Online research in philosophy

Is sex between people with "mental retardation" morally permissible and, if at all, under what conditions? This paper tries to answer this question, but only with regard to sex between biologically mature individuals with mild or moderate mental retardation. First, the concepts of "sexual activity" and "mental retardation" are analysed briefly, which is challenging given the widely divergent and sometimes rather awkward definitions of these concepts. On the basis of this analysis, it is argued that the liberal principle of mutual (...) consent, if taken as a necessary condition of permissible sex, has unacceptable consequences for people with mental retardation. Many forms of sex between them would be morally impermissible, given the fact that their limited powers of practical reasoning will often make valid consent well-nigh impossible. As an alternative to the liberal principle of permissible sex, conditions are specified that include the additional consent of caretakers. If people with mental retardation do not have the capacities of practical deliberation required for valid consent, care providers with mature reasoning powers should act as their substitutes. Finally, some important implications for the moral education of future care professionals are spelled out. (shrink)

This response argues that Greenspan's comment is basically incoherent, and that the position taken by Leicester and Cooke has unacceptable practical consequences. Greenspan admits that many people with 'mental retardation' lack adult decision-making capacities, but at the same time assumes that they have these very capacities in assigning them freedom rights. Leicester and Cooke consistently argue that people with 'mental retardation' do have adult reasoning powers and therefore should be given freedom rights. But this position has the rather disquieting implication (...) that both the practice of treating 'mental retardation' as an exempting condition and the practice of giving them important special welfare rights seem to loose their justification. (shrink)

The authority of educators in general, and the authority of the moral educator in particular, are central and pervasive themes in John Wilson's writings. This paper summarises his account of authority in educational relationships, not simply by describing the results of his analysis, but by reconstructing his views in terms of some basic distinctions between different types of authority, in particular the distinction between practical and theoretical authority, and the one between de jure and de facto authority. Next, the paper (...) explores the rather neglected topic of parental authority, applying the same distinctions between basic types of authority. It is argued that the authority of the parent is in important respects different from the authority standardly ascribed to the teacher. Finally, some comments are made on the complex question of whether or not authoritative parental supervision is essential to the upbringing of children and their growth into adult people. (shrink)

Abstract In our society adults who are guilty of having sex with prepubescent children often have a paedophile disposition. This paper first criticises the justifications that are given by paedophiles for having sex with children. Part of this criticism is a brief analysis of ?sexual desire? and ?erotic?. Next, the question is raised whether paedophile activities can ever be morally permissible. Using the principles of mutual consent and non?exploitation as touchstone, the question is answered in the negative. Finally, it is (...) examined whether paedophile desires can be regarded as perverse. In order to deal with this issue a moral conception of perversions is proposed. (shrink)

Intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, clarity, intellectual honesty and the willingness to participate in rational discussions, are conceived as important aims of education. In this paper an attempt is made to clarify the specific nature of intellectual virtues. Firstly, the intellectual virtues are systematically compared with moral virtues. The upshot is that considering a trait of character to be an intellectual virtue implies assuming that such a trait can be derived from, or is a specification of, the cardinal virtue of concern (...) and respect for truth. Secondly, several (possible) misconceptions of intellectual virtues are avoided by making the required distinctions. For example, it is argued that our concept of an intellectual virtue should not be confused with a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness. (shrink)

Abstract In a recent paper Richard Barrett criticises Solomon (and the so?called cognitivists in general) for dismissing irrational emotions as marginal and atypical. This paper argues that Barrett's criticism is unwarranted. Two explanations are suggested for his misconception of Solomon's view (and, more generally, of the cognitive view) on irrational emotions. First, Barrett mistakenly conceives the reconciliation of emotion and reason as a conciliation of emotion and rationality in an evaluative or normative sense. Secondly, Barrett disregards the difference between the (...) cognitive conception of (ir)rationality and his own definition of (ir)rationality in terms of coping. Some implications of the argument for the education of (moral) emotions are spelled out. (shrink)

Abstract Recently two members of the Dutch government, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Education and Science, have stressed publicly the importance of ?the transmission of norms and values?. In this paper their public statements are evaluated from the perspective of a liberal conception of civic education. Such an assessment seems to be fair, since both people are, in their public role as ministers, key representatives of a liberal constitutional state. First, a brief analysis of the concept of (...) civic education is presented. Subsequently, an explanation of the central aims of liberal education for citizenship is given. Finally, the educational statements of the ministers are tested against the explained liberal conception. (shrink)

Abstract Most parents value highly their children growing up to be just, sincere, reliable, kind and helpful people. This string of adjectives refers to certain qualities of character which are also called virtues. In this paper, I shall subject the typical motives (wants and aversions) of the virtuous human being to a conceptual investigation. Based on the results of this analysis, it will be possible to draw up an inventory of a number of important tasks educators face if they wish (...) to cultivate virtuousness in children. 1. This article is a revised version of some parts of previously published essays (Steutel, 1984; Steutel (Ed), 1984, pp.39?67). (shrink)