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Profile: Jason Megill (Bentley University)
  1.  92
    Evan Sandsmark & Jason L. Megill (2010). Cosmological Argument: A Pragmatic Defense. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):127 - 142.
    We formulate a sort of "generic" cosmological argument, i.e., a cosmological argument that shares premises (e.g., "contingent, concretely existing entities have a cause") with numerous versions of the argument. We then defend each of the premises by offering pragmatic arguments for them. We show that an endorsement of each premise will lead to an increase in expected utility; so in the absence of strong evidence that the premises are false, it is rational to endorse them. Therefore, it is rational to (...)
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  2. Jason L. Megill (2005). Locke's Mysterianism: On the Unsolvability of the Mind-Body Problem. Locke Studies 5:119-147.
  3.  88
    Jason L. Megill (2004). Are We Paraconsistent? On the Lucas-Penrose Argument and the Computational Theory of Mind. Auslegung 27 (1):23-30.
  4. Jason L. Megill, Tim Melvin & Alex Beal (2014). On Some Properties of Humanly Known and Humanly Knowable Mathematics. Axiomathes 24 (1):81-88.
    We argue that the set of humanly known mathematical truths (at any given moment in human history) is finite and so recursive. But if so, then given various fundamental results in mathematical logic and the theory of computation (such as Craig’s in J Symb Log 18(1): 30–32(1953) theorem), the set of humanly known mathematical truths is axiomatizable. Furthermore, given Godel’s (Monash Math Phys 38: 173–198, 1931) First Incompleteness Theorem, then (at any given moment in human history) humanly known mathematics must (...)
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  5. Jason L. Megill & Jon Cogburn (2005). Easy's Gettin' Harder All the Time: The Computational Theory and Affective States. Ratio 18 (3):306-316.
    We argue that A. Damasio’s (1994) Somatic Marker hypothesis can explain why humans don’t generally suffer from the frame problem, arguably the greatest obstacle facing the Computational Theory of Mind. This involves showing how humans with damaged emotional centers are best understood as actually suffering from the frame problem. We are then able to show that, paradoxically, these results provide evidence for the Computational Theory of Mind, and in addition call into question the very distinction between easy and hard problems (...)
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  6. Jason L. Megill (2003). What Role Do the Emotions Play in Cognition? Towards a New Alternative to Cognitive Theories of Emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100.
    This paper has two aims: to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational theories of consciousness? as generally formulated? are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the (...)
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