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Jay F. Rosenberg [79]Jay Frank Rosenberg [1]
  1.  35
    Jay F. Rosenberg (2007). Wilfrid Sellars: Fusing the Images. Oxford University Press Inc..
    This volume presents Rosenberg's previously published studies of the central elements and implications of Sellars' philosophy, along with three new essays that ...
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  2.  31
    Jay F. Rosenberg (2005). Accessing Kant: A Relaxed Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason. Oxford University Press.
    Jay Rosenberg introduces Immanuel Kant's masterwork, the Critique of Pure Reason, from a "relaxed" problem-oriented perspective which treats Kant as an especially insightful practicing philosopher, from whom we still have much to learn, intelligently and creatively responding to significant questions that transcend his work's historical setting. Rosenberg's main project is to command a clear view of how Kant understands various perennial problems, how he attempts to resolve them, and to what extent he succeeds. At the same time the book is (...)
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  3. Jay F. Rosenberg (1987). Phenomenological Ontology Revisited: A Bergmannian Retrospective. Philosophical Perspectives 1:387-404.
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  4.  37
    Jay F. Rosenberg (2002). Thinking About Knowing. Oxford University Press.
    Jay Rosenberg offers a systematic philosophical theory of knowledge which is specifically responsive to the fact that we always engage the world from a particular perspective within it. It consequently calls into question in a fundamental way many received understandings regarding the relationships among the concepts of knowledge, belief, justification, and truth.
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  5. Jay F. Rosenberg (1993). Another Look at Proper Names. Philosophical Perspectives 7:505-530.
  6. Jay F. Rosenberg (1984). Bodies, Corpses, and Chunks of Matter--A Reply to Carter. Mind 93 (371):419-422.
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  7.  8
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1974). Linguistic Representation. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
  8.  4
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1986). The Thinking Self. Philadephia: Temple University Press.
  9.  9
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1984). Thinking Clearly About Death. Philosophical Review 93 (3):492-494.
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  10.  26
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1993). Comments on Peter van Inwagen's Material Beings. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):701 - 708.
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  11.  28
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1999). How Not to Be Systematic. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:217-225.
    Philosophy is by its nature systematic in intent. In Wilfrid Sellars’ words, it aims “to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” Philosophical systematicity is thus a matter of both scope and structure. The purview of a philosophical inquiry may encompass more or less of what is of rational concern to us, and such structure as its outcome has will constituted by the fundamental globalcommitments that inform (...)
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  12.  32
    Jay F. Rosenberg (2004). Ryleans and Outlookers: Wilfrid Sellars on "Mental States". Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):239–265.
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  13. Jay F. Rosenberg (1983). One World and Our Knowledge of It. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (4):410-412.
     
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  14.  86
    Jay F. Rosenberg (2000). Identity and Substance in Hume and Kant. Topoi 19 (2):137-145.
    According to Hume, the idea of a persisting, self-identical object, distinct from our impressions of it, and the idea of a duration of time, the mere passage of time without change, are mutually supporting "fictions". Each rests upon a "mistake", the commingling of "qualities of the imagination" or "impressions of reflection" with "external" impressions (perceptions), and, strictly speaking, we are conceptually and epistemically entitled to neither. Among Kant's aims in the First Critique is the securing of precisely these entitlements. Like (...)
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  15.  43
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1975). Transcendental Arguments Revisited. Journal of Philosophy 72 (18):611-624.
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  16.  49
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1990). Treating Connectionism Properly: Reflections on Smolensky. Psychological Research 52.
  17.  80
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1988). On Not Knowing What or Who One Is: Reflections on the Intelligibility of Dualism. Topoi 7 (March):57-63.
    Beginning with Descartes' caution not “imprudently” to “take some other object in place of myself”, I consider first the problems of self-identification confronted by various amnesiacs , both ordinary and Cartesian. Noting that cogitationes as such do not individuate, I proceed to examine conclusions drawn from certain sorts of “body-switching” thought experiments. This, in turn, gives rise to a general critique of “psychological connectedness” or “unity of consciousness” as a candidate criterion of personal identity. I conclude that our ability to (...)
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  18.  35
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1988). About Competence and Performance. Philosophical Papers 17 (1):33-49.
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  19.  72
    Jay F. Rosenberg (2000). Perception Vs. Inner Sense: A Problem About Direct Awareness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):143-160.
  20.  64
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1997). Kantian Schemata and the Unity of Perception. In Language and Thought. Hawthorne: De Gruyter
  21.  43
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1981). Apperception and Sartre's "Pre-Reflective Cogito". American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (3):255 - 260.
  22.  49
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1988). Comparing the Incommensurable: Another Look at Convergent Realism. Philosophical Studies 54 (2):163 - 193.
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  23.  51
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1972). Russell on Negative Facts. Noûs 6 (1):27-40.
    During his atomistic period, Russell felt compelled to include negative facts in his ontology. In this essay, I diagnose the grounds of that compulsion, Assess the cogency of an ontology which includes negative facts, And, Finding it inadequate, Consider finally alternative solutions within the atomistic framework to the root problems of negation.
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  24.  47
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1987). 'I Thinks': Some Reflections on Kant's Paralogisms. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):503-530.
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  25.  61
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1994). Comments on Bechtel, Levels of Description and Explanation in Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 4 (1):27-37.
    I begin by tracing some of the confusions regarding levels and reduction to a failure to distinguish two different principles according to which theories can be viewed as hierarchically arranged — epistemic authority and ontological constitution. I then argue that the notion of levels relevant to the debate between symbolic and connectionist paradigms of mental activity answers to neither of these models, but is rather correlative to the hierarchy of functional decompositions of cognitive tasks characteristic of homuncular functionalism. Finally, I (...)
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  26.  12
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1980). Coupling, Retheoretization, and the Correspondence Principle. Synthese 45 (3):351 - 385.
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  27.  14
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1967). Synonymy and the Epistemology of Linguistics. Inquiry 10 (1-4):405-420.
    In Word and Object, Quine argues from the observation that ?there is no justification for collating linguistic meanings, unless in terms of men's dispositions to respond overtly to socially observable stimulations? to the conclusion that ?the enterprise of translation is found to be involved in a certain systematic indeterminacy?. In this paper, I propose to show (1) that Quine's thesis, when properly understood, reveals in the situation of translation no peculiar indeterminacy but merely the ordinary indeterminacy present in any case (...)
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  28.  51
    Jay F. Rosenberg (2006). Still Mythic After All Those Years: On Alston's Latest Defense of the Given. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):157-173.
    Wilfrid Sellars' conclusion in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" that "the Given" is a "Myth" quickly elicited philosophical opposition and remains contentious fifty years later. William Alston has challenged that conclusion on several occasions by attempting to devise an acceptable account of perception committed to the givenness of perceived objects. His most recent challenge advances a "Theory of Appearing" which posits irreducible non-conceptual relations, ostensibly overlooked by Sellars, e.g., of "looking red", between the subject and the object perceived, that (...)
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  29.  3
    Jay F. Rosenberg (2004). (RTSH)," Red Triangles and Speckled Hens: Critical Notice of BonJour and Sosa on Epistemic Justification". International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4):463 - 77.
  30. Jay F. Rosenberg (1998). Descartes' Sceptical Argument. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 1 (1998):209-32.
    Descartes' First Meditation is widely supposed to contain an intuitive and compelling argument in support of skepticism with respect to the existence of a natural world. The leading question of this essay is whether that is indeed the case. To this end, I undertake a detailed rereading of Descartes' text on its own terms, abstracting from what has been made of it during subsequent centuries. I conclude that the argument in fact to be found in the First Meditation rests upon (...)
     
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  31.  12
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1983). The Place of Color in the Scheme of Things: A Roadmap to Sellar's Carus Lectures. The Monist 65 (July):315-335.
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  32.  29
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1997). Brandom's Making It Explicit. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):179 - 187.
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  33.  23
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1982). The Place of Color in the Scheme of Things. The Monist 65 (3):315-335.
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  34.  21
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1968). Wittgenstein's Theory of Language as Picture. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1):18 - 30.
    I develop one account of propositions as pictures sharing logical form with what they depict. Two concepts of simplicity in the "tractatus" are then isolated. Since characterization of sachverhalten as configurations of referential simples does not entail their inferential simplicity, By rejecting the tractarian theory of inference, I retain the picture theory without commitment to atomistic ontology. Interpretation of inference as performance then gives rise to a second sense of picturing.
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  35.  39
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1978). On Strawson: Sounds, Skepticism, and Necessity. Philosophia 8 (November):405-419.
  36. Jay F. Rosenberg (1984). The Practice of Philosophy: A Handbook for Beginners. Prentice-Hall.
     
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  37.  11
    Jay F. Rosenberg (2000). Scrutinizing a Trade. Noûs 34 (s1):58-66.
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  38.  16
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1996). On a Certain Antinomy: Properties, Concepts and Items in Space. Philosophical Perspectives 10:357 - 383.
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  39. Jay F. Rosenberg (1980). One World and Our Knowledge of It the Problematic of Realism in Post-Kantian Perspective.
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  40.  33
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1998). Kant and the Problem of Simultaneous Causation. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):167 – 188.
    The argument of Kant's Second Analogy provides only for causal connections between successive appearances, but, as Kant himself immediately notes, in many cases cause and effect are simultaneous. This essay examines Kant's solution to the resulting problem of simultaneous causation. I argue that there are, in fact, at least two distinct problems falling together under the rubric 'simultaneous causation', both reflecting significant features of paradigmatic causal-explanatory scenarios within Newtonian mechanics - a problem about the 'persisting simultaneity' of a continuous or (...)
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  41.  22
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1970). Wittgenstein's Self-Criticisms or "Whatever Happened to the Picture Theory?". Noûs 4 (3):209-223.
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  42.  22
    Jay F. Rosenberg (2007). Comments on Ruth Garrett Millikan's Varieties of Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):692–700.
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  43.  21
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1989). Why the Theory of Knowledge Isn't the Same as Epistemology and What It Might Be Instead. Philosophical Papers 18 (2):161-168.
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  44.  28
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1968). Intentionality and Self in the Tractatus. Noûs 2 (4):341-358.
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  45.  7
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1977). Speaking Lions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):155 - 160.
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  46.  23
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1990). Fusing the Images. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 21 (1):1-23.
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  47.  25
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1993). Raiders of the Lost Distinction: Richard Rorty and the Search for the Last Dichotomy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):195-214.
    Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity , (CIS), Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge and New York; 1989), pp. 201+xvi ____________, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth , (ORT), Philosophical Papers Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge and New York; 1991), pp. 226+x. ____________, Essays on Heidegger and Others , (EHO), Philosophical Papers Volume 2, Cambridge UniversityPress, (Cambridge and New York; 1991), pp. 202+x. Alan R. Malachowski, ed., Reading Rorty , (RR), Basil Blackwell, (Oxford and Cambridge, MA; 1990), pp. 384+xiv.
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  48.  14
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1975). The "Given" and How to Take It: Some Reflections on Phenomenal Ontology. Metaphilosophy 6 (3-4):303-337.
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  49.  9
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1968). Bergmann on Time--Showing and Saying. Mind 77 (306):279-287.
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  50.  8
    Jay F. Rosenberg (1966). Tensed Discourse and the Eliminability of Tenses. Philosophical Quarterly 16 (63):146-150.
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