13 found
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  1.  2
    Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer (2013). Uncertainty and the de Finetti Tables. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):308-328.
  2.  2
    Guy Politzer, David P. Over & Jean Baratgin (2010). Betting on Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 16 (3):172-197.
    A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B, and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B. The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional – true, false, or void for indicative conditionals and win, lose or void for conditional (...)
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  3.  62
    Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer (2006). Is the Mind Bayesian? The Case for Agnosticism. Mind and Society 5 (1):1-38.
    This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that (...)
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  4.  5
    Jean Baratgin, Igor Douven, Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Mike Oaksford, David Over & Guy Politzer (2015). The New Paradigm and Mental Models. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (10):547-548.
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  5.  49
    Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer (2011). Betting on Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 16 (3):172-197.
    A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B , and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B . The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional— true , false , or void for indicative conditionals and win , lose (...)
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  6.  54
    Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer (2011). Updating: A Psychologically Basic Situation of Probability Revision. Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):253-287.
    The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1992), (...)
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  7.  16
    Jean Baratgin, G. Politzer & D. P. Over, The Psychology of Indicative Conditionals and Conditional Bets.
    There is a new Bayesian, or probabilistic, paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, with new psychological accounts of the indicative conditional of natural language. In psychological experiments in this new paradigm, people judge that the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if A then C), is the conditional probability of C given A, P(C | A). In other experiments, participants respond with what has been called the 'de- fective' truth table: they judge that if A then C is true when A (...)
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  8.  1
    Darya V. Filatova, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, Jean Baratgin, Frank Jamet & Jing Shao (forthcoming). Cycles of Maximin and Utilitarian Policies Under the Veil of Ignorance. Mind and Society.
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  9. Jean Baratgin (2002). Base Rate Neglect: A Focus on the Methodology of the Engineer-Lawyer Paradigm. In Serge P. Shohov (ed.), Advances in Psychology Research. Nova Science Publishers 183--198.
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  10.  8
    Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer (2007). The Psychology of Dynamic Probability Judgment: Order Effect, Normative Theories, and Experimental Methodology. Mind and Society 6 (1):53-66.
    The Bayesian model is used in psychology as the reference for the study of dynamic probability judgment. The main limit induced by this model is that it confines the study of revision of degrees of belief to the sole situations of revision in which the universe is static (revising situations). However, it may happen that individuals have to revise their degrees of belief when the message they learn specifies a change of direction in the universe, which is considered as changing (...)
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  11. Guy Politzer & Jean Baratgin (2015). Deductive Schemas with Uncertain Premises Using Qualitative Probability Expressions. Thinking and Reasoning 22 (1):78-98.
    ABSTRACTThe new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning redirects the investigation of deduction conceptually and methodologically because the premises and the conclusion of the inferences are assumed to be uncertain. A probabilistic counterpart of the concept of logical validity and a method to assess whether individuals comply with it must be defined. Conceptually, we used de Finetti's coherence as a normative framework to assess individuals' performance. Methodologically, we presented inference schemas whose premises had various levels of probability that contained non-numerical (...)
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  12. Guy Politzer & Jean Baratgin (forthcoming). Deductive Schemas with Uncertain Premises Using Qualitative Probability Expressions. Deductive Schemas with Uncertain Premises Using Qualitative Probability Expressions:1-21.
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  13.  13
    Jean Baratgin & Bernard Walliser (2010). Sleeping Beauty and the Absent-Minded Driver. Theory and Decision 69 (3):489-496.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which summarizes the underlying probability structure. The two rival solutions proposed by Elga and Lewis differ by a single parameter concerning her prior probability. They can be supported by considering, respectively, that Sleeping Beauty is “fuzzy-minded” and “blank-minded”, the first interpretation being more natural than the second. The traditional absent -minded driver problem is reinterpreted in this framework and sustains Elga’s solution.
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