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  1. Jay David Atlas, Some Remarks on Jerry Fodor's Arguments for a Language of Thought.
    The arguments that Fodor (1987: 150-52) gives in support of a Language of Thought are apparently straightforward. (1) Linguistic capacities are "systematic", in the sense that if one understands the words 'John loves Mary' one also understands the form of words 'Mary loves John'. In other words, sentences have a combinatorial semantics, because they have constituent structure. (2) If cognitive capacities are systematic in the same way, they must have constituent structure also. Thus there is a Language of Thought. The (...)
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  2. Jay David Atlas, 16-17 April 2005.
    The lecture that we have heard consists of excerpts from Professor Stanley’s forthcoming book Knowledge and Interest, and it consists of two parts, a messy part and a clean part; the messy part is from the book’s introduction, which describes the “central data that is at issue in this debate,” and the clean part is from Chapter 7, which presents an interesting criticism of a semantical theory of knowledge-attribution sentences that makes their truth-conditions relative to non-time-world circumstances of evaluation, e.g. (...)
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  3. Jay David Atlas, Aboutness, Fiction, and Quantifying Into Intentional Contexts: A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on The..
    A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on the Active/Passive Mood Distinction in English, etc.
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  4. Jay David Atlas, March 2006.
    In Atlas (1991, 1993, 1996b) I argued that sentences containing the generalized quantifier NP ‘only a’ , where ‘a’ is an individual constant, in sentences like ‘Only God can make a tree’, ‘Only Muriel voted for Hubert’[Horn 1969], sometimes license Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) like ever and minimizer NPIs like give…a red cent and sometimes do not, as the data in (1a), (2a), (3a), and (4) show. Data from Horn (1996b) and McCawley (1981, 1988) showed that ‘only a’ would license (...)
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  5. Jay David Atlas, Qualia, Consciousness, and Memory: Dennett (2005), Rosenthal (2002), Ledoux (2002), and Libet (2004).
    In his recent (2005) book "Sweet Dreams: philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness," Dennett renews his attack on a philosophical notion of qualia, the success of which attack is required if his brand of Functionalism is to survive. He also articulates once again what he takes to be essential to his notion of consciousness. I shall argue that his new, central argument against the philosophical concept of qualia fails. In passing I point out a difficulty that David (...)
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  6. Jay David Atlas, What is It Like to Be a Chinese Room?
    When philosophers think about mental phenomena, they focus on several features of human experience: (1) the existence of consciousness, (2) the intentionality of mental states, that property by which beliefs, desires, anger, etc. are directed at, are about, or refer to objects and states of affairs, (3) subjectivity, characterized by my feeling my pains but not yours, by my experiencing the world and myself from my point of view and not yours, (4) mental causation, that thoughts and feelings have physical (...)
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  7. Jay David Atlas (2007). 1. Meaning Dualism and its Criticism of Davidsonian Truth-Theories for Natural. In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Jay David Atlas (2007). Meanings, Propositions, Context, and Semantical Underdeterminacy. In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press.
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  9. Jay David Atlas (2007). What Reflexive Pronouns Tell Us About Belief : A New Moore's Paradox de Se, Rationality, and Privileged Access. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
  10. Jay David Atlas (2005). Logic, Meaning, and Conversation: Semantical Underdeterminacy, Implicature, and Their Interface. Oxford University Press.
    This fresh look at the philosophy of language focuses on the interface between a theory of literal meaning and pragmatics--a philosophical examination of the relationship between meaning and language use and its contexts. Here, Atlas develops the contrast between verbal ambiguity and verbal generality, works out a detailed theory of conversational inference using the work of Paul Grice on Implicature as a starting point, and gives an account of their interface as an example of the relationship between Chomsky's Internalist Semantics (...)
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  11. Jay David Atlas (1993). The Importance of Being 'Only': Testing the Neo-Gricean Versus Neo-Entailment Paradigms. Journal of Semantics 10 (4):301-318.
    In Atlas (1991) I proposed a novel account of the logical form of statements having the form ‘Only a is F’ and the form ‘Also a is F’, an analysis of the entailments and of the implicatures of those statements, and a discussion of the effects of focal stress on implicatures. In this paper I discuss the merits of my account over those of a Gricean account offered by Peter Geach (1962), Larty Horn (1992), and James McCawley (1981). In doing (...)
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  12. Jay David Atlas (1991). Topic/Comment, Presupposition, Logical Form and Focus Stress Implicatures: The Case of Focal Particles Only and Also. Journal of Semantics 8 (1-2):127-147.
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  13. Jay David Atlas (1989). Philosophy Without Ambiguity: A Logico-Linguistic Essay. Oxford University Press.
    This book expounds and defends a new conception of the relation between truth and meaning. Atlas argues that the sense of a sense-general sentence radically underdetermines (independently of indexicality) its truth-conditional content. He applies this linguistic analysis to illuminate old and new philosophical problems of meaning, truth, falsity, negation, existence, presupposition, and implicature. In particular, he demonstrates how the concept of ambiguity has been misused and confused with other concepts of meaning, and how the interface between semantics and pragmatics has (...)
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  14. Jay David Atlas (1988). What Are Negative Existence Statements About? Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):373 - 394.
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  15. Jay David Atlas (1984). Comparative Adjectives and Adverbials of Degree: An Introduction to Radically Radical Pragmatics. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 7 (4):347 - 377.
  16. Jay David Atlas (1984). Grammatical Non-Specification: The Mistaken Disjunction 'Theory'. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 7 (4):433 - 443.
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  17. Jay David Atlas (1980). A Note on a Confusion of Pragmatic and Semantic Aspects of Negation. Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (3):411 - 414.
  18. Jay David Atlas (1980). Reference, Meaning and Translation. Philosophical Books 21 (3):129-140.
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  19. Jay David Atlas (1978). On Presupposing. Mind 87 (347):396-411.
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  20. Jay David Atlas (1977). Negation, Ambiguity, and Presupposition. Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):321 - 336.
    In this paper I argue for the Atlas-Kempson Thesis that sentences of the form The A is not B are not ambiguous but rather semantically general (Quine), non-specific (Zwicky and Sadock), or vague (G. Lakoff). This observation refutes the 1970 Davidson-Harman hypothesis that underlying structures, as full semantic representations, are logical forms. It undermines the conception of semantical presupposition, removes a support for the existence of truth-value gaps for presuppositional sentences (the remaining arguments for which are viciously circular), and lifts (...)
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