly adequate to enable you to know that it’s a zebra. So you know.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. James Pryor, Varieties of Two-Dimensionalism.
    There are different _kinds _of two-dimensional matrix one can work with, representing different properties of an expression. One has to understand the rows and columns differently for the different matrices; but there are some formal characteristics all the matrices have in common.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. James Pryor (2001). Epistemology C. 1988-2000. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52:95-124.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. James Pryor (2001). Highlights of Recent Epistemology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.
    This article surveys work in epistemology since the mid-1980s. It focuses on (i) contextualism about knowledge attributions, (ii) modest forms of foundationalism, and (iii) the internalism/externalism debate and its connections to the ethics of belief.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. James Pryor (2000). The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
    Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. James Pryor (1999). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):271-304.