Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics offers a highly distinctive and original approach to the metaphysics of death and applies this approach to contemporary debates in bioethics that address end-of-life and post-mortem issues.
The papers in this special thematic issue of HEC Forum critically and carefully explore key issues at the intersection of patient privacy and commodification. For example, should hospitals be required to secure a person’s consent to any possible uses to which his discarded body parts might be put after his treatment or should it only be concerned with securing his informed consent to his treatment? Should a hospital be required to raise the possibility of the commodification of such (patient-discarded) body (...) parts, or should it only be required to address this issue if the patient asks about it? Should persons be paid to engage in medical research, or should they only be compensated for their time, on the grounds, perhaps, that such payment would be coercive or exploitative, for it might move some persons to agree to participate in research who otherwise would not have done? This number of HEC Forum illustrates the widespread implications of these issues upon which healthcare ethics committees are called to deliberate. (shrink)
James Taylor (2009). Forward. In Jinfen Yan & David E. Schrader (eds.), Creating a Global Dialogue on Value Inquiry: Papers From the Xxii Congress of Philosophy (Rethinking Philosophy Today). Edwin Mellen Press.
Karol Wojtyla’s The Acting Person is devoted to articulating how the experience and structure of action reveals that the person is an objective/subjective unity whose self-fulfillment is achieved by moral praxis. Wojtyla is attempting to harmonize the Boethian-Thomistic definition of man as an individual substance of a rational nature with a modern, phenomenological vision of man as an incommunicable subject. In doing so, he adopts what might be termed a “maximalist” interpretation of Boethius’ definition, an interpretation that understands the basic (...) concepts of substance, rationality, and nature as part of a deeper unity that also includes the aspects of subjectivity, consciousness, and personal love. This unity is revealed through a phenomenological description of action. Wojtyla’s personalist synthesis depends upon establishing the compatibility of the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of human nature with his own phenomenological analysis. This article differentiates Wojtyla’s various uses of the term nature, indicating where he departs from or develops traditional views. Most important is Wojtyla’s conclusion that while the natural order possesses its own integrity, it can only properly be understood in light of the personal order, or the order of love. Love alone integrates the person, enabling him to both fully realize and transcend his natural potentialities. Consequently, the person can only partially be identified with his human nature because his end lies in an order of love beyond the natural realm. —Correspondence to: firstname.lastname@example.org. (shrink)
It is widely accepted that a person can be harmed by events that occur after her death. The most influential account of how persons can suffer such posthumous harm has been provided by George Pitcher and Joel Feinberg. Yet, despite its influence (or perhaps because of it) the Feinberg-Pitcher account of posthumous harm has been subject to several well-known criticisms. Surprisingly, there has been no attempt to defend this account of posthumous harm against these criticisms, either by philosophers who work (...) on the metaphysics of death or by those who draw upon this account of posthumous harm in their work in other philosophical fields. This paper will rectify this omission, by defending this view against the criticisms it has been subject to—a defense that will both be of intrinsic interest to those who work on the metaphysics of death and that will remedy the lacunae in the wide-ranging philosophical literature that draws upon this account of how posthumous harm is possible. (shrink)
Philosophers continue to debate about David Hume’s case against the rationality of belief in miracles. This article clarifies semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical questions addressed in the controversy. It also explains the main premises of Hume’s argument and discusses criticisms of them. The article concludes that one’s evaluation of Hume’s argument will depend on one’s views about (a) the definitions of ’miracle’ and ’natural law’; (b) the type of reasoning one ought to employ to determine the probability that a particular miracle (...) claim is true; and (c) whether reasonable people proportion their beliefs about the occurrence of miracles to their evidence. (shrink)
In Models of God, Ted Peters discusses a methodology for formulating and evaluating models of God, surveys nine models, and proposes one that he entitles Eschatological Panentheism. This paper provides critical comments on Petersâ methodological claims, taxonomy of models of God, and specific proposal. This paper has been delivered during APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.Both Petersâ Models of God and these comments were presented at the Models of God mini-conference at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American (...) Philosophical Association in April of 2007. (shrink)
In a recent paper Carol Hay has argued for the conclusion that “a woman who has been sexually harassed has a moral obligation to confront her harasser.” I will argue in this paper that Hay’s arguments for her conclusion are unsound, for they rest on both a misconstrual of the nature of personal autonomy, and a misunderstanding of its relationship to moral responsibility. However, even though Hay’s own arguments do not support her conclusion that women have a duty to resist (...) sexual harassment this conclusion can draw support from arguments that are independent of hers. Women, then, do indeed have a moral obligation to confront those who sexually harass them. (shrink)
In recent years there has been much philosophical discussion over the question of whether the prohibitions on markets in such items as human body parts and gene sequences, and services such as human reproductive labor and sex, should be lifted. Yet despite the attention paid to this issue there are been surprisingly little discussion of the question of whether markets in certain items that are currently freely traded should be restricted or eliminated. In particular, there has been little discussion of (...) the question of whether markets in items that could be readily used to deceive people should be restricted. I argue in this paper that one of the central moral values of the contemporary West – respect for personal autonomy – requires that such markets be restricted. (shrink)
One of the most widespread objections to legalizing a market in human organs is that such legalization would stimulate the black market in human organs. Unfortunately, the proponents of this argument fail to explain how such stimulation will occur. To remedy thus, two accounts of how legalizing markets in human organs could stimulate the black market in them are developed in this paper. Yet although these accounts remedy the lacuna in the anti-market argument from the black market neither of them (...) provide reason to believe that legalizing an organ markets would stimulate the black market in organs. Despite its prevalence, then, the argument from the black market should be rejected. (shrink)
In Bohmian mechanics elementary particles exist objectively, as point particles moving according to a law determined by a wavefunction. In this context, questions as to whether the particles of a certain species are real---questions such as, Do photons exist? Electrons? Or just the quarks?---have a clear meaning. We explain that, whatever the answer, there is a corresponding Bohm-type theory, and no experiment can ever decide between these theories. Another question that has a clear meaning is whether particles are intrinsically distinguishable, (...) i.e., whether particle world lines have labels indicating the species. We discuss the intriguing possibility that the answer is no, and particles are points---just points. (shrink)
Abstract Although the standard objections to Harry Frankfurt's early hierarchical analysis of identification and its variants are well known, more recent work on identification has yet to be subjected to the same degree of scrutiny. To remedy this I develop in this paper objections to Frankfurt's most recent analysis of identification as satisfaction that he first outlined in his paper ?The Faintest Passion?. With such objections in place I show that they demonstrate that Frankfurt's analysis fails because it is based (...) on the attitudes that the person whose identification with his desires is in question adopts towards them. I then develop a new (objective and cognitive) analysis that avoids the difficulties that Frankfurt's subjective approach is prey to. I conclude by considering and rebutting some preliminary objections to this new analysis. (shrink)
The main thesis of this paper is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from scientific psychological investigation. I call this view the strong thesis of methodological psychologism. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of at least one justified belief a psychological capacity which humans do not have. That is, the correct account of epistemic (...) justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from scientific psychological investigation. After defending these subtheses, I point out some interesting consequences of the overall thesis which present a challenge to traditional epistemology. (shrink)