19 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Jason Baehr [15]Jason S. Baehr [4]
See also:
Profile: Jason Baehr (Loyola Marymount University)
  1. Jason Baehr, Unraveling the Value Problem.
    The value problem in epistemology is rooted in a commonsense intuition to the effect that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Call this the “guiding intuition.” The guiding intuition generates a problem in light of two additional considerations. The first is that knowledge is (roughly) justified or warranted true belief.[1] The second is that on certain popular accounts of justification or warrant (e.g. reliabilism), its value is apparently instrumental to and hence derivative from the value of true belief.[2] But (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jason Baehr (2013). Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):248-262.
    After a brief overview of what intellectual virtues are, I offer three arguments for the claim that education should aim at fostering ‘intellectual character virtues’ like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual honesty. I then go on to discuss several pedagogical and related strategies for achieving this aim.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jason Baehr (2013). Reply to Zagzebski. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 146.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jason Baehr (2012). Credit Theories and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):1-22.
    One alleged advantage of credit theories of knowledge is that they are capable of explaining why knowledge is essentially more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that credit theories in fact provide grounds for denying this claim and therefore are incapable of overcoming the ‘value problem’ in epistemology. Much of the discussion revolves around the question of whether true belief is always epistemically valuable. I also consider to what extent, if any, my main argument should worry credit theorists.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jason Baehr (2012). “Two Types of Wisdom”. Acta Analytica 27 (2):81-97.
    The concept of wisdom is largely ignored by contemporary philosophers. But given recent movements in the fields of ethics and epistemology, the time is ripe for a return to this concept. This article lays some groundwork for further philosophical work in ethics and epistemology on wisdom. Its focus is the distinction between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom or between phronesis and sophia . Several accounts of this distinction are considered and rejected. A more plausible, but also considerably more complex, account (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Jason Baehr (2011). The Structure of Open-Mindedness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):191-213.
    Open-mindedness enjoys widespread recognition as an intellectual virtue. This is evident, among other ways, in its appearance on nearly every list of intellectual virtues in the virtue epistemology literature.1 Despite its popularity, however, it is far from clear what exactly open-mindedness amounts to: that is, what sort of intellectual orientation or activity is essential to it. In fact, there are ways of thinking about open-mindedness that cast serious doubt on its status as an intellectual virtue. Consider the following description, from (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jason S. Baehr (2011). The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    This book is the first systematic treatment of 'responsibilist' or character-based virtue epistemology, an approach to epistemology that focuses on intellectual ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jason Baehr (2010). Epistemic malevolence. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):189-213.
    Abstract: Against the background of a great deal of structural symmetry between intellectual and moral virtue and vice, it is a surprising fact that what is arguably the central or paradigm moral vice—that is, moral malevolence or malevolence proper—has no obvious or well-known counterpart among the intellectual vices. The notion of "epistemic malevolence" makes no appearance on any standard list of intellectual vices; nor is it central to our ordinary ways of thinking about intellectual vice. In this essay, I argue (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Jason Baehr (2009). Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):545-567.
    Evidentialists maintain that epistemic justification is strictly a function of the evidence one has at the moment of belief. I argue here, on the basis of two kinds of cases, that the possession of good evidence is an insuflicient basis for justification. I go on to propose a modification of evidentialism according to which justification sometimes requires intellectually virtuous agency. The discussion thereby underscores an important point of contact between evidentialism and the more recent enterprise of virtue epistemology.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jason Baehr (2009). Is There a Value Problem? In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. 42--59.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jason Baehr (2008). Four Varieties of Character-Based Virtue Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):469-502.
    The terrain of character-based or “responsibilist” virtue epistemology has evolved dramatically over the last decade -- so much so that it is far from clear what, if anything, unifies the various views put forth in this area. In an attempt to bring some clarity to the overall thrust and structure of this movement, I develop a fourfold classification of character-based virtue epistemologies. I also offer a qualified assessmentof each approach, defending a certain account of the probable future of this burgeoning (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jason Baehr (2007). Review of Robert C. Roberts, W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (7).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jason Baehr (2007). On the Reliability of Moral and Intellectual Virtues. Metaphilosophy 38 (4):456-470.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jason Baehr (2006). Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212.
    Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. I argue that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions and (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jason Baehr (2006). Epistemic Luck. By Duncan Pritchard. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):728-736.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jason S. Baehr (2006). Character in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479--514.
    This paper examines the claim made by certain virtue epistemologists that intellectual character virtues like fair-mindedness, open-mindedness and intellectual courage merit an important and fundamental role in epistemology. I begin by considering whether these traits merit an important role in the analysis of knowledge. I argue that they do not and that in fact they are unlikely to be of much relevance to any of the traditional problems in epistemology. This presents a serious challenge for virtue epistemology. I go on (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Jason S. Baehr, Virtue Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jason Baehr (2003). Necessity and Rational Insight. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:361-370.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jason S. Baehr, A Priori and a Posteriori. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The terms "a priori" and "a posteriori" refer primarily to how or on what basis a proposition might be known. A proposition is knowable a priori if it is knowable independently of experience. A proposition is knowable a posteriori if it is knowable on the basis of experience. The a priori/a posteriori distinction is epistemological and should not be confused with the metaphysical distinction between the necessary and the contingent or the semantical or logical distinction between the analytic and the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation