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  1.  43
    James R. Griesemer & Michael J. Wade (1988). Laboratory Models, Causal Explanation and Group Selection. Biology and Philosophy 3 (1):67-96.
    We develop an account of laboratory models, which have been central to the group selection controversy. We compare arguments for group selection in nature with Darwin's arguments for natural selection to argue that laboratory models provide important grounds for causal claims about selection. Biologists get information about causes and cause-effect relationships in the laboratory because of the special role their own causal agency plays there. They can also get information about patterns of effects and antecedent conditions in nature. But to (...)
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  2.  21
    James R. Griesemer (2005). The Informational Gene and the Substantial Body: On the Generalization of Evolutionary Theory by Abstraction. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):59-116.
  3.  34
    James R. Griesemer (1990). Modeling in the Museum: On the Role of Remnant Models in the Work of Joseph Grinnell. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 5 (1):3-36.
    Accounts of the relation between theories and models in biology concentrate on mathematical models. In this paper I consider the dual role of models as representations of natural systems and as a material basis for theorizing. In order to explicate the dual role, I develop the concept of a remnant model, a material entity made from parts of the natural system(s) under study. I present a case study of an important but neglected naturalist, Joseph Grinnell, to illustrate the extent to (...)
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  4.  25
    James R. Griesemer (1990). Material Models in Biology. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:79 - 93.
    Propositions alone are not constitutive of science. But is the "non-propositional" side of science theoretically superfluous: must philosophy of science consider it in order to adequately account for science? I explore the boundary between the propositional and non-propositional sides of biological theory, drawing on three cases: Grinnell's remnant models of faunas, Wright's path analysis, and Weismannism's role in the generalization of evolutionary theory. I propose a picture of material model-building in biology in which manipulated systems of material objects function as (...)
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  5.  20
    James R. Griesemer (1999). Materials for the Study of Evolutionary Transition. Biology and Philosophy 14 (1):127-142.
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  6.  8
    James R. Griesemer & Elihu M. Gerson (2006). Of Mice and Men and Low Unit Cost. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (2):363-372.
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  7.  14
    James R. Griesemer (1991). Must Scientific Diagrams Be Eliminable? The Case of Path Analysis. Biology and Philosophy 6 (2):155-180.
    Scientists use a variety of modes of representation in their work, but philosophers have studied mainly sentences expressing propositions. I ask whether diagrams are mere conveniences in expressing propositions or whether they are a distinct, ineliminable mode of representation in scientific texts. The case of path analysis, a statistical method for quantitatively assessing the relative degree of causal determination of variation as expressed in a causal path diagram, is discussed. Path analysis presents a worst case for arguments against eliminability since (...)
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  8.  26
    James R. Griesemer & Michael J. Wade (2000). Populational Heritability: Extending Punnett Square Concepts to Evolution at the Metapopulation Level. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):1-17.
    In a previous study, using experimental metapopulations of the flour beetle, Tribolium castaneum, we investigated phase III of Wright's shifting balance process (Wade and Griesemer 1998). We experimentally modeled migration of varying amounts from demes of high mean fitness into demes of lower mean fitness (as in Wright's characterization of phase III) as well as the reciprocal (the opposite of phase III). We estimated the meta-populational heritability for this level of selection by regression of offspring deme means on the weighted (...)
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  9.  7
    James R. Griesemer & Elihu M. Gerson (1993). Collaboration in the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology. Journal of the History of Biology 26 (2):185 - 203.
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  10.  20
    James R. Griesemer (1988). Genes, Memes and Demes. Biology and Philosophy 3 (2):179-184.
  11.  8
    James R. Griesemer, Michael J. Wade, Populational Heritability, Cutting Some Slack, Jason Scott Robert & Foundational Heresies Fastidious (2000). Volume15 No. 1 January2000. Biology and Philosophy 15:795-798.
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  12.  20
    William Bechtel, Werner Callebaut, James R. Griesemer & Jeffrey C. Schank (2006). Bill Wimsatt on Multiple Ways of Getting at the Complexity of Nature. Biological Theory 1 (2):213-219.
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  13.  10
    James R. Griesemer (1988). Causal Explanation in Laboratory Ecology: The Case of Competitive Indeterminacy. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:337 - 344.
    This paper characterizes the role of the experimenter in causal explanations of laboratory phenomena. Causal explanation rests on appeals to the experimenter's efficacy as a causal agent. I contrast "demographic" and "genetic" explanations of stochastic outcomes in a set of competition experiments in ecology. The demographic view ascribes causes to the experimenter's agency in setting up the experiment and to events within the experimental set-up. The genetic view ascribes causes to an unrecognized effect of the experimenter's sampling process prior to (...)
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  14. James R. Griesemer & Elihu M. Gerson (1993). Collaboration in the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology. Journal of the History of Biology 26 (2):185-203.
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  15. James R. Griesemer & Elihu M. Gerson (2006). Of Mice and Men and Low Unit Cost. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (2):363-372.
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  16. James R. Griesemer (1988). With Commentary. Biology and Philosophy 3 (2):179.
     
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