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  1.  2
    Andraž Stožer & Janez Bregant (forthcoming). Physicalist and Dispositionalist Views on Colour: A Physiological Objection. Acta Analytica:1-21.
    Using the results of the latest neurophysiological research on colour, the article rejects outright physicalism and dispositionalism as appropriate approaches to solving the problem of colour realism. Physicalism sees colour as a real property of objects, i.e. the reflectance profile, while dispositionalism takes subjects, objects and light as necessary elements for colour production. First, it briefly outlines the historical development of the theory of colour, pointing towards dispositionalism which, in some sense, considers colour as a real entity of the world, (...)
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  2.  35
    Janez Bregant (2011). Paul Churchland, Neurophilosophy at Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 249 Pp. [REVIEW] Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1 (31)):128-132.
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  3.  61
    Janez Bregant (2004). Van Gulick's Solution of the Exclusion Problem Revisited. Acta Analytica 19 (33):83-94.
    The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and (...)
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  4.  57
    Janez Bregant, Andraž Stožer & Marko Cerkvenik (2010). Molecular Reduction: Reality or Fiction? [REVIEW] Synthese 172 (3):437 - 450.
    Neurophysiological research suggests our mental life is related to the cellular processes of particular nerves. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, some authors take these connections as reductions of psychological terms and kinds to molecular- biological mechanisms and patterns. Bickle’s ‘intervene cellularly/molecularly and track behaviourally’ reduction is one example of this. Here the mental is being reduced to the physical in two steps. The first is, through genetically altered mammals, to causally alter activity of particular nerve cells, i.e. neurons, at (...)
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  5.  47
    Janez Bregant (2003). The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.
    It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation that rests on supervenience is an attractive theory. On the one hand, it secures uniqueness of the mental; on the other hand, it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalist view. However, Kim reminds us that anti-reductionists face the following dilemma: either mental properties have causal powers or they do not. If they have them, we risk a violation of (...)
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  6. Janez Bregant (2006). John Bickle, Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16:133-140.
     
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  7.  17
    Janez Bregant (2009). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):219-232.
    The article critically examines Jaegwon Kim’s book Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). It recognizes the »near enough type of physicalism« involving functional reduction and covering the relational properties of qualia. Its intrinsic qualites are left out, but since it is qualia’s differences and similarities that matter, i.e. which affect our cognition and behaviour, this is, according to Kim, “no big loss”. While appreciating the book’s effort to offer an intelligible physicalistic theory of the world, the (...)
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  8.  15
    Janez Bregant (2006). Philosophy and Neuroscience. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):133-140.
  9.  2
    Janez Bregant (2007). The Limits of Functional Reduction. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (1):219-229.
    It is obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation, which considers mental phenomena to be causally efficacious, is so attractive: it preserves the unique nature of the mental , while at the same time it tries to secure a place for the mental in our world which is compatible with a physicalist ideology . But Kim’s so called argument from supervenience reminds us of the dilemma that we face while favouring antireductionist solutions of mental causation which might force us (...)
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  10.  1
    Janez Bregant (2007). Die Grenzen der funktionalen Reduktion. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (1):219-229.
    Es liegt auf der Hand, warum das antireduktionistische Bild der mentalen Verursachung, die mentale Phänomene für kausal wirkungsvoll hält, so attraktiv ist: Es bewahrt die einmalige Natur des Mentalen , während es gleichzeitig dem Mentalen in unserer Welt seinen Platz zu sichern sucht, was mit der physikalistischen Ideologie kompatibel ist. Doch Kims so genanntes Supervenienzargument erinnert an das Dilemma, dem wir begegnen, wenn wir antireduktionistischen Lösungen der mentalen Verursachung den Vorzug geben, was uns dazu zwingen kann, diese aufzugeben, um nach (...)
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  11. Janez Bregant (2012). In Brain We Trust. Prolegomena 11 (2):283-296.
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  12. Janez Bregant (2007). Les Limites de la Réduction Fonctionnelle. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (1):219-229.
    Il est évident pourquoi l`image antiréductionniste de la causalité mentale, selon laquelle les phénomènes mentaux sont considérés comme des causes efficientes est si attirante : elle préserve la nature unique du mental , tout en essayant d`assurer la place pour le mental dans notre monde, ce qui est compatible à l`idéologie physicaliste . Mais le soi disant argument de Kim provenant de la survenance nous rappelle le dilemme auquel nous devons faire face lorsque nous favorisons les solutions antiréductionnistes de la (...)
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  13. Janez Bregant (2004). Misel Kot Vzrok: Ali so Mentalna Stanja Vzročno Učinkovita? Pedagoška Fakulteta.
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  14. Janez Bregant, Andraž Stožer & Marko Cerkvenik (2010). Molecular Reduction: Reality or Fiction? Synthese 172 (3):437-450.
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