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Jason Megill [13]Jason L. Megill [6]
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Profile: Jason Megill (Carroll College, Montana)
  1. Jason Megill & Tim Melvin (forthcoming). Computability and Human Symbolic Output. Logic and Logical Philosophy.
  2. Jason Megill (2014). An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2):5 - 17.
    I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the argument shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improbable. Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessarily. I address possible objections and then conclude by considering some implications the argument has for dualism.
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  3. Jason Megill (2014). Emotion, Cognition and Artificial Intelligence. Minds and Machines 24 (2):189-199.
    Some have claimed that since machines lack emotional “qualia”, or conscious experiences of emotion, machine intelligence will fall short of human intelligence. I examine this objection, ultimately finding it unpersuasive. I first discuss recent work on emotion (from cognitive science, neuroscience and philosophy) that suggests that emotion plays various roles in cognition. I then raise the following question: are phenomenal experiences of emotion an essential or necessary component of the performance of these cognitive abilities? I then sharpen the question by (...)
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  4. Jason Megill (2014). Hume, Causation and Two Arguments Concerning God. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2).
    In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume (1779/1993) appeals to his account of causation (among other things) to undermine certain arguments for the existence of God. If 'anything can cause anything', as Hume claims, then the Principle of Causal Adequacy is false; and if the Principle of Causal Adequacy is false, then any argument for God's existence that relies on that principle fails. Of course, Hume's critique has been influential. But Hume's account of causation undermines the argument from evil at least (...)
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  5. Jason L. Megill, Tim Melvin & Alex Beal (2014). On Some Properties of Humanly Known and Humanly Knowable Mathematics. Axiomathes 24 (1):81-88.
    We argue that the set of humanly known mathematical truths (at any given moment in human history) is finite and so recursive. But if so, then given various fundamental results in mathematical logic and the theory of computation (such as Craig’s in J Symb Log 18(1): 30–32(1953) theorem), the set of humanly known mathematical truths is axiomatizable. Furthermore, given Godel’s (Monash Math Phys 38: 173–198, 1931) First Incompleteness Theorem, then (at any given moment in human history) humanly known mathematics must (...)
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  6. Jason Megill (2013). A Defense of Emergence. Axiomathes 23 (4):597-615.
    I defend a physicalistic version of ontological emergence; qualia emerge from the brain, but are physical properties nevertheless. First, I address the following questions: what are the central tenets of physicalistic ontological emergentism; what are the relationships between these tenets; what is the relationship between physicalistic ontological emergentism and non-reductive physicalism; and can there even be a physicalistic version of ontological emergentism? This discussion is merely an attempt to clarify exactly what a physicalistic version of ontological emergentism must claim, and (...)
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  7. Jason Megill (2012). The Lucas-Penrose Argument About Gödel's Theorem. In J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  8. Jason Megill (2012). Two Ontological Arguments for the Existence of an Omniscient Being. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today. Ontos Verlag. 50--77.
  9. Jason Megill & Amy Reagor (2012). A Model Theistic Argument. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today. Ontos Verlag. 50--89.
  10. Jason Megill (2011). Evil and the Many Universes Response. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):127-138.
    I formulate and defend a version of the many universes (or multiverse) reply to the atheistic argument from evil. Specifically, I argue that (i) if we know that any argument from evil (be it a logical or evidential argument) is sound, then we know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. I then argue that (ii) there might be a multiverse and (iii) if so, then we do not know that God would (...)
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  11. Jon Cogburn & Jason Megill (2010). Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439.
    We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.
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  12. Evan Sandsmark & Jason L. Megill (2010). Cosmological Argument: A Pragmatic Defense. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):127 - 142.
    We formulate a sort of "generic" cosmological argument, i.e., a cosmological argument that shares premises (e.g., "contingent, concretely existing entities have a cause") with numerous versions of the argument. We then defend each of the premises by offering pragmatic arguments for them. We show that an endorsement of each premise will lead to an increase in expected utility; so in the absence of strong evidence that the premises are false, it is rational to endorse them. Therefore, it is rational to (...)
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  13. Jason Megill & Joshua M. Mitchell (2009). A Modest Modal Ontological Argument. Ratio 22 (3):338-349.
    We formulate a new modal ontological argument; specifically, we show that there is a possible world in which an entity that has at least the property of omnipotence exists. Then we argue that if such an entity is possible, it is necessary as well.
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  14. Jason Megill (2007). Naturalism, Physicalism and Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):681 – 686.
    I argue that physicalistic naturalism entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. I conclude by briefly discussing implications of my argument for cognitive science, non-reductive physicalism, and the possibility of formulating a naturalistic form of dualism.
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  15. Jason L. Megill (2005). Locke's Mysterianism: On the Unsolvability of the Mind-Body Problem. Locke Studies 5:119-147.
  16. Jason L. Megill & Jon Cogburn (2005). Easy's Gettin' Harder All the Time: The Computational Theory and Affective States. Ratio 18 (3):306-316.
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  17. Jason L. Megill (2004). Are We Paraconsistent? On the Lucas-Penrose Argument and the Computational Theory of Mind. Auslegung 27 (1):23-30.
     
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  18. Jason Megill (2003). What Role Do the Emotions Play in Cognition?: Towards a New Alternative to Cognitive Theories of Emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100.
    This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in (...)
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  19. Jason L. Megill (2003). What Role Do the Emotions Play in Cognition? Towards a New Alternative to Cognitive Theories of Emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100.
    This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness ? as generally formulated ? are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in (...)
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