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Jason Stanley [46]Jason C. Stanley [2]
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Profile: Jason Stanley (Yale University)
  1. Jason Stanley & Zoltan Szabo, A Philosopher's Guide to Context Dependence.
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  2. Zoltan Szabo & Jason Stanley, Domain of Quantification.
    When we utter sentences containing quantifiers, typically we are not to be taken to speak about absolutely everything there is. Suppose Mary has invited her friend John to a party to which she is going. If, upon entering the party, Mary turns to Jack and utters (1), it would be rather odd of Jack to object by pointing out that John in fact knows several people who are not present.
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  3. Jason Stanley (forthcoming). Context, Interest-Relativity, and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies.
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  4. Jason Stanley (forthcoming). Constructing Meanings. Analysis.
  5. Jason Stanley (forthcoming). Review of Literal Meaning. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  6. Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley (2012). Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism. Episteme 9 (1):3-26.
    According to Interest-Relative Invariantism, whether an agent knows that p, or possesses other sorts of epistemic properties or relations, is in part determined by the practical costs of being wrong about p. Recent studies in experimental philosophy have tested the claims of IRI. After critically discussing prior studies, we present the results of our own experiments that provide strong support for IRI. We discuss our results in light of complementary findings by other theorists, and address the challenge posed by a (...)
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  7. Jason Stanley (2012). Précis of Know How. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):733-736.
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  8. Jason Stanley (2012). Replies to Dickie, Schroeder and Stalnaker. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):762-778.
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  9. Joshua Armstrong & Jason Stanley (2011). Singular Thoughts and Singular Propositions. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):205 - 222.
    A singular thought about an object o is one that is directly about o in a characteristic way—grasp of that thought requires having some special epistemic relation to the object o, and the thought is ontologically dependent on o. One account of the nature of singular thought exploits a Russellian Structured Account of Propositions, according to which contents are represented by means of structured n-tuples of objects, properties, and functions. A proposition is singular, according to this framework, if and only (...)
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  10. Jason Stanley (2011). Knowing (How). Noûs 45 (2):207 - 238.
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  11. Jason Stanley (2011). Know How. Oxford University Press.
    Chapter 1: Ryle on Knowing How Chapter 2: Knowledge-wh Chapter 3: PRO and the Representation of First-Person Thought Chapter 4: Ways of Thinking Chapter 5: Knowledge How Chapter 6: Ascribing Knowledge How Chapter 7: The Cognitive Science of Practical Knowledge Chapter 8: Knowledge Justified Preface A fact, as I shall use the term, is a true proposition. A proposition is the sort of thing that is capable of being believed or asserted. A proposition is also something that is characteristically the (...)
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  12. Jason Stanley (2010). &Quot;assertion" and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87 - 113.
    Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also accepts the "direct reference" theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker's view of content is thus threatened by Frege's Puzzle. Stalnaker's classic paper "Assertion" is intended to provide a response to this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker's claim (...)
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  13. Christopher Kennedy & Jason Stanley (2009). On 'Average'. Mind 118 (471):583 - 646.
    This article investigates the semantics of sentences that express numerical averages, focusing initially on cases such as 'The average American has 2.3 children'. Such sentences have been used both by linguists and philosophers to argue for a disjuncture between semantics and ontology. For example, Noam Chomsky and Norbert Hornstein have used them to provide evidence against the hypothesis that natural language semantics includes a reference relation holding between words and objects in the world, whereas metaphysicians such as Joseph Melia and (...)
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  14. John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley (2008). Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
    Judging by our folk appraisals, then, knowledge and action are intimately related. The theories of rational action with which we are familiar leave this unexplained. Moreover, discussions of knowledge are frequently silent about this connection. This is a shame, since if there is such a connection it would seem to constitute one of the most fundamental roles for knowledge. Our purpose in this paper is to rectify this lacuna, by exploring ways in which knowing something is related to rationally acting (...)
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  15. Jason Stanley (2008). Knowledge and Certainty. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.
    This paper is a companion piece to my earlier paper “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”. There are two intuitive charges against fallibilism. One is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it might be that he is not a Republican”. The second is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, even though (...)
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  16. Jason Stanley (2007). Language in Context: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Egalitarianism, the view that equality matters, attracts a great deal of attention amongst contemporary political theorists. And yet it has turned out to be surprisingly difficult to provide a fully satisfactory egalitarian theory. The cutting-edge articles in Egalitarianism move the debate forward. They are written by some of the leading political philosophers in the field.
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  17. Jason Stanley (2007). Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168–172.
    Our intuitions about whether someone knows that p vary even fixing the intuitively epistemic features of that person’s situation. Sometimes they vary with features of our own situation, and sometimes they vary with features of the putative knower’s situation. If the putative knower is in a risky situation and her belief that p is pivotal in achieving a positive outcome of one of the actions available to her, or avoiding a negative one, we often feel she must be in a (...)
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  18. Jason Stanley (2007). Replies to Gilbert Harman, Ram Neta, and Stephen Schiffer. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):196–210.
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  19. Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley (2005). I-Paper by Jennifer Hornsby. Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107–130.
    [Jennifer Hornsby] The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents' knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided. /// [Jason Stanley] The central claim is that Hornsby's argument that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge is based upon a false premise. I argue, contra Hornsby, that speakers do not voice their thoughts (...)
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  20. Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley (2005). Jason Stanley. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131-145.
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  21. Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley (2005). II Reply by Jason Stanley. Hornsby on the Phenomenology of Speech. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131–145.
    The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents’ knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.
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  22. Jason Stanley (2005). Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Analysis 65 (286):126–131.
    Lewis concludes that fallibilism is uncomfortable, though preferable to scepticism. However, he believes that contextualism about knowledge allows us to ‘dodge the choice’ between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism.
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  23. Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
    Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a (...)
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  24. Jason Stanley (2005). Review of François Recanati, Literal Meaning. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9).
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  25. Jason Stanley (2005). Review of Robyn Carston, Thoughts and Utterances. [REVIEW] Mind and Language 20 (3):364–368.
    Relevance Theory is the influential theory of linguistic interpretation first championed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. Relevance theorists have made important contributions to our understanding of a wide range of constructions, especially constructions that tend to receive less attention in semantics and philosophy of language. But advocates of Relevance Theory also have had a tendency to form a rather closed community, with an unwillingness to translate their own special vocabulary and distinctions into more neutral vernacular. Since Robyn Carston has (...)
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  26. Jason Stanley (2005). Semantics in Context. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press. 221--54.
  27. Jason Stanley (2005). Thoughts and Utterances. Mind and Language 20 (3):364-368.
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  28. Jason Stanley (2004). On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):119-146.
    Contextualism in epistemology is the doctrine that the proposition expressed by a knowledge attribution relative to a context is determined in part by the standards of justification salient in that context. The (non-skeptical) contextualist allows that in some context c, a speaker may truly attribute knowledge at a time of a proposition p to Hannah, despite her possession of only weak inductive evidence for the truth of that proposition. Relative to another context, someone may make the very same knowledge attribution (...)
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  29. Jason Stanley (2003). Context, Interest Relativity and the Sorites. Analysis 63 (4):269–281.
    According to what I will call a contextualist solution to the sorites paradox, vague terms are context-sensitive, and one can give a convincing dissolution of the sorites paradox in terms of this context-dependency. The reason, according to the contextualist, that precise boundaries for expressions like “heap” or “tall for a basketball player” are so difficult to detect is that when two entities are sufficiently similar (or saliently similar), we tend to shift the interpretation of the vague expression so that if (...)
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  30. Jason Stanley (2003). Modality and What is Said. In John Hawthorne (ed.), Language and Mind. Blackwell. 321--44.
    If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is necessarily true, then what it says must be so. If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is possible, then what it says could be true. Following natural philosophical usage, it would thus seem clear that in assessing an occurrence of a sentence for possibility or necessity, one is assessing what is said by that occurrence. In this paper, I argue that natural philosophical usage misleads here. In assessing an (...)
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  31. Jason Stanley (2002). Making It Articulated. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):149–168.
  32. Jason C. Stanley (2002). Nominal Restriction. In Georg Peter & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Oxford University Press. 365--390.
  33. Jason Stanley (2001). Hermeneutic Fictionalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):36–71.
    Fictionalist approaches to ontology have been an accepted part of philosophical methodology for some time now. On a fictionalist view, engaging in discourse that involves apparent reference to a realm of problematic entities is best viewed as engaging in a pretense. Although in reality, the problematic entities do not exist, according to the pretense we engage in when using the discourse, they do exist. In the vocabulary of Burgess and Rosen (1997, p. 6), a nominalist construal of a given discourse (...)
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  34. Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  35. Jason Stanley (2000). Context and Logical Form. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (4):391--434.
    In this paper, I defend the thesis that alleffects of extra-linguistic context on thetruth-conditions of an assertion are traceable toelements in the actual syntactic structure of thesentence uttered. In the first section, I develop thethesis in detail, and discuss its implications for therelation between semantics and pragmatics. The nexttwo sections are devoted to apparent counterexamples.In the second section, I argue that there are noconvincing examples of true non-sentential assertions.In the third section, I argue that there are noconvincing examples of what (...)
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  36. Jason Stanley & Zoltan Gendler Szabó (2000). On Quantifier Domain Restriction. Mind and Language 15 (2‐3):219-261.
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  37. Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2000). Reply to Bach and Neale. Mind and Language 15 (2‐3):295-298.
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  38. Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2000). On Quantifier Domain Restriction. Mind and Language 15 (2&3):219--61.
  39. Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2000). Reply to Bach and Neale. Mind and Language 15 (2&3):295–298.
  40. Jason Stanley (1999). Understanding, Context-Relativity, and the Description Theory. Analysis 59 (1):14 - 18.
  41. Jason Stanley (1998). Persons and Their Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):159-175.
    According to what I call ‘the asymmetry thesis’, persons, though they are the direct bearers of the properties expressed by mental predicates, are not the direct bearers of properties such as those expressed by ‘weighs 135 pounds’ or ‘has crossed legs’. A number of different views about persons entail the asymmetry thesis. I first argue that the asymmetry thesis entails an error theory about our discourse involving person‐referring terms. I then argue that it is further threatened by consideration of the (...)
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  42. Jason C. Stanley (1997). Rigidity and Content. In Richard G. Heck Jr (ed.), Language, Truth, and Logic. Oxford University Press.
  43. Jason Stanley (1996). Truth and Metatheory in Frege. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1).
    In this paper it is contended, against a challenging recent interpretation of Frege, that Frege should be credited with the first semirigorous formulation of semantic theory. It is argued that the considerations advanced against this contention suffer from two kinds of error. The first involves the attribution to Frege of a skeptical attitude towards the truth-predicate. The second involves the sort of justification which these arguments assume a classical semantic theory attempts to provide. Finally, it is shown that Frege was (...)
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  44. Richard Heck & Jason Stanley (1993). Reply to Hintikka and Sandu: Frege and Second-Order Logic. Journal of Philosophy 90 (8):416 - 424.
    Hintikka and Sandu had argued that 'Frege's failure to grasp the idea of the standard interpretation of higher-order logic turns his entire foundational project into a hopeless daydream' and that he is 'inextricably committed to a non-standard interpretation' of higher-order logic. We disagree.
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  45. Jason Stanley, Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century.
    In the Twentieth Century, Logic and Philosophy of Language are two of the few areas of philosophy in which philosophers made indisputable progress. For example, even now many of the foremost living ethicists present their theories as somewhat more explicit versions of the ideas of Kant, Mill, or Aristotle. In contrast, it would be patently absurd for a contemporary philosopher of language or logician to think of herself as working in the shadow of any figure who died before the Twentieth (...)
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