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  1. Javier Kalhat (2011). Is There A Quasi-Mereological Account of Property Incompatibility? Acta Analytica 26 (2):115-133.
    Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility faces the obvious difficulty that not all universals are compatible. In this paper I develop three objections against Armstrong’s attempt to account for property incompatibilities. First, Armstrong’s account cannot handle incompatibilities holding among properties that are either simple, or that are complex but stand to one another in the relation of overlap rather than in the part/ whole relation. Secondly, at the heart of Armstrong’s account lies a notion of structural universals which, building on an (...)
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  2. Javier Kalhat (2009). Has Lewis Reduced Modality? European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):504-526.
    Building on the pioneer work of Lycan (1988, 1991a and b, 1994) and Yagisawa (1988), this paper aims to set out in a comprehensive way the case for the view that Lewis' analyses of modality in terms of quantification over worlds and counterparts fail to be genuinely reductive. This involves bringing together elements of the case which have hitherto remained unconnected, motivating some of those elements in new and more decisive ways, and bolstering them by considering a range of objections (...)
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  3. Javier Kalhat, Review: Terrance Klein, Wittgenstein and the Metaphysics of Grace. [REVIEW]
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  4. Javier Kalhat (2008). A Critique of Armstrong's Truthmaking Account of Possibility. Acta Analytica 23 (2):161-176.
    In this paper I argue against Armstrong’s recent truthmaking account of possibility. I show that the truthmaking account presupposes modality in a number of different ways, and consequently that it is incapable of underwriting a genuine reduction of modality. I also argue that Armstrong’s account faces serious difficulties irrespective of the question of reduction; in particular, I argue that his Entailment and Possibility Principles are both false.
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  5. Javier Kalhat (2008). Has the Later Wittgenstein Accounted for Necessity? Philosophical Investigations 31 (1):1–23.
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  6. Javier Kalhat (2008). Necessity and Language: The Gap is Still Very Real. Philosophical Investigations 31 (3):227–236.
    In my previous paper "Has the later Wittgenstein accounted for necessity?" I argued against the conventionalist account of necessity proposed by Wittgenstein and his followers. Glock has addressed some of my objections in his paper "Necessity and Language: In Defence of Conventionalism". This brief rejoinder considers Glock's replies to three of those objections. In the course of doing so, I revisit Wittgenstein's explanation of the special status of necessary propositions, the supposedly arbitrary nature of colour-grammatical propositions, and the relation between (...)
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  7. Javier Kalhat (2008). Primitive Modality and Possible Worlds. Philosophy 83 (4):497-517.
    This paper sets out a number of reasons for thinking that the framework of possible worlds, even when construed non-reductively, does not provide an adequate basis for an explanation of modality. I first consider a non-reductive version of Lewis' modal realism, and then move on to consider the ersatzist approach of Plantinga et al. My main complaint is that the framework of possible worlds gets the semantics and metaphysics of ordinary modal discourse wrong. That is, possible worlds do not give (...)
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  8. Javier Kalhat, Possible Worlds and Primitive Modality.
    This paper sets out a number of reasons for thinking that the framework of possible worlds, even when construed non-reductively, does not provide an adequate basis for an explanation of modality. I first consider a non-reductive version of Lewis' modal realism, and then move on to consider the ersatzist approach of Plantinga et al. My main complaint is that the framework of possible worlds gets the semantics and metaphysics of ordinary modal discourse wrong. That is, possible worlds do not give (...)
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  9. Javier Kalhat (2008). Structural Universals and the Principle of Uniqueness of Composition. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):57-77.
    Lewis has objected to Armstrong's notion of a structural universal on the grounds that it violates the Principle of Uniqueness of Composition (PUC), which says that given some parts, there is only one whole that they compose. This paper reviews Armstrong's case for structural universals, and then attempts to reconcile structural universals with PUC by arguing for the existence of arrangement universals. The latter are not only a key to defending structural universals against Lewis' objection, but are in fact essential (...)
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  10. Javier Kalhat (2006). Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and William H. Brenner, Eds., Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 26 (4):279-281.
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  11. Javier Kalhat, Review: Moyal-Sharrock, W. H. Brenner , Readings of Wittgenstein's "On Certainty". [REVIEW]
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  12. Javier Kalhat, Review: Brian McGuinness: Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers. [REVIEW]
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  13. Javier Kalhat (2004). Discussion Nozick on Objectivity, Truth and Necessity. Ratio 17 (3):345–352.
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  14. Javier Kalhat, Review: Christopher New, Philosophy of Literature: An Introduction. [REVIEW]
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