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James W. Garson [44]James Warfield Garson [1]
  1.  11
    Joshua D. K. Brown & James W. Garson (forthcoming). A New Semantics for Vagueness. Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Intuitively, vagueness involves some sort of indeterminacy: if Plato is a borderline case of baldness, then there is no fact of the matter about whether or not he’s bald—he’s neither bald nor not bald. The leading formal treatments of such indeterminacy—three valued logic, supervaluationism, etc.—either fail to validate the classical theorems, or require that various classically valid inference rules be restricted. Here we show how a fully classical, yet indeterminist account of vagueness can be given within natural semantics, an alternative (...)
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  2. James W. Garson (2013). What Logics Mean: From Proof Theory to Model-Theoretic Semantics. Cambridge University Press.
    What do the rules of logic say about the meanings of the symbols they govern? In this book, James W. Garson examines the inferential behaviour of logical connectives, whose behaviour is defined by strict rules, and proves definitive results concerning exactly what those rules express about connective truth conditions. He explores the ways in which, depending on circumstances, a system of rules may provide no interpretation of a connective at all, or the interpretation we ordinarily expect for it, or an (...)
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  3.  28
    James W. Garson (2009). Modal Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  4.  31
    James W. Garson (2006). Modal Logic for Philosophers. Cambridge University Press.
    Designed for use by philosophy students, this book provides an accessible, yet technically sound treatment of modal logic and its philosophical applications. Every effort has been made to simplify the presentation by using diagrams in place of more complex mathematical apparatus. These and other innovations provide philosophers with easy access to a rich variety of topics in modal logic, including a full coverage of quantified modal logic, non-rigid designators, definite descriptions, and the de-re de-dictio distinction. Discussion of philosophical issues concerning (...)
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  5. James W. Garson (2013). Modal Logic for Philosophers. Cambridge University Press.
    This book on modal logic is especially designed for philosophy students. It provides an accessible yet technically sound treatment of modal logic and its philosophical applications. Every effort is made to simplify the presentation by using diagrams instead of more complex mathematical apparatus. These and other innovations provide philosophers with easy access to a rich variety of topics in modal logic, including a full coverage of quantified modal logic, non-rigid designators, definite descriptions, and the de-re de-dicto distinction. Discussion of philosophical (...)
     
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  6.  96
    James W. Garson (2005). Unifying Quantified Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5/6):621-649.
    Quantified modal logic has reputation for complexity. Completeness results for the various systems appear piecemeal. Different tactics are used for different systems, and success of a given method seems sensitive to many factors, including the specific combination of choices made for the quantifiers, terms, identity, and the strength of the underlying propositional modal logic. The lack of a unified framework in which to view QMLs and their completeness properties puts pressure on those who develop, apply, and teach QML to work (...)
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  7.  26
    James W. Garson (1996). Cognition Poised at the Edge of Chaos: A Complex Alternative to a Symbolic Mind. Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):301-22.
    This paper explores a line of argument against the classical paradigm in cognitive science that is based upon properties of non-linear dynamical systems, especially in their chaotic and near-chaotic behavior. Systems of this kind are capable of generating information-rich macro behavior that could be useful to cognition. I argue that a brain operating at the edge of chaos could generate high-complexity cognition in this way. If this hypothesis is correct, then the symbolic processing methodology in cognitive science faces serious obstacles. (...)
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  8.  33
    James W. Garson (2001). Natural Semantics: Why Natural Deduction is Intuitionistic. Theoria 67 (2):114-139.
    In this paper investigates how natural deduction rules define connective meaning by presenting a new method for reading semantical conditions from rules called natural semantics. Natural semantics explains why the natural deduction rules are profoundly intuitionistic. Rules for conjunction, implication, disjunction and equivalence all express intuitionistic rather than classical truth conditions. Furthermore, standard rules for negation violate essential conservation requirements for having a natural semantics. The standard rules simply do not assign a meaning to the negation sign. Intuitionistic negation fares (...)
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  9.  66
    James W. Garson (1994). Cognition Without Classical Architecture. Synthese 100 (2):291-306.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) argue that any successful model of cognition must use classical architecture; it must depend upon rule-based processing sensitive to constituent structure. This claim is central to their defense of classical AI against the recent enthusiasm for connectionism. Connectionist nets, they contend, may serve as theories of the implementation of cognition, but never as proper theories of psychology. Connectionist models are doomed to describing the brain at the wrong level, leaving the classical view to account for the (...)
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  10.  60
    James W. Garson (1995). Chaos and Free Will. Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):365-74.
    This paper explores the possibility that chaos theory might be helpful in explaining free will. I will argue that chaos has little to offer if we construe its role as to resolve the apparent conflict between determinism and freedom. However, I contend that the fundamental problem of freedom is to find a way to preserve intuitions about rational action in a physical brain. New work on dynamic computation provides a framework for viewing free choice as a process that is sensitive (...)
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  11.  73
    James W. Garson (2001). (Dis)Solving the Binding Problem. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):381 – 392.
    The binding problem is to explain how information processed by different sensory systems is brought together to unify perception. The problem has two sides. First, we want to explain phenomenal binding: the fact that we experience a single world rather than separate perceptual fields for each sensory modality. Second, we must solve a functional problem: to explain how a neural net like the brain links instances to types. I argue that phenomenal binding and functional binding require very different treatments. The (...)
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  12. James W. Garson (2005). Unifying Quantified Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5-6):621-649.
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  13.  72
    James W. Garson (2010). Expressive Power and Incompleteness of Propositional Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2):159-171.
    Natural deduction systems were motivated by the desire to define the meaning of each connective by specifying how it is introduced and eliminated from inference. In one sense, this attempt fails, for it is well known that propositional logic rules underdetermine the classical truth tables. Natural deduction rules are too weak to enforce the intended readings of the connectives; they allow non-standard models. Two reactions to this phenomenon appear in the literature. One is to try to restore the standard readings, (...)
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  14.  21
    James W. Garson (1994). No Representations Without Rules: The Prospects for a Compromise Between Paradigms in Cognitive Science. Mind and Language 9 (1):25-37.
  15.  14
    James W. Garson (1973). Indefinite Topological Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1):102 - 118.
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  16.  7
    James W. Garson (1973). The Completeness of an Intensional Logic: Definite Topological Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14 (2):175-184.
  17.  37
    James W. Garson (2006). Review of Ernest Lepore, Kirk Ludwig, Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (2).
    Over the last forty years, Donald Davidson has been one of the most influential, but least accessible voices in philosophy. There are several reasons why it is hard to come to grips with his work. First, his language is dense, even by the standards of analytic philosophy; while at the same time his thought is highly organic, so that it is difficult to make sense of one idea without an understanding of his whole program. Davidson never attempted to write a (...)
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  18.  8
    James W. Garson (1998). Why Dynamical Implementation Matters. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):641-642.
    Another objection to the dynamical hypothesis is explored. To resolve it completely, one must focus more directly on an area not emphasized in van Gelder's discussion: the contributions of dynamical systems theory to understanding how cognition is neutrally implemented.
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  19.  36
    James W. Garson (2003). Simulation and Connectionism: What is the Connection? Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):499-515.
    Simulation has emerged as an increasingly popular account of folk psychological (FP) talents at mind-reading: predicting and explaining human mental states. Where its rival (the theory-theory) postulates that these abilities are explained by mastery of laws describing the connections between beliefs, desires, and action, simulation theory proposes that we mind-read by "putting ourselves in another's shoes." This paper concerns connectionist architecture and the debate between simulation theory (ST) and the theory-theory (TT). It is only natural to associate TT with classical (...)
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  20.  33
    James W. Garson (1998). Chaotic Emergence and the Language of Thought. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):303-315.
    The purpose of this paper is to explore the merits of the idea that dynamical systems theory (also known as chaos theory) provides a model of the mind that can vindicate the language of thought (LOT). I investigate the nature of emergent structure in dynamical systems to assess its compatibility with causally efficacious syntactic structure in the brain. I will argue that anyone who is committed to the idea that the brain's functioning depends on emergent features of dynamical systems should (...)
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  21.  14
    Nicholas Rescher & James W. Garson (1967). A Note on Chronological Logic. Theoria 33 (1):39-44.
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  22.  16
    James W. Garson (1969). Here and Now. The Monist 53 (3):469-477.
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  23. James W. Garson (1978). Completeness of some quantified modal logics. Logique Et Analyse 21 (82):153.
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  24.  11
    James W. Garson (1978). Investigations in Modal and Tense Logics with Applications to Problems in Philosophy and Linguistics. International Studies in Philosophy 10:190-192.
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  25.  12
    James W. Garson (1974). The Substitution Interpretation in Topological Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1/2):109 - 132.
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  26. James W. Garson (1987). Review: Stuart M. Shieber, An Introduction to Unification-Based Approaches to Grammar. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (4):1052-1054.
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  27.  9
    James W. Garson (1978). Imperatives and Their Logics. New Scholasticism 52 (4):595-598.
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  28.  17
    James W. Garson (1998). A Commentary on "Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap". Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):169-172.
  29.  13
    James W. Garson (1980). The Unaxiomatizability of a Quantified Intensional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (1):59 - 72.
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  30.  2
    James W. Garson (1993). Must We Solve the Binding Problem in Neural Hardware? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):459.
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  31.  3
    James W. Garson (1991). What Connectionists Cannot Do: The Threat to Classical AI. In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer 113--142.
  32.  11
    James W. Garson (1997). Syntax in a Dynamic Brain. Synthese 110 (3):343-55.
    Proponents of the language of thought (LOT) thesis are realists when it comes to syntactically structured representations, and must defend their view against instrumentalists, who would claim that syntactic structures may be useful in describing cognition, but have no more causal powers in governing cognition than do the equations of physics in guiding the planets. This paper explores what it will take to provide an argument for LOT that can defend its conclusion from instrumentalism. I illustrate a difficulty in this (...)
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  33. James W. Garson (1991). Leonard Angel, How to Build a Conscious Machine Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 11 (1):8-10.
     
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  34.  2
    James W. Garson (1990). Categorical Semantics. In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences. Kluwer 155--175.
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  35.  4
    James W. Garson & Paul Mellema (1980). Computer-Assisted Instruction in Logic. Teaching Philosophy 3 (4):453-478.
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  36.  5
    James W. Garson (1979). The Substitution Interpretation and the Expressive Power of Intensional Logics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (4):858-864.
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  37.  1
    James W. Garson (1993). Mice in Mirrored Mazes and the Mind. Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):123-34.
    The computational theory of cognition (CTC) holds that the mind is akin to computer software. This article aims to show that CTC is incorrect because it is not able to distinguish the ability to solve a maze from the ability to solve its mirror image. CTC cannot do so because it only individuates brain states up to isomorphism. It is shown that a finer individuation that would distinguish left-handed from right-handed abilities is not compatible with CTC. The view is explored (...)
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  38.  1
    James W. Garson (1973). Review: Aldo Bressan, Metodo di Assiomatizzazione in Senso Stretto Della Meccannica Classica Applicazione di Esso ad Alcuni Problem di Assiomatizzazione non Ancora Completamente Risolti. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (1):144-145.
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  39. James W. Garson (2002). Evolution, Consciousness, and the Language of Thought. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins
  40. James W. Garson (2010). Expressive Power and Incompleteness of Propositional Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2):159-171.
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  41. James W. Garson (1979). Free topological logic. Logique Et Analyse 22 (88):453.
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  42. James W. Garson (2011). Modal Logic for Philosophers. Cambridge University Press.
    Designed for use by philosophy students, this 2006 book provides an accessible, yet technically sound treatment of modal logic and its philosophical applications. Every effort has been made to simplify the presentation by using diagrams in place of more complex mathematical apparatus. These and other innovations provide philosophers with easy access to a rich variety of topics in modal logic, including a full coverage of quantified modal logic, non-rigid designators, definite descriptions, and the de-re de-dictio distinction. Discussion of philosophical issues (...)
     
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  43. James W. Garson (2010). Modal Logic for Philosophers. Cambridge University Press.
    Designed for use by philosophy students, this 2006 book provides an accessible, yet technically sound treatment of modal logic and its philosophical applications. Every effort has been made to simplify the presentation by using diagrams in place of more complex mathematical apparatus. These and other innovations provide philosophers with easy access to a rich variety of topics in modal logic, including a full coverage of quantified modal logic, non-rigid designators, definite descriptions, and the de-re de-dictio distinction. Discussion of philosophical issues (...)
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  44. James W. Garson (1999). Terence Horgan and John Tienson Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50:319-323.
     
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