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Profile: Jason Decker (Carleton College)
  1. Jason Decker (forthcoming). Conciliation and Self-Incrimination. Erkenntnis:1-36.
    Conciliationism is a view—well, a family of views—in the epistemology of disagreement. The idea, simply put, is that, in a wide range of cases where you find yourself in disagreement with another reasoner about the truth of some proposition, you are rationally obliged to adjust your credence in the direction of hers. Conciliationism enjoys a fair bit of prima facie plausibility. Most versions of it, however, suffer from a common (and rather obvious) problem: self-incrimination. Although there is some recognition in (...)
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  2. Daniel Groll & Jason Decker (2014). Moral Testimony: One of These Things Is Just Like the Others. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):54-74.
    What, if anything, is wrong with acquiring moral beliefs on the basis of testimony? Most philosophers think that there is something wrong with it, and most point to a special problem that moral testimony is supposed to create for moral agency. Being a good moral agent involves more than bringing about the right outcomes. It also involves acting with "moral understanding" and one cannot have moral understanding of what one is doing via moral testimony. And so, adherents to this view (...)
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  3. Jason Decker & Daniel Groll (2013). The (In)Significance of Moral Disagreement for Moral Knowledge. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8. Oxford.
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  4. Jason Decker (2012). Disagreement, Evidence, and Agnosticism. Synthese 187 (2):753-783.
    In this paper, I respond to recent attempts by philosophers to deny the existence of something that is both real and significant: reasonable disagreements between epistemic peers. In their arguments against the possibility of such disagreements, skeptical philosophers typically invoke one or more of the following: indifference reasoning , equal weight principles , and uniqueness theses . I take up each of these in turn, finding ample reason to resist them. The arguments for indifference reasoning and equal weight principles tend (...)
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  5. Jason Decker & Charles Taliaferro (2012). When Should Philosophers Be Silent? Philosophy 87 (02):163-187.
    Are there general precepts governing when philosophers should not conduct inquiry on a given topic? When, if ever, should a philosopher just be silent? In this paper we look at a number of practical, epistemic, and moral arguments for philosophical silence. Some are quite general, and suggest that it is best never to engage in philosophical inquiry, while others are more domain - or context - specific. We argue that these arguments fail to establish their conclusions. We do, however, try (...)
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  6. Jason Decker (2010). On Keeping Logic in the Major. Teaching Philosophy 33 (2):133-142.
    A course in symbolic logic belongs as a requirement in the undergraduate philosophy major. In this paper, which started life as a letter to my departmental colleagues, I consider and respond to several reasons one might have for excluding Logic from the core requirements. I then give several arguments in favor of keeping Logic. The central—and most important—argument is that the lack of a proper background in logic makes it very difficult to approach many relatively straightforward philosophical arguments, let alone (...)
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  7. Jason Decker (2010). Philosophy of Language. Teaching Philosophy 33 (4):411-415.
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