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Profile: Jan Palkoska (Charles University, Prague)
  1. Jan Palkoska (2012). Are Humean Beliefs Pyrrhonian Appearances? Hume's Critique of Pyrrhonism Revisited. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):183-198.
    The aim of the paper is to reassess Hume's handling of scepticism in its Pyrrhonian form. I argue that, contrary to what Hume declares, his own philosophy comes close to what Sextus Empiricus sets out as the essential moments of the Pyrrhonian , at least in one crucial respect: I contend that Hume's conception of belief is in line with precisely the type of doxastic state which Sextus ascribes to the Pyrrhonian sceptic as appropriate for ‘following appearances’. Then I show (...)
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  2. Jan Palkoska (2012). „Res illa quae cognoscitur“ v Suárezových Metafyzických disputacích Odpověď na kritickou poznámku Daniela Heidera „K objektivnímu bytí u Suáreze“. Studia Neoaristotelica 9 (3):93-105.
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  3. Jan Palkoska (2010). Descartova ontologie mentální reprezentace a otázka Suárezova vlivu. Studia Neoaristotelica 7 (1):28-48.
    The Ontology of Mental Representation in Descartes and the Problem of Suárez’s InfluenceThe aim of the article is to critically assess the widespread surmise according to which Descartes was in certain important aspects of his thought infl uenced by Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations. In the article this question is addressed with regard to the problem of the ontological background of the representational acts of a finite mind. Descartes’ position is reconstructed on the basis of an analysis of Meditation III and consequently (...)
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  4. Jan Palkoska (2005). „Corpus non est Substantia, sed modus tantum Entis“ leibniz o fenomenalitě látkového světa. Studia Neoaristotelica 2 (1):39-66.
    „Corpus non est Substantia se modus tantum Entis“: Leibniz de mundo materiali ut mero phaenomenoFinis huiusce dissertationis est, argumentationes ac discursus praecipuos, quibus Leibniz usus est ad sententiam suam stabiliendam circa „statum ontologicum“ rerum materialium (seu corporum) necnon ipsam materiam, prae oculis ponere atque analysi subicere. Duo accurate statuuntur ac explicantur: primo, duplex Leibnizii via argumentandi (viae scil., ut aiunt, „epistemica“ et „realistica“) pro thesi, quod nihil materiale, nec a fortiori ullum corpus, rigore metaphysico substantia vocari possit; secundo, propositiones ipsius, (...)
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