18 found
Jane L. Mcintyre [17]Jane Lipsky Mcintyre [1]
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Profile: Jane L McIntyre (Cleveland State University)
  1.  18
    Jane L. McIntyre (2000). Hume' Passions: Direct and Indirect. Hume Studies 26 (1):77-86.
  2.  52
    Jane L. Mcintyre (2006). Strength of Mind: Prospects and Problems for a Humean Account. [REVIEW] Synthese 152 (3):393 - 401.
    References to strength of mind, a character trait implying “the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent”, occur in a number of important discussions of motivation in the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Nevertheless, Hume says surprisingly little about what strength of mind is, or how it is achieved. This paper argues that Hume’s theory of the passions can provide an interesting and defensible account of strength of mind. The paper concludes with a brief comparison (...)
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  3.  7
    Jane L. McIntyre (2006). Hume's “New and Extraordinary” Account of the Passions. In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise. Blackwell Pub. 199--215.
  4.  16
    Jane L. McIntyre (1990). Character: A Humean Account. History of Philosophy Quarterly 7 (2):193 - 206.
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  5.  52
    Jane L. McIntyre (1989). Personal Identity and the Passions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4):545-557.
  6.  10
    Jane L. Mcintyre (1993). Norms for a Reflective Naturalist: A Review of Annette Baier's A Progress of Sentiments. [REVIEW] Hume Studies 19 (2):317-323.
  7.  9
    Jane L. McIntyre (2010). Hume' Passions. Hume Studies 26 (1):77-86.
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  8.  14
    Jane L. McIntyre (1994). Hume: Second Newton of the Moral Sciences. Hume Studies 20 (1):3-18.
  9.  17
    Jane L. McIntyre (1993). Norms for a Reflective Naturalist. [REVIEW] Hume Studies 19 (2):317-323.
  10.  9
    Jane L. McIntyre (1979). Further Remarks on the Consistency of Hume's Account of the Self. Hume Studies 5 (1):55-61.
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  11. Jane L. McIntyre (1999). Passion and Artifice in Hume's Account of Superstition'. In D. Z. Phillips & Timothy Tessin (eds.), Religion and Hume's Legacy. St. Martin's Press, Scholarly and Reference Division 171--84.
  12.  8
    Jane L. McIntyre (2003). “So Great a Question”: A Critical Study of Raymond Martin and John Barresi: Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century. Hume Studies 29 (2):363-373.
  13.  8
    Jane L. McIntyre (1995). The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (2):346-348.
  14.  12
    Jane L. McIntyre (1983). Chisholm on Indirect Attribution. Philosophical Studies 43 (3):409 - 414.
    In "the first person" chisholm argues that the primary form of belief is non-Propositional belief about oneself. Belief about others is essentially indirect, Mediated by the attribution of a property to oneself. In this paper I argue that chisholm's account cannot give a non-Circular explanation of various plausible examples of "de re" belief.
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  15.  8
    Jane L. McIntyre (1978). The Role of Temporal Adverbs in Statements About Persons. Noûs 12 (4):443-461.
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  16. Jane L. Mcintyre (2009). Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity. In David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Anne Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge University Press
  17. Jane Lipsky Mcintyre (1973). New Perspectives on Locke and Personal Identity. Dissertation, Stanford University
  18. Jane L. Mcintyre (1985). The Connection Between Impressions and Ideas. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 11:9.
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