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Profile: Jay Newhard (East Carolina University)
  1. Jay Newhard (forthcoming). Alethic Functionalism, Manifestation, and the Nature of Truth. Acta Analytica:1-13.
    Michael Lynch has recently proposed an updated version of alethic functionalism according to which the relation between truth per se and lower-level truth properties is not the realization relation, as might be expected, and as Lynch himself formerly held, but the manifestation relation. I argue that the manifestation relation is merely a resemblance relation and is inadequate to properly relate truth per se to lower-level truth properties. I also argue that alethic functionalism does not justify the claim that truth per (...)
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  2. Jay Newhard (2013). Four Objections to Alethic Functionalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:69-87.
    Alethic functionalism is a sophisticated version of alethic pluralism according to which truth per se is a functional property supervening on lower level truth properties. After presenting alethic functionalism, I discuss four objections to it. I raise a new objection to alethic functionalism that if Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry are the three truisms, correspondence is necessary and sufficient to satisfy the truisms, so that alethic functionalism capitulates to a correspondence theory of truth. Second, I present a (...)
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  3. Jay Newhard (2012). The Argument From Skepticism for Contextualism. Philosophia 40 (3):563-575.
    Epistemic contextualism was originally motivated and supported by the response it provides to skeptical paradox. Although there has been much discussion of the contextualist response to skeptical paradox, not much attention has been paid to the argument from skepticism for contextualism. Contextualists argue that contextualism accounts for the plausibility and apparent inconsistency of a set of paradoxical claims better than any classical invariantist theory. In this paper I focus on and carefully examine the argument from skepticism for contextualism. I argue (...)
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  4. Jay Newhard (2009). The Chrysippus Intuition and Contextual Theories of Truth. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345 - 352.
    Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth. The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.” In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition is false. I conclude that the philosophical (...)
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  5. Jay Newhard (2005). Grelling's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):1 - 27.
    Grelling’s Paradox is the paradox which results from considering whether heterologicality, the word-property which a designator has when and only when the designator does not bear the word-property it designates, is had by ‘ ȁ8heterologicality’. Although there has been some philosophical debate over its solution, Grelling’s Paradox is nearly uniformly treated as a variant of either the Liar Paradox or Russell’s Paradox, a paradox which does not present any philosophical challenges not already presented by the two better known paradoxes. The (...)
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  6. Jay Newhard (2004). Disquotationalism, Minimalism, and the Finite Minimal Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):61 - 86.
    Recently, Paul Horwich has developed the minimalist theory of truth, according to which the truth predicate does not express a substantive property, though it may be used as a grammatical expedient. Minimalism shares these claims with Quine’s disquotationalism; it differs from disquotationalism primarily in holding that truth-bearers are propositions, rather than sentences. Despite potential ontological worries, allowing that propositions bear truth gives Horwich a prima facie response to several important objections to disquotationalism. In section I of this paper, disquotationalism is (...)
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  7. Jay Newhard (2002). Matthew McGrath, Between Deflationism & Correspondence Theory Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 22 (1):53-54.
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