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Jason Ford [7]Jason M. Ford [1]
  1. Jason Ford (2011). Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room. Minds and Machines 21 (1):57-72.
    William Rapaport, in “How Helen Keller used syntactic semantics to escape from a Chinese Room,” (Rapaport 2006), argues that Helen Keller was in a sort of Chinese Room, and that her subsequent development of natural language fluency illustrates the flaws in Searle’s famous Chinese Room Argument and provides a method for developing computers that have genuine semantics (and intentionality). I contend that his argument fails. In setting the problem, Rapaport uses his own preferred definitions of semantics and syntax, but he (...)
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  2. Jason Ford (2011). Tye-Dyed Teleology and the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):267-281.
    Michael Tye’s considered position on visual experience combines representationalism with externalism about color, so when considering spectrum inversion, he needs a principled reason to claim that a person with inverted color vision is seeing things incorrectly. Tye’s responses to the problem of the inverted spectrum ( 2000 , in: Consciousness, color, and content, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and 2002a , in: Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, Oxford) rely on a teleological approach to (...)
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  3. Jason Ford (2010). Robert Kirk: Zombies and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (2):321-324.
  4. Jason Ford (2009). Saving Time: How Attention Explains the Utility of Supposedly Superfluous Representations. Cognitive Critique 1 (1):101-114.
    I contend that Alva Noë’s Enactive Approach to Perception fails to give an adequate account of the periphery of attention. Noë claims that our peripheral experience is not produced by the brain’s representation of peripheral items, but rather by our mastery of sensorimotor skills and contingencies. I offer a two-pronged assault on this account of the periphery of attention. The first challenge comes from Mack and Rock’s work on inattentional blindness, and provides robust empirical evidence for the semantic processing (and (...)
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  5. Jason Ford (2009). Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (Eds), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 19 (2):283-287.
  6. Jason Ford (2008). Attention and the New Sceptics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):59-86.
    In response to new research into the phenomena of inattentional blindness and change- blindness, several philosophers and vision researchers have proposed a novel form of scepticism: they contend that we do not have the conscious experience that we think we have. I will show that this claim is not supported by the evidence usually cited in support of it, and I expose what I believe to be the underlying error motivating this position: the belief that consciousness is either focal (what (...)
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  7. Jason Ford & David Woodruff Smith (2006). Consciousness, Self, and Attention. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 353-377.
  8. Jason M. Ford (2005). The Attention Model of Consciousness. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
     
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