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Profile: Jaroslav Peregrin (Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, University of Hradec Králové)
  1.  35
    Jaroslav Peregrin & Vladimír Svoboda (2013). Criteria for Logical Formalization. Synthese 190 (14):2897-2924.
    The article addresses two closely related questions: What are the criteria of adequacy of logical formalization of natural language arguments, and what gives logic the authority to decide which arguments are good and which are bad? Our point of departure is the criticism of the conception of logical formalization put forth, in a recent paper, by M. Baumgartner and T. Lampert. We argue that their account of formalization as a kind of semantic analysis brings about more problems than it solves. (...)
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  2.  14
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2016). Should One Be A Left or A Right Sellarsian? Metaphilosophy 47 (2):251-263.
    The followers of Wilfrid Sellars are often divided into “right” and “left” Sellarsians, according to whether they believe, in Mark Lance's words, that “linguistic roles constitutive of meaning and captured by dot quoted words are ‘normative all the way down.’” The present article anatomizes this division and argues that it is not easy to give it a nontrivial sense. In particular, the article argues that it is not really possible to construe it as a controversy related to ontology, and goes (...)
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  3. Jaroslav Peregrin (2006). Meaning as an Inferential Role. Erkenntnis 64 (1):1-35.
    While according to the inferentialists, meaning is always a kind of inferential role, proponents of other approaches to semantics often doubt that actual meanings, as they see them, can be generally reduced to inferential roles. In this paper we propose a formal framework for considering the hypothesis of the.
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  4. Jaroslav Peregrin (2012). Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning. Philosophia 40 (1):75-97.
    There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative in any nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the anti-normativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any (...)
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  5.  16
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2006). Semantics as Based on Inference. In Johan van Benthem, Gerhard Heinzman, M. Rebushi & H. Visser (eds.), The Age of Alternative Logics. Springer 25--36.
  6. Jaroslav Peregrin, Inferentialism and the Compositionality of Meaning.
    Inferentialism, which I am going to present in detail in the following sections, is the view that meanings are, roughly, roles that are acquired by types of sounds and inscriptions in virtue of their being treated according to rules of our language games, roughly in the sense in which wooden pieces acquire certain roles by being treated according the rules of chess. The most important consequences are that (i) a meaning is not an object labeled (stood for, represented ...) by (...)
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  7.  50
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2010). The Enigma of Rules. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):377-394.
    In a remarkable early paper, Wilfrid Sellars warned us that if we cease to recognize rules, we may well find ourselves walking on four feet; and it is obvious that within human communities, the phenomenon of rules is ubiquitous. Yet from the viewpoint of the sciences, rules cannot be easily accounted for. Sellars himself, during his later years, managed to put a lot of flesh on the normative bones from which he assembled the remarkable skeleton of the early paper; and (...)
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  8.  47
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2010). Inferentializing Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):255 - 274.
    The entire development of modern logic is characterized by various forms of confrontation of what has come to be called proof theory with what has earned the label of model theory. For a long time the widely accepted view was that while model theory captures directly what logical formalisms are about, proof theory is merely our technical means of getting some incomplete grip on this; but in recent decades the situation has altered. Not only did proof theory expand into new (...)
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  9.  76
    Jaroslav Peregrin, There is No Such Thing as Predication.
    In a memorable paper, Donald Davidson (1986, p. 446) insists that "there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed". I have always taken this as an exaggeration, albeit an apt exaggeration that might be philosophically helpful. Now when it comes to predication, what I would have expected to hear from the same author would be along the lines of "there is no such thing as predication ... (...)
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  10.  47
    Jaroslav Peregrin (1997). Language and its Models: Is Model Theory a Theory of Semantics? Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1):1-23.
    Tarskian model theory is almost universally understood as a formal counterpart of the preformal notion of semantics, of the “linkage between words and things”. The wide-spread opinion is that to account for the semantics of natural language is to furnish its settheoretic interpretation in a suitable model structure; as exemplified by Montague 1974.
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  11. Jaroslav Peregrin (2002). Meaning and Structure. Filosoficky Casopis 50:686-688.
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  12.  15
    Vladimír Svoboda & Jaroslav Peregrin (2016). Logically Incorrect Arguments. Argumentation 30 (3):263-287.
    What do we learn when we find out that an argument is logically incorrect? If logically incorrect means the same as not logically correct, which in turn means not having a valid logical form, it seems that we do not learn anything too useful—an argument which is logically incorrect can still be conclusive. Thus, it seems that it makes sense to fix a stronger interpretation of the term under which a logically incorrect argument is guaranteed to be wrong. In this (...)
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  13. Jaroslav Peregrin, What is Inferentialism?
    Inferentialism is the conviction that to be meaningful in the distinctively human way, or to have a 'conceptual content', is to be governed by a certain kind of inferential rules. The term was coined by Robert Brandom as a label for his theory of language; however, it is also naturally applicable (and is growing increasingly common) within the philosophy of logic.
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  14.  65
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2005). Brandom and Davidsom: What Do We Need to Account for Thinking and Agency? Philosophica 75.
    There are various approaches to truth and knowledge (in fact, cataloguing them has become something of a philosophical industry of its own); and in many cases, their explanations are taken to underlie the explanation of other crucial concepts, like language, reason etc. Especially in recent years, some of the approaches have come to be based on reducing semantics to pragmatics. An outstanding example of such a pragmatist approach is that of Bob Brandom, who bases the explication of both truth and (...)
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  15. Jaroslav Peregrin (2013). Odkud Se Berou Axiomy Logiky? Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2):117-139.
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  16.  85
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2007). Logical Rules and the a Priori: Good and Bad Questions. In Jean-Yves Béziau & Alexandre Costa-Leite (eds.), Perspectives on Universal Logic. 111--122.
  17.  23
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2008). What is the Logic of Inference? Studia Logica 88 (2):263 - 294.
    The topic of this paper is the question whether there is a logic which could be justly called the logic of inference. It may seem that at least since Prawitz, Dummett and others demonstrated the proof-theoretical prominency of intuitionistic logic, the forthcoming answer is that it is this logic that is the obvious choice for the accolade. Though there is little doubt that this choice is correct (provided that inference is construed as inherently single-conclusion and complying with the Gentzenian structural (...)
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  18. Jaroslav Peregrin, Inferentialism: From Logic to Language.
    1.1 INFERENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATIONALISM 1.2 INFERENTIALISM AND LOGIC 1.3 FROM PROOF THEORY TO SEMANTICS 1.4 BRANDOM'S NORMATIVE INFERENTIALISM..
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  19.  87
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Deflationism and Inferentialism.
    After putting forward his celebrated deflationary theory of truth (Horwich, 1998a), Paul Horwich added a compatible theory of meaning (Horwich, 1998b). I am calling also this latter theory deflationism (although it may be a slightly misleading name in that, as Paul himself notes, his theory of meaning is deflationary more in the sense of being forced by the deflationary theory of truth than of being particularly deflationary in itself). In contrast, what I call inferentialism is the theory of meaning which (...)
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  20.  15
    Jaroslav Peregrin (1996). Dynamická sémantika a dynamická logika. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 3 (4):333-348.
    The “dynamic turn” in semantic theory of natural language, which has been taking place roughly during the last decade, has resulted into seeing the meaning of a sentence as a “context-change-potential”, as a function which maps the set of possible contexts on itself. The development of theories of this kind has been stimulated especially by the effort to semantically cope with the anaphoric items of natural language . The most significant species of dynamic semantic theories are represented by Kamp´s “discourse (...)
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  21.  69
    Vladimír Svoboda & Jaroslav Peregrin (forthcoming). Logical Form and Reflective Equilibrium. Synthese.
    Though, at first sight, logical formalization of natural language sentences and arguments might look like an unproblematic enterprise, the criteria of its success are far from clear and, surprisingly, there have only been a few attempts at making them explicit. This paper provides a picture of the enterprise of logical formalization that does not conceive of it as a kind of translation from one language (a natural one) into another language (a logical one), but rather as a construction of a (...)
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  22.  34
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Www.Cuni.Cz/-Peregrin.
    Summary. I do not think there is one true answer to the question What is logic?. There are, clearly, good and less good answers, and there are answers which are plainly wrong; but the term 'logic' has been employed, throughout the history of the subject matter, in such diverse ways that no single one of the uses can be said to be the correct one. However, even among the answers which are acceptable on historico-semantical grounds there are still, without doubt, (...)
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  23.  42
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2000). The "Natural" and the "Formal". Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (1):75-101.
    The paper presents an argument against a "metaphysical" conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its (...)
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  24.  34
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Consequence & Inference.
    Logic is usually considered to be the study of logical consequence – of the most basic laws governing how a statement’s truth depends on the truth of other statements. Some of the pioneers of modern formal logic, notably Hilbert and Carnap, assumed that the only way to get hold of the relation of consequence was to reconstruct it as a relation of inference within a formal system built upon explicit inferential rules. Even Alfred Tarski in 1930 seemed to foresee no (...)
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  25.  48
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2008). An Inferentialist Approach to Semantics: Time for a New Kind of Structuralism? Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1208-1223.
    The perennial question – What is meaning? – receives many answers. In this paper I present and discuss inferentialism – a recent approach to semantics based on the thesis that to have ( such and such ) a meaning is to be governed by ( such and such ) a cluster of inferential rules . I point out that this thesis presupposes that looking for meaning requires seeing language as a social institution (rather than, say, a psychological reality). I also (...)
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  26.  39
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2000). Variables in Natural Language: Where Do They Come From?'. In Michael Böttner & Wolf Thümmel (eds.), Variable-Free Semantics. Secolo 46--65.
  27.  66
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Logic and Reasoning.
    Logic, it is often held, is primarily concerned with reasoning; and the conviction that logic and reasoning are two sides of the same coin nowadays usually equates with the conviction that logic spells out some directives for the "right" management of beliefs. In this paper I put forward an alternative view, based on seeing rules of logic rules as constitutive rules, not instructing us how to reason, but rather providing us with certain vehicles or in terms of which to reason. (...)
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  28.  20
    Jaroslav Peregrin (1999). The Pragmatization of Semantics. In Ken Turner (ed.), The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface From Different Points of View. Elsevier 419--442.
  29.  39
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2000). 'Fregean' Logic and 'Russellian' Logic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):557 – 574.
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  30.  30
    Jaroslav Peregrin, The Use Theory of Meaning.
    After putting forward his celebrated deflationary theory of truth (Horwich, 1998a), Paul Horwich added a compatible theory of meaning (Horwich, 1998b). I am calling also this latter theory deflationism (although it may be a slightly misleading name in that, as Paul himself notes, his theory of meaning is deflationary more in the sense of being forced by the deflationary theory of truth than of being particularly deflationary in itself). In contrast, what I call inferentialism is the theory of meaning which (...)
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  31.  12
    Jack Furlong, Ion Giorgiou, Jaroslav Peregrin, Jon Phelan & Lawrence Phillips (1999). Big Question Marks. The Philosophers' Magazine 6:53-54.
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  32.  25
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Pozoruhodne Logicke Systemy.
    Vuvodnim rocniku ORGANONu Pavel Cmorej ve svych @@piton lch z logicjce syntaxe predvadel, jak je prirozeny jazyk mozne nahlizet prismatem 'standardni' logiky. Historicky ovsem neexistuje jedna logika,ale ruzne logicke systemy, ktere spolu castecne soupeii (tak jako treba klasicka a intuicionisticka logika), castecne jeden druhy rozsiruji (Iako treba klasicky vyrokovy a klasicky predikatovy pocet) ci se navzajem doplnuji (Iako napriklad modalni a temporalni logika). To co je v logice obecne prijimano za standard, je fakticky vysledkem interakce a soutezeni ruznych neustale vznikajicich (...)
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  33.  81
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2010). The Myth of Semantic Structure. In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Ontos Verlag 1.
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  34.  13
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2005). The Nature of Meaning: Brandom Versus Chomsky. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):39-58.
    Part of the philosophy of language of the 20th century is marked by a shift from the view of language as a tool of representing the world to its view as a means of interacting with the world. This shift is common to the later Wittgenstein, to pragmatists and neopragmatists including Brandom, and also to Chomsky and his school. The claim of the paper is that though the Chomskyans have offered an admirably elaborated theory of syntax adequate to the interactive (...)
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  35.  14
    Jaroslav Peregrin (1998). Logic and Consciousness. The Philosophers' Magazine 2 (2):46-47.
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  36.  47
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2003). Meaning and Inference. In Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer (eds.), Logica Yearbook 2002. Filosofia
    In this paper we first propose an exact definition of the concept of inferential role, and then go on to examine the question whether subscribing to inferentialism necessitates throwing away existing theories of formal semantics, as we know them from logic, or whether these could be somehow accomodated within the inferentialist framework. The conclusion we reach is that it is possible to make an inferentialist sense of even those common semantic theories which are usually considered as incompatible with inferentialism, such (...)
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  37.  15
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2015). What Logics Mean: From Proof Theory to Model-Theoretic Semantics, by James W. Garson. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):613-616.
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  38.  12
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2000). Pozoruhodné logické systémy. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 8:90-96.
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  39.  52
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Sellarsian "Patterned Governed Behavior" and the Space of Meaningfulness.
    While the traditional view was that in order to understand language and our linguistic practices we must explain meaning, the 'pragmatic turn' emerging within the writings of various philosohpers of the second half of the twentieth century caused a basic change of the perspective: the tendency is to concentrate directly on explaining the linguistic practices and leave the need for explaining meaning to emerge (or, as the case may be, not to emerge) subsequently. I argue that after this turn we (...)
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  40.  52
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Inference as an Explication and as a Counterpart of Consequence.
    Logic is usually considered to be the study of logical consequence – of the most basic laws governing how a statement’s truth depends on the truth of other statements. Some of the pioneers of modern formal logic, notably Hilbert and Carnap, assumed that the only way to get hold of the relation of consequence was to reconstruct it as a relation of inference within a formal system built upon explicit inferential rules. Even Alfred Tarski in 1930 seemed to foresee no (...)
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  41. Vladimír Svoboda & Jaroslav Peregrin (2010). Od jazyka k logice. : [From language to logic]. Filosoficky Casopis 58:281-287.
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  42.  40
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Diagonalization.
    It is a trivial fact that if we have a square table filled with numbers, we can always form a column which is not yet contained in the table. Despite its apparent triviality, this fact underlies the foundations of most of the path-breaking results of logic in the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. We explain how this fact can be used to show that there are more sequences of natural numbers than there (...)
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  43.  55
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Jeremy Wanderer: Robert Brandom.
    When Bob Brandom, six years after publishing his opus magnum Making it explicit (hereafter MIE)1, produced his slender Articulating reasons2, many people expected that finally they would have a concise introduction to his philosophical views. Their expectations, however, were to be dashed: Articulating reasons is a heterogeneous collection of texts elaborating on some of the topics of MIE and hardly digestible without the background of MIE3. As yet, Brandom has produced nothing that could be taken as introductory. His subsequent books (...)
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  44.  43
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Logic As Based On Incompatibility.
    Can we base the whole of logic solely on the concept of incompatibility? My motivation for asking this is two-fold: firstly, a technical interest in what a minimal foundations of logic might be; and secondly, the existence of philosophers who have taken incompatibility as the ultimate key to human reason (viz., e.g., Hegel's concept of determinate negation). The main aim of this contribution is to tackle two related questions: Is it possible to reduce the foundations of logic to the mere (...)
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  45.  63
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Wittgenstein a Pravidla Našich Jazykových Her.
    Abstrakt. Když se řekne Ludwig Wittgenstein, vybaví se člověku, který to jméno už někdy slyšel, nejspíše termín jazyková hra. Tento termín si Wittgenstein vybral, aby se v rámci své pozdní filosofie distancoval od určitého druhu názorů na jazyk (druhu, kterého byly i jeho vlastní ranější filosofické názory). Chtěl jeho pomocí zdůraznit různorodost lidských aktivit, které se opírají o jazyk. Avšak ač to Wittgenstein úplně explicitně neříká, zdá se mi že je tu něco podstatného, co je podle něj pro jazykové hry (...)
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  46.  11
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2002). Gavagai! The Philosophers' Magazine 20:23-24.
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  47.  37
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Following the Rules of Discourse.
    Th is review article discusses Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance’s (2009) book on normative speech act theory and Joseph Heath’s (2008) book on rule following, putting them into the context of the general problem of normativity of human discursive practices (and human practices in general). Th e upshot of the discussion is that while Heath’s book advances our understanding of the normative dimension of human life, prominently including human language, Kukla and Lance’s one presents a deeply interesting attempt at a (...)
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  48.  47
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Possible Worlds: A Critical Analysis.
    Frege has proposed to consider names as denoting objects, predicates as standing for concepts and sentences as denoting truth values. He was, however, aware that such denotation does not exhaust all what is to be said about meaning. Therefore he has urged that in addition to such denotation (Bedeutung) an expression has sense (Sinn). The sense is the "way of presentation" of denotation; hence the expressions Morning Star and Evening Star have identical denotations, but different senses. Carnap has proposed to (...)
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  49.  48
    Jaroslav Peregrin (2010). Kvaszova filosofie matematiky mezi platonismem a naturalismem. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (1):71-80.
    Ve svém článku Matematika a skúsenosť (2009) předkládá Ladislav Kvasz pohled na matematiku, který je do jisté míry 'pragmatistický' či 'naturalistický' a mně osobně je velmi sympatický. Jenom si myslím, že je škoda, že je naturalistický právě jenom "do jité míry".
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  50.  52
    Jaroslav Peregrin, Legal Inferentialism and Semantic Inferentialism.
    One of the recent trends in the philosophy of language and theory of meaning is the inferentialist project launched by Robert Brandom (1994, 2000, 2008), elaborating on the approach of Wilfrid Sellars (1953, 1954, 1956, 1974). According to this project, language is to be seen as essentially a rule-governed activity, providing for meaningful utterances in a way analogous to the way in which the rules of chess provide for making one's pawns, bishops or rooks attack one's opponent, checking his king (...)
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