Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics offers a highly distinctive and original approach to the metaphysics of death and applies this approach to contemporary debates in bioethics that address end-of-life and post-mortem issues.
The papers in this special thematic issue of HEC Forum critically and carefully explore key issues at the intersection of patient privacy and commodification. For example, should hospitals be required to secure a person’s consent to any possible uses to which his discarded body parts might be put after his treatment or should it only be concerned with securing his informed consent to his treatment? Should a hospital be required to raise the possibility of the commodification of such (patient-discarded) body (...) parts, or should it only be required to address this issue if the patient asks about it? Should persons be paid to engage in medical research, or should they only be compensated for their time, on the grounds, perhaps, that such payment would be coercive or exploitative, for it might move some persons to agree to participate in research who otherwise would not have done? This number of HEC Forum illustrates the widespread implications of these issues upon which healthcare ethics committees are called to deliberate. (shrink)
It is widely accepted that a person can be harmed by events that occur after her death. The most influential account of how persons can suffer such posthumous harm has been provided by George Pitcher and Joel Feinberg. Yet, despite its influence (or perhaps because of it) the Feinberg-Pitcher account of posthumous harm has been subject to several well-known criticisms. Surprisingly, there has been no attempt to defend this account of posthumous harm against these criticisms, either by philosophers who work (...) on the metaphysics of death or by those who draw upon this account of posthumous harm in their work in other philosophical fields. This paper will rectify this omission, by defending this view against the criticisms it has been subject to—a defense that will both be of intrinsic interest to those who work on the metaphysics of death and that will remedy the lacunae in the wide-ranging philosophical literature that draws upon this account of how posthumous harm is possible. (shrink)
In a recent paper Carol Hay has argued for the conclusion that “a woman who has been sexually harassed has a moral obligation to confront her harasser.” I will argue in this paper that Hay’s arguments for her conclusion are unsound, for they rest on both a misconstrual of the nature of personal autonomy, and a misunderstanding of its relationship to moral responsibility. However, even though Hay’s own arguments do not support her conclusion that women have a duty to resist (...) sexual harassment this conclusion can draw support from arguments that are independent of hers. Women, then, do indeed have a moral obligation to confront those who sexually harass them. (shrink)
In recent years there has been much philosophical discussion over the question of whether the prohibitions on markets in such items as human body parts and gene sequences, and services such as human reproductive labor and sex, should be lifted. Yet despite the attention paid to this issue there are been surprisingly little discussion of the question of whether markets in certain items that are currently freely traded should be restricted or eliminated. In particular, there has been little discussion of (...) the question of whether markets in items that could be readily used to deceive people should be restricted. I argue in this paper that one of the central moral values of the contemporary West – respect for personal autonomy – requires that such markets be restricted. (shrink)
One of the most widespread objections to legalizing a market in human organs is that such legalization would stimulate the black market in human organs. Unfortunately, the proponents of this argument fail to explain how such stimulation will occur. To remedy thus, two accounts of how legalizing markets in human organs could stimulate the black market in them are developed in this paper. Yet although these accounts remedy the lacuna in the anti-market argument from the black market neither of them (...) provide reason to believe that legalizing an organ markets would stimulate the black market in organs. Despite its prevalence, then, the argument from the black market should be rejected. (shrink)
Abstract Although the standard objections to Harry Frankfurt's early hierarchical analysis of identification and its variants are well known, more recent work on identification has yet to be subjected to the same degree of scrutiny. To remedy this I develop in this paper objections to Frankfurt's most recent analysis of identification as satisfaction that he first outlined in his paper ?The Faintest Passion?. With such objections in place I show that they demonstrate that Frankfurt's analysis fails because it is based (...) on the attitudes that the person whose identification with his desires is in question adopts towards them. I then develop a new (objective and cognitive) analysis that avoids the difficulties that Frankfurt's subjective approach is prey to. I conclude by considering and rebutting some preliminary objections to this new analysis. (shrink)