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Profile: Jane Suilin Lavelle (University of Edinburgh)
  1. G. S. Botterill & Jane Suilin Lavelle (forthcoming). The Absent Relata Problem: Can Absences and Omissions Really Be Causes? Dialectica.
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  2. Matthew Chrisman, Duncan Pritchard, Jane Suilin Lavelle, Michela Massimi, Alasdair Richmond & Dave Ward (2013). Philosophy for Everyone. Routledge.
    Philosophy for Everyone begins by explaining what philosophy is before exploring the questions and issues at the foundation of this important subject. Key topics and their areas of focus include: Epistemology - what our knowledge of the world and ourselves consists in, and how we come to have it; Philosophy of Science - foundational conceptual issues in scientific research and practice; Philosophy of Mind - what it means for something to have a mind, and how minds should be understood and (...)
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  3. Jane Suilin Lavelle, George Botterill & Suzanne Lock (2013). Contrastive Explanation and the Many Absences Problem. Synthese 190 (16):3495-3510.
    We often explain by citing an absence or an omission. Apart from the problem of assigning a causal role to such apparently negative factors as absences and omissions, there is a puzzle as to why only some absences and omissions, out of indefinitely many, should figure in explanations. In this paper we solve this ’many absences problem’ by using the contrastive model of explanation. The contrastive model of explanation is developed by adapting Peter Lipton’s account. What initially appears to be (...)
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  4. Jane Suilin Lavelle (2012). Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):213-230.
    Philosophers and psychologists have often maintained that in order to attribute mental states to other people one must have a ‘theory of mind’. This theory facilitates our grasp of other people’s mental states. Debate has then focussed on the form this theory should take. Recently a new approach has been suggested, which I call the ‘Direct Perception approach to social cognition’. This approach maintains that we can directly perceive other people’s mental states. It opposes traditional views on two counts: by (...)
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  5. Jane Suilin Lavelle (2012). Two Challenges to Hutto's Enactive Account of Pre-Linguistic Social Cognition. Philosophia 40 (3):459-472.
    Daniel Hutto’s Enactive account of social cognition maintains that pre- and non-linguistic interactions do not require that the participants represent the psychological states of the other. This goes against traditional ‘cognitivist’ accounts of these social phenomena. This essay examines Hutto’s Enactive account, and proposes two challenges. The account maintains that organisms respond to the behaviours of others, and in doing so respond to the ‘intentional attitude’ which the other has. The first challenge argues that there is no adequate account of (...)
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