69 found
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  1. Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2006). Logical Pluralism. Oxford University Press.
    Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...)
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  2.  93
    Jc Beall & Julien Murzi (2013). Two Flavors of Curry's Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
    In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: c-Curry, the standard conditional-Curry paradox, and v-Curry, a validity-involving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving c-curry. A unified treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a unified treatment of both c-Curry and v-Curry. If, as is often thought, c-Curry paradox is to be solved via non-classical logic, then v-Curry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity relation itself.
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  3. Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2000). Logical Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
    Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...)
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  4.  62
    Jc Beall (2015). Free of Detachment: Logic, Rationality, and Gluts. Noûs 49 (2):410-423.
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  5. Jc Beall, Ross Brady, J. Michael Dunn, A. P. Hazen, Edwin Mares, Robert K. Meyer, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, David Ripley, John Slaney & Richard Sylvan (2012). On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):595 - 612.
    One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing (...)
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  6.  20
    Jc Beall, Thomas Forster & Jeremy Seligman (2013). A Note on Freedom From Detachment in the Logic of Paradox. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (1):15-20.
    We shed light on an old problem by showing that the logic LP cannot define a binary connective $\odot$ obeying detachment in the sense that every valuation satisfying $\varphi$ and $(\varphi\odot\psi)$ also satisfies $\psi$ , except trivially. We derive this as a corollary of a more general result concerning variable sharing.
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  7.  23
    Jc Beall (2011). Multiple-Conclusion Lp and Default Classicality. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (2):326-336.
    Philosophical applications of familiar paracomplete and paraconsistent logics often rely on an idea of . With respect to the paraconsistent logic LP (the dual of Strong Kleene or K3), such is standardly cashed out via an LP-based nonmonotonic logic due to Priest (1991, 2006a). In this paper, I offer an alternative approach via a monotonic multiple-conclusion version of LP.
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  8.  80
    Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.) (2004). The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced inquiry into (...)
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  9. Jc Beall (2011). Spandrels of Truth. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which 'is true' is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical reasons. This device, when introduced into the language, brings about truth-theoretic paradoxes. The options for dealing with the paradoxes while preserving the full transparency of 'true' are limited. In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
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  10. JC Beall & Michael Glanzberg (2010). The Liar Paradox. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Csli
    The first sentence in this essay is a lie. There is something odd about saying so, as has been known since ancient times. To see why, remember that all lies are untrue. Is the first sentence true? If it is, then it is a lie, and so it is not true. Conversely, suppose that it is not true. As we (viz., the authors) have said it, presumably with the intention of you believing it when it is not true, it is (...)
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  11.  59
    Jc Beall (2013). Shrieking Against Gluts: The Solution to the 'Just True' Problem. Analysis 73 (3):438-445.
    This paper applies what I call the shrieking method (a refined version of an idea with roots in Priest's work) to one of – if not the – issues confronting glut-theoretic approaches to paradox (viz., the problem of ‘just true’ or, what comes to the same, ‘just false’). The paper serves as a challenge to formulate a problem of ‘just true’ that isn't solved by shrieking (as advanced in this paper), if such a problem be thought to exist.
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  12. JC Beall & Mark Colyvan (2001). Heaps of Gluts and Hyde-Ing the Sorites. Mind 110 (438):401--408.
    JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
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  13.  78
    Jc Beall (2012). Why Priest's Reassurance is Not Reassuring. Analysis 72 (3):517-525.
    In the service of paraconsistent (indeed, ‘dialetheic’) theories, Graham Priest has long advanced a non-monotonic logic (viz., MiLP) as our ‘universal logic’ (at least for standard connectives), one that enjoys the familiar logic LP (for ‘logic of paradox’) as its monotonic core (Priest, G. In Contradiction , 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First printed by Martinus Nijhoff in 1987: Chs. 16 and 19). In this article, I show that MiLP faces a dilemma: either it is (plainly) unsuitable as a (...)
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  14. JC Beall (2000). On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382.
  15.  7
    Jc Beall (2013). A Simple Approach Towards Recapturing Consistent Theories in Paraconsistent Settings. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):755-764.
    I believe that, for reasons elaborated elsewhere (Beall, 2009; Priest, 2006a, 2006b), the logic LP (Asenjo, 1966; Asenjo & Tamburino, 1975; Priest, 1979) is roughly right as far as logic goes.1 But logic cannot go everywhere; we need to provide nonlogical axioms to specify our (axiomatic) theories. This is uncontroversial, but it has also been the source of discomfort for LP-based theorists, particularly with respect to true mathematical theories which we take to be consistent. My example, throughout, is arithmetic; but (...)
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  16. JC Beall (2000). On Truthmakers for Negative Truths. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):264 – 268.
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  17.  71
    JC Beall, Ross T. Brady, A. P. Hazen, Graham Priest & Greg Restall (2006). Relevant Restricted Quantification. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):587 - 598.
    The paper reviews a number of approaches for handling restricted quantification in relevant logic, and proposes a novel one. This proceeds by introducing a novel kind of enthymematic conditional.
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  18.  11
    Jc Beall (2014). Finding Tolerance Without Gluts. Mind 123 (491):791-811.
    Weber, Colyvan, and Priest have advanced glutty approaches to the sorites, on which the truth about the penumbral region of a soritical series is inconsistent. The major benefit of a glut-based approach is maintaining the truth of all sorites premisses while none the less avoiding, in a principled fashion, the absurdity of the sorites conclusion. I agree that this is a major virtue of the target glutty approach; however, I think that it can be had without gluts. If correct, this (...)
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  19.  42
    Jc Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.) (2005). Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox.
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  20. JC Beall & Mark Colyvan (2001). Looking for Contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):564 – 569.
  21.  56
    JC Beall (2000). Fitch's Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
    I have argued that without an adequate solution to the knower paradox Fitch's Proof is- or at least ought to be-ineffective against verificationism. Of course, in order to follow my suggestion verificationists must maintain that there is currently no adequate solution to the knower paradox, and that the paradox continues to provide prima facie evidence of inconsistent knowledge. By my lights, any glimpse at the literature on paradoxes offers strong support for the first thesis, and any honest, non-dogmatic reflection on (...)
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  22.  45
    JC Beall & Greg Restall, Logical Consequence.
    A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich (...)
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  23.  91
    Jc Beall (2012). Future Contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):547-557.
    A common and much-explored thought is ?ukasiewicz's idea that the future is ?indeterminate??i.e., ?gappy? with respect to some claims?and that such indeterminacy bleeds back into the present in the form of gappy ?future contingent? claims. What is uncommon, and to my knowledge unexplored, is the dual idea of an overdeterminate future?one which is ?glutty? with respect to some claims. While the direct dual, with future gluts bleeding back into the present, is worth noting, my central aim is simply to sketch (...)
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  24.  17
    Jc Beall (2013). Lp+, K3+, Fde+, and Their 'Classical Collapse'. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):742-754.
    This paper is a sequel to Beall (2011), in which I both give and discuss the philosophical import of a result for the propositional (multiple-conclusion) logic LP+. Feedback on such ideas prompted a spelling out of the first-order case. My aim in this paper is to do just that: namely, explicitly record the first-order result(s), including the collapse results for K3+ and FDE+.
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  25.  65
    Jc Beall (2006). True, False and Paranormal. Analysis 66 (290):102–114.
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  26. Jc Beall & David Ripley, Nonclassical Theories of Truth.
    This chapter attempts to give a brief overview of nonclassical (-logic) theories of truth. Due to space limitations, we follow a victory-through-sacrifice policy: sacrifice details in exchange for clarity of big-picture ideas. This policy results in our giving all-too-brief treatment to certain topics that have dominated discussion in the non-classical-logic area of truth studies. (This is particularly so of the ‘suitable conditoinal’ issue: §4.3.) Still, we present enough representative ideas that one may fruitfully turn from this essay to the more-detailed (...)
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  27.  4
    Jc Beall (2014). End of Inclosure. Mind 123 (491):829-849.
    This paper briefly defends theses in Beall 2014 against objections advanced in Weber et al. 2014. The second part of the paper both defends and fortifies an objection to the ‘inclosure’ argument for glut theory, spelling an end to the inclosure strategy (or at least its application to the sorites).
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  28.  56
    Jc Beall (2011). Dialetheists Against Pinocchio. Analysis 71 (4):689-691.
    This paper argues that, contrary to P. Eldridge-Smith, the so-called Pinocchio paradox affords no argument against ‘simply semantic dialetheism’.
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  29. JC Beall & Greg Restall, Defending Logical Pluralism.
    We are pluralists about logical consequence [1]. We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity. Our pluralism starts with our analysis of consequence. This analysis of consequence is not idiosyncratic. We agree with Richard Jeffrey, and with many other philosophers of logic about how logical consequence is to be defined. To quote Jeffrey.
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  30.  56
    Jc Beall (2001). A Neglected Deflationist Approach to the Liar. Analysis 61 (270):126–129.
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  31. Jc Beall & David Ripley (2004). Analetheism and Dialetheism. Analysis 64 (281):30–35.
  32. Jc Beall (2011). Adding to Relevant Restricted Quantification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 10:36-44.
    This paper presents, in a more general setting, a simple approach to ‘relevant restricted generalizations’ advanced in previous work. After reviewing some desiderata for restricted generalizations, I present the target route towards achieving the desiderata. An objection to the approach, due to David Ripley, is presented, followed by three brief replies, one from a dialetheic perspective and the others more general.
     
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  33.  26
    Jc Beall (2014). Strict-Choice Validities: A Note on a Familiar Pluralism. Erkenntnis 79 (2):301-307.
    My aim here is a modest one: to note another example in which the theory of validity and the theory of ‘inference’ naturally come apart. The setting is multiple-conclusion logic. At least on one philosophy of multiple-conclusion logic, there are very clear examples of where logic qua validity and logic qua normative guide to inference are essentially different things. On the given conception, logic tells us only what follows from what, what our ‘choices’ are given a set of premises; it (...)
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  34.  81
    Jc Beall, Curry's Paradox.
    Curry's paradox, so named for its discoverer, namely Haskell B. Curry, is a paradox within the family of so-called paradoxes of self-reference (or paradoxes of circularity). Like the liar paradox (e.g., ‘this sentence is false’) and Russell's paradox , Curry's paradox challenges familiar naive theories, including naive truth theory (unrestricted T-schema) and naive set theory (unrestricted axiom of abstraction), respectively. If one accepts naive truth theory (or naive set theory), then Curry's paradox becomes a direct challenge to one's theory of (...)
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  35.  44
    Jc Beall & Michael Glanzberg (2008). Where the Paths Meet: Remarks on Truth and Paradox. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):169-198.
    The study of truth is often seen as running on two separate paths: the nature path and the logic path. The former concerns metaphysical questions about the ‘nature’, if any, of truth. The latter concerns itself largely with logic, particularly logical issues arising from the truth-theoretic paradoxes. Where, if at all, do these two paths meet? It may seem, and it is all too often assumed, that they do not meet, or at best touch in only incidental ways. It is (...)
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  36. Jc Beall, Graham Priest & Zack Weber (2011). Can U Do That? Analysis 71 (2):280-285.
    In his ‘On t and u and what they can do’, Greg Restall presents an apparent problem for a handful of well-known non-classical solutions to paradoxes like the liar. In this article, we argue that there is a problem only if classical logic – or classical-enough logic – is presupposed. 1. Background Many have thought that invoking non-classical logic – in particular, a paracomplete or paraconsistent logic – is the correct response to the liar and related paradoxes. At the most (...)
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  37.  24
    Jc Beall (2014). Eco-Logical Lives: The Philosophical Lives of Richard Routley/Sylvan and Val Routley/Plumwood, by Dominic Hyde. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):619-621.
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  38. Jc Beall & Graham Priest (2007). Not So Deep Inconsistency. Australasian Journal of Logic 5:74-84.
    In his “Deep Inconsistency?” Eklund attacks arguments to the effect that some contradictions are true, and especially those based on the liar paradox, to be found in Priest’ In Contradiction. The point of this paper is to evaluate his case.
     
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  39.  12
    Jc Beall (2006). Introductory Remarks. The Monist 89 (1):3-8.
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  40.  41
    JC Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (2003). Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists? Noûs 37 (2):303–324.
  41.  4
    Jc Beall & OtÁvio Bueno (2002). The Simple Liar Without Bivalence? Analysis 62 (273):22-26.
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  42.  70
    Jc Beall (2002). Deflationism and Gaps: Untying ‘Not’s in the Debate. Analysis 62 (276):299–305.
  43.  59
    Jc Beall & Otávio Bueno (2002). The Simple Liar Without Bivalence? Analysis 62 (273):22–26.
  44.  63
    Jc Beall (1999). Prom Full Blooded Platonism to Really Full Blooded Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica 7 (3):322-325.
    Mark Balaguer argues for full blooded platonism (FBP), and argues that FBP alone can solve Benacerraf's familiar epistemic challenge. I note that if FBP really can solve Benacerraf's epistemic challenge, then FBP is not alone in its capacity so to solve; RFBP—really full blooded platonism—can do the trick just as well, where RFBP differs from FBP by allowing entities from inconsistent mathematics. I also argue briefly that there is positive reason for endorsing RFBP.
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  45.  52
    Jc Beall (2001). Existential Claims and Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1):80-86.
    This paper responds to Colin Cheyne's new anti-platonist argument according to which knowledge of existential claims—claims of the form such-tmd-so exist—requires a caused connection with the given such-and-so. If his arguments succeed then nobody can know, or even justifiably believe, that acausal entities exist, in which case (standard) platonism is untenable. I argue that Cheyne's anti-platonist argument fails.
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  46.  22
    JC Beall (2000). Is the Observable World Consistent? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):113 – 118.
  47. Jc Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.) (2005). Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth. Contributors (...)
     
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  48.  36
    Jc Beall (2001). The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its Origins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):308 – 309.
    Book Information The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins. Edited by Paul Humphreys and James Fetzer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Boston. Pp. xiii + 290. Hardback, US$105.
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  49. JC Beall (ed.) (2004). Liars and Heaps: New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press.
     
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  50.  19
    JC Beall (2001). Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):309 – 310.
    Book Information Truth. Truth Enrique Villanueva Atascadero, CA Ridgeview Publishing Company 1997 i + 446 Edited by Enrique Villanueva . Ridgeview Publishing Company. Atascadero, CA. Pp. i + 446.
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