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  1. Jann E. Schlimme (2013). Depressive Habituality and Altered Valuings. The Phenomenology of Depressed Mental Life. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 44 (1):92-118.
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  2. Jann E. Schlimme (2013). Is Acting on Delusions Autonomous? Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 8 (1):14.
    In this paper the question of autonomy in delusional disorders is investigated using a phenomenological approach. I refer to the distinction between freedom of intentional action, and freedom of the will, and develop phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy, taking into account the distinction between a pre-reflective and a reflective type. Drawing on a case report, I deliver finely-grained phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy and experienced self-determination when acting on delusions. This analysis seeks to demonstrate that a person with delusions can (...)
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  3. Jann E. Schlimme (2013). Sense of Self-Determination and the Suicidal Experience. A Phenomenological Approach. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):211-223.
    In this paper phenomenological descriptions of the experiential structures of suicidality and of self-determined behaviour are given; an understanding of the possible scopes and forms of lived self-determination in suicidal mental life is offered. Two possible limits of lived self-determination are described: suicide is always experienced as minimally self-determined, because it is the last active and effective behaviour, even in blackest despair; suicide can never be experienced as fully self-determined, even if valued as the authentic thing to do, because no (...)
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  4. Jann E. Schlimme (2012). Lived Autonomy and Chronic Mental Illness: A Phenomenological Approach. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 33 (6):387-404.
    In this paper, I develop a phenomenological description of lived autonomy and describe possible alterations of lived autonomy associated with chronic depression as they relate to specific psychopathological symptoms. I will distinguish between two types of lived autonomy, a pre-reflective type and a reflective type, which differ with respect to the explicitness of the action that is willed into existence; and I will relate these types to the classical distinction between freedom of intentional action and freedom of the will. I (...)
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  5. Jann E. Schlimme (2010). Addiction and Self-Determination: A Phenomenological Approach. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):49-62.
    In this article, I focus on possibly impaired self-determination in addiction. After some methodological reflections, I introduce a phenomenological description of the experience of being self-determined. I argue that being self-determined implies effectivity of agency regarding three different behavioural domains. Such self-referential agency shall be called ‘self-effectivity’ in this article. In a second step, I will use this phenomenological description to understand the impairments of self-determination in addiction. While addiction does not necessarily imply a basic lack of control over one’s (...)
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  6. Jann E. Schlimme, Catharina Bonnemann & Aaron L. Mishara (2010). No Departure To. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 5 (1):15.
    The mind-body problem lies at the heart of the clinical practice of both psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine. In their recent publication, Schwartz and Wiggins address the question of how to understand life as central to the mind-body problem. Drawing on their own use of the phenomenological method, we propose that the mind-body problem is not resolved by a general, evocative appeal to an all encompassing life-concept, but rather falters precisely at the insurmountable difference between.
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  7. Jann E. Schlimme (2009). Paranoid Atmospheres: Psychiatric Knowledge and Delusional Realities. [REVIEW] Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 4 (1):1-12.
    In this paper I investigate the topic of paranoid atmospheres. This subject is especially of interest with respect to persons who are deluded, and also, I will demonstrate, sheds light upon the psychiatrist's "gaze" and knowledge of delusions. In my argument I will follow a path initially outlined by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969): modern psychiatric diagnosis of delusions is a diagnosis of form and not content. Jaspers' emphasis on the form of delusions enables psychiatrists to be self-critical about their professional knowledge (...)
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  8. Jann E. Schlimme (2009). Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 4:14.
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  9. Jann E. Schlimme (2008). The “Psychiatric Gaze”, Delusional Realities and Paranoid Atmospheres. Topos 18:13-24.
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