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Profile: Jani Hakkarainen (University of Tampere)
  1. Markku Keinänen, Jani Hakkarainen & Antti Keskinen (2016). Why Realists Need Tropes. Metaphysica 17 (1):69-85.
    We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a Neo-Aristotelian ontology involving tropes instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists should adopt the relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or convert to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. Instantiation of property universals by tropes and characterization or inherence between tropes and objects are more (...)
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  2.  22
    Jani Hakkarainen & Markku Keinänen (2016). Bradley's Reductio of Relations and Formal Ontological Relations. In Hemmo Laiho & Arto Repo (eds.), DE NATURA RERUM - Scripta in honorem professoris Olli Koistinen sexagesimum annum complentis. University of Turku 246-261.
    In this paper, we argue that formal ontological relations avoid Bradley's reductio of relations, including his famous relation regress.
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  3.  38
    Antti Keskinen, Jani Hakkarainen & Markku Keinänen (2015). Concrete Universals and Spatial Relations. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (1):57-71.
    According to strong immanent realism, proposed for instance by David M. Armstrong, universals are concrete, located in their instances. E.J. Lowe and Douglas Ehring have presented arguments to the effect that strong immanent realism is incoherent. Cody Gilmore has defended strong immanent realism against the charge of incoherence. Gilmore’s argument has thus far remained unanswered. We argue that Gilmore’s response to the charge of incoherence is an ad hoc move without support independent of strong immanent realism itself. We conclude that (...)
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  4. Markku Keinänen & Jani Hakkarainen (2010). Persistence of Simple Substances. Metaphysica 11 (2):119-135.
    In this paper, we argue for a novel three-dimensionalist solution to the problem of persistence, i.e. cross-temporal identity. We restrict the discussion of persistence to simple substances, which do not have other substances as their parts. The account of simple substances employed in the paper is a trope-nominalist strong nuclear theory, which develops Peter Simons' trope nominalism. Regarding the distinction between three dimensionalism and four dimensionalism, we follow Michael Della Rocca's formulation, in which 3D explains persistence in virtue of same (...)
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  5.  85
    Jani Hakkarainen (2012). A Third Type of Distinction in the Treatise. Hume Studies 38 (1):55-78.
    In this paper, I resolve a potential contradiction between two of Hume’s central tenets: that complex perceptions consist of simple perceptions and that distinct things are separable. The former implies that a complex perception is not separable from its constituent simple perceptions, as a change in its constituents destroys its identity. The latter entails that the complex perception is separable from these simple perceptions, since it is distinct from them. This is a contradiction. I resolve it by appealing to a (...)
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  6.  3
    Jani Hakkarainen (2015). Hume on Spatial Properties. In Guigon Ghislain & Rodriguez-Pereyra Gonzalo (eds.), Nominalism about Properties. Routledge 79-94.
    I defend a reading of David Hume’s nominalism that he comes close to Keith Campbell's contemporary trope theory in the specific case of spatial properties. I argue that Hume's view should be construed as classifying spatial properties as Campbellian tropes (particular properties): abstract, particular, determinate and qualitatively simple properties. This has implications for reconstructing Hume's answer to the problem of universals. I argue that Hume’s account of objects resembling each other in respect of spatial properties is grounded in the resemblance (...)
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  7.  40
    Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Hume's Scepticism and Realism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):283-309.
    In this article, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume's attitude in the domain of philosophy should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas Hume the common man firmly believes in (...)
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  8.  80
    Markku Keinänen & Jani Hakkarainen (2014). The Problem of Trope Individuation: A Reply to Lowe. Erkenntnis 79 (1):65-79.
    This paper is the first trope-theoretical reply to E. J. Lowe’s serious dilemma against trope nominalism in print. The first horn of this dilemma is that if tropes are identity dependent on substances, a vicious circularity threatens trope theories because they must admit that substances are identity dependent on their constituent tropes. According to the second horn, if the trope theorist claims that tropes are identity independent, she faces two insurmountable difficulties. (1) It is hard to understand the ontological dependence (...)
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  9.  41
    Jani Hakkarainen (2011). Hume's Argument for the Ontological Independence of Simple Properties. Metaphysica 12 (2):197-212.
    In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of rigid existential) independence of simple properties in A Treatise of Human Nature , Book 1 (1739). According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and his Conceivability Principle. In my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property in his atomistic theory of sense perception (...)
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  10.  29
    Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):143-161.
    In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or (...)
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  11.  1
    Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Hume as a Trope Nominalist. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (supl1):55-66.
    In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call “the problem of universals” would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are postulated to account for the fact that there are particular beings resembling each other. I show that Hume's simple sensible perceptions are tropes: simple qualities. Accordingly, their similarities are explained by these tropes themselves and their resemblance. Reading (...)
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  12.  16
    Jani Hakkarainen (2004). The Materialist of Malmesbury and the Experimentalist of Edinburgh. Hume's and Hobbes' Conceptions of Imagination Compared. Hobbes Studies 17 (1):72-107.
    In this article, I make a philosophical comparison between Hobbes' and Hume's s conceptions of imagination. The article should not be taken as an examination of Hobbes' real effect on Hume's thinking. That is a historical problem I do not address. In addition to being philosophically comparative, the article is expli- cative. Since the subject matter is so broad, I have been compelled to confine myself to the explicative level in my examination. I unfold Hume's conception of imagination, take Juhana (...)
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  13.  1
    Martin A. Bertman, Gary B. Herbert, Giuseppe Duso, Juhana Lemetti & Jani Hakkarainen (2009). Brill Online Books and Journals. Hobbes Studies 22 (2).
  14. Jani Hakkarainen, Mirja Hartimo & Jaana Virta (eds.) (2013). Muisti. Tampere University Press.
    Proceedings of the annual congress of the Finnish Philosophical Association in 2013. Theme: memory.
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