4 found
  1. Jan Sleutels (2006). Greek Zombies. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):177-197.
    This paper explores the possibility that the human mind underwent substantial changes in recent history. Assuming that consciousness is a substantial trait of the mind, the paper focuses on the suggestion made by Julian Jaynes that the Mycenean Greeks had a "bicameral" mind instead of a conscious one. The suggestion is commonly dismissed as patently absurd, for instance by critics such as Ned Block. A closer examination of the intuitions involved, considered from different theoretical angles , reveals that the idea (...)
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    Jan Sleutels (2013). The Flinstones Fallacy. Dialogue and Universalism 23 (1):65-75.
    A leading idea in evolutionary psychology and philosophy of mind is that the basic architecture and dynamics of the mind are very old, presumably dating back to the Stone Age. Theories based on this idea are liable to paint a caricature of our ancestors by projecting our modern self-conception onto earlier minds. I argue that this ‘Flintstones Fallacy’ is an underrated risk, relieved neither by standard biological arguments nor by arguments from psychology and philosophy. Indeed, each of these fields has (...)
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    Jan Sleutels (2009). Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):233 – 236.
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    Jan Sleutels (1998). Phenomenal Consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, Naturalism and Perceptual Plasticity. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 31 (1):21-55.