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Profile: Jan Heylen (KU Leuven)
  1. Jan Heylen (2010). Descriptions and Unknowability. Analysis 70 (1):50-52.
    In a recent paper Horsten embarked on a journey along the limits of the domain of the unknowable. Rather than knowability simpliciter, he considered a priori knowability, and by the latter he meant absolute provability, i.e. provability that is not relativized to a formal system. He presented an argument for the conclusion that it is not absolutely provable that there is a natural number of which it is true but absolutely unprovable that it has a certain property. The argument depends (...)
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  2.  46
    Jan Heylen (2016). Russell's Revenge: A Problem for Bivalent Fregean Theories of Descriptions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Fregean theories of descriptions as terms have to deal with improper descriptions. To save bivalence various proposals have been made that involve assigning referents to improper descriptions. While bivalence is indeed saved, there is a price to be paid. Instantiations of the same general scheme, viz. the one and only individual that is F and G is G, are not only allowed but even required to have different truth values.
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  3.  14
    Jan Heylen (2010). Carnap’s Theory of Descriptions and its Problems. Studia Logica 94 (3):355-380.
    Carnap's theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum. The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap's theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.
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  4.  59
    Jan Heylen (2016). Being in a Position to Know and Closure. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):63-67.
    The focus of this article is the question whether the notion of being in a position to know is closed under modus ponens. The question is answered negatively.
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  5. Jan Heylen (2010). Carnap's Theory of Descriptions and its Problems. Studia Logica 94 (3):355-380.
    Carnap's theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum . The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap's theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.
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  6.  19
    Jan Heylen (forthcoming). Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? A Logical Investigation. Erkenntnis:1-29.
    From Leibniz to Krauss philosophers and scientists have raised the question as to why there is something rather than nothing. Why-questions request a type of explanation and this is often thought to include a deductive component. With classical logic in the background only trivial answers are forthcoming. With free logics in the background, be they of the negative, positive or neutral variety, only question-begging answers are to be expected. The same conclusion is reached for the modal version of the Question, (...)
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  7.  49
    Jan Heylen (2015). Closure of A Priori Knowability Under A Priori Knowable Material Implication. Erkenntnis 80 (2):359-380.
    The topic of this article is the closure of a priori knowability under a priori knowable material implication: if a material conditional is a priori knowable and if the antecedent is a priori knowable, then the consequent is a priori knowable as well. This principle is arguably correct under certain conditions, but there is at least one counterexample when completely unrestricted. To deal with this, Anderson proposes to restrict the closure principle to necessary truths and Horsten suggests to restrict it (...)
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  8.  92
    Jan Heylen (2013). Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic and the Problem of Quantifying In. Synthese 190 (1):89-111.
    The subject of this article is Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic (MEA), a theory introduced by Horsten to interpret Epistemic Arithmetic (EA), which in turn was introduced by Shapiro to interpret Heyting Arithmetic. I will show how to interpret MEA in EA such that one can prove that the interpretation of EA is MEA is faithful. Moreover, I will show that one can get rid of a particular Platonist assumption. Then I will discuss models for MEA in light of the problems of logical (...)
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  9.  49
    Jan Heylen (2016). Counterfactual Theories of Knowledge and the Notion of Actuality. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1647-1673.
    The central question of this article is how to combine counterfactual theories of knowledge with the notion of actuality. It is argued that the straightforward combination of these two elements leads to problems, viz. the problem of easy knowledge and the problem of missing knowledge. In other words, there is overgeneration of knowledge and there is undergeneration of knowledge. The combination of these problems cannot be solved by appealing to methods by which beliefs are formed. An alternative solution is put (...)
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  10. Jan Heylen & Leon Horsten (2006). Strict Conditionals: A Negative Result. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):536–549.
    Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis' notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. We show that Lowe's notion of implication does not achieve this aim, and offer a general argument to demonstrate that no other variation on Lewis' notion of constantly strict implication describes the logical behaviour of natural-language conditionals in a satisfactory way.
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  11.  38
    Jan Heylen (forthcoming). The Epistemic Significance of Numerals. Synthese:1-27.
    The central topic of this article is de re knowledge about natural numbers and its relation with names for numbers. It is held by several prominent philosophers that numerals are eligible for existential quantification in epistemic contexts, whereas other names for natural numbers are not. In other words, numerals are intimately linked with de re knowledge about natural numbers, whereas the other names for natural numbers are not. In this article I am looking for an explanation of this phenomenon. It (...)
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  12.  20
    Lorenz Demey & Jan Heylen (2013). Syntactical Treatment of Modalities, 6 February. The Reasoner 7 (4):45-45.
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  13.  13
    Jan Heylen (2007). Nicholas Rescher, Realism and Pragmatic Epistemology. Pittsburgh (PA), University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (1):162-164.
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  14.  11
    Jan Heylen (2007). Nicholas Rescher, Cognitive Harmony. The Role of Systemic Harmony in the Constitution of Knowledge. Pittsburgh (PA), University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (2):373-374.
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  15.  10
    Jan Heylen (2004). Lieven Decock, Trading Ontology for Ideology. The Interplay of Logic, Set Theory and Semantics in Quine's Philosophy (Synthese Library, Vol. 313). Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. [REVIEW] Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):370-371.
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  16.  8
    Jan Heylen (2006). Nicholas Rescher, Epistemic Logic. A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. [REVIEW] Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (3):644-646.
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  17.  4
    Jan Heylen (2007). Bremmer, R., Ten Kate, L., Warrink, E.(red.), Encyclopedie van de Filosofie. Van de Oudheid tot vandaag. Termen, begrippen, namen en stromingen. Amsterdam, Boom, 2007. [REVIEW] Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 99 (4):313-315.
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  18. Jan Heylen (2007). Encyclopedie van de Filosofie. [REVIEW] Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 4.
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  19. Jan Heylen (2007). Gerecenseerde Werken-Boekbesprekingen-Rescher, N., Cognitive Harmony. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (1):165.
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