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  1. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson, Probabilistic Justification.
    We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.
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  2. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson, Lamps, Cubes, Balls and Walls.
    Various arguments have been put forward to show that Zeno-like paradoxes are still with us. A particularly interesting one involves a cube composed of colored slabs that geometrically decrease in thickness. We first point out that this argument has already been nullified by Paul Benacerraf. Then we show that nevertheless a further problem remains, one that withstands Benacerraf’s critique. We explain that the new problem is isomorphic to two other Zeno-like predicaments: a problem described by Alper and Bridger in 1998 (...)
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  3. Jeanne Peijnenburg & Scott F. Aikin (2014). Introduction. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):139-145.
    This introduction presents selected proceedings of a two-day meeting on the regress problem, sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and hosted by Vanderbilt University in October 2013, along with other submitted essays. Three forms of research on the regress problem are distinguished: metatheoretical, developmental, and critical work.
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  4. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2014). The Need for Justification. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):201-210.
    Some series can go on indefinitely, others cannot, and epistemologists want to know in which class to place epistemic chains. Is it sensible or nonsensical to speak of a proposition or belief that is justified by another proposition or belief, ad infinitum? In large part the answer depends on what we mean by “justification.” Epistemologists have failed to find a definition on which everybody agrees, and some have even advised us to stop looking altogether. In spite of this, the present (...)
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  5. Jeanne Peijnenburg & Sylvia Wenmackers (2014). Infinite Regress in Decision Theory, Philosophy of Science, and Formal Epistemology. Synthese 191 (4):627-628.
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  6. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2013). Transitivity and Partial Screening Off. Theoria 79 (4):294-308.
    The notion of probabilistic support is beset by well-known problems. In this paper we add a new one to the list: the problem of transitivity. Tomoji Shogenji has shown that positive probabilistic support, or confirmation, is transitive under the condition of screening off. However, under that same condition negative probabilistic support, or disconfirmation, is intransitive. Since there are many situations in which disconfirmation is transitive, this illustrates, but now in a different way, that the screening-off condition is too restrictive. We (...)
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  7. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2013). The Emergence of Justification. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):546-564.
    A major objection to epistemic infinitism is that it seems to make justification impossible. For if there is an infinite chain of reasons, each receiving its justification from its neighbour, then there is no justification to inherit in the first place. Some have argued that the objection arises from misunderstanding the character of justification. Justification is not something that one reason inherits from another; rather it gradually emerges from the chain as a whole. Nowhere however is it made clear what (...)
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  8. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2012). Fractal Patterns in Reasoning. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (1):15-26.
    This paper is the third and final one in a sequence of three. All three papers emphasize that a proposition can be justified by an infinite regress, on condition that epistemic justification is interpreted probabilistically. The first two papers showed this for one-dimensional chains and for one-dimensional loops of propositions, each proposition being justified probabilistically by its precursor. In the present paper we consider the more complicated case of two-dimensional nets, where each "child" proposition is probabilistically justified by two "parent" (...)
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  9. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2012). A Case of Confusing Probability and Confirmation. Synthese 184 (1):101-107.
    Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed.
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  10. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2012). An Endless Hierarchy of Probabilities. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):267-276.
    Suppose q is some proposition, and let -/- P(q) = v0 (1) -/- be the proposition that the probability of q is v0.1 How can one know that (1) is true? One cannot know it for sure, for all that may be asserted is a further probabilistic statement like -/- P(P(q) = v0) = v1, (2) -/- which states that the probability that (1) is true is v1. But the claim (2) is also subject to some further statement of an (...)
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  11. Jeanne Peijnenburg, Branden Fitelson & Igor Douven (2012). Introduction to the Special Issue: Probability, Confirmation and Fallacies. Synthese 184 (1):1-1.
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  12. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2011). Grounds and Limits: Reichenbach and Foundationalist Epistemology. Synthese 181 (1):113 - 124.
    From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form 'x is probable' only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis's idea, calling it "a remnant of rationalism". The last move in this debate was a challenge by (...)
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  13. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2010). Crosswords and Coherence. The Review of Metaphysics 63 (4):807-820.
    A common objection to coherentism is that it cannot account for truth: it gives us no reason to prefer a true theory over a false one, if both theories are equally coherent. By extending Susan Haack's crossword metaphor, the authors argue that there could be circumstances under which this objection is untenable. Although these circumstances are remote, they are in full accordance with the most ambitious modern theories in physics. Coherence may perhaps be truth conducive.
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  14. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2010). Justification by Infinite Loops. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (4):407-416.
    In an earlier paper we have shown that a proposition can have a well-defined probability value, even if its justification consists of an infinite linear chain. In the present paper we demonstrate that the same holds if the justification takes the form of a closed loop. Moreover, in the limit that the size of the loop tends to infinity, the probability value of the justified proposition is always well-defined, whereas this is not always so for the infinite linear chain. This (...)
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  15. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2010). The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg. Studia Logica 94 (3):347 - 353.
    We have earlier shown by construction that a proposition can have a welldefined nonzero probability, even if it is justified by an infinite probabilistic regress. We thought this to be an adequate rebuttal of foundationalist claims that probabilistic regresses must lead either to an indeterminate, or to a determinate but zero probability. In a comment, Frederik Herzberg has argued that our counterexamples are of a special kind, being what he calls ‘solvable’. In the present reaction we investigate what Herzberg means (...)
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  16. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2010). Volume Lxiii. Review of Metaphysics 63:999-1000.
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  17. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2010). Crosswords and Coherence. Review of Metaphysics 63 (4):807-820.
    A common objection to coherentism is that it cannot account for truth: it gives us no reason to prefer a true theory over a false one, if both theories are equally coherent. By extending Susan Haack's crossword metaphor, the authors argue that there could be circumstances under which this objection is untenable. Although these circumstances are remote, they are in full accordance with the most ambitious modern theories in physics. Coherence may perhaps be truth conducive.
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  18. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2010). Lamps, Cubes, Balls and Walls: Zeno Problems and Solutions. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):49 - 59.
    Various arguments have been put forward to show that Zeno-like paradoxes are still with us. A particularly interesting one involves a cube composed of colored slabs that geometrically decrease in thickness. We first point out that this argument has already been nullified by Paul Benacerraf. Then we show that nevertheless a further problem remains, one that withstands Benacerraf s critique. We explain that the new problem is isomorphic to two other Zeno-like predicaments: a problem described by Alper and Bridger in (...)
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  19. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2009). Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):183-193.
    Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties.
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  20. David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers (2009). How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
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  21. David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Theo Kuipers, William T. Wojtach, Erik Curiel & Ronald Pisaturo (2009). 1. How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses (Pp. 1-21). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 76 (1).
     
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  22. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2009). De Faculteit Wijsbegeerte in Groningen. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 71 (3):469.
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  23. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2009). The Philosophy Faculty in Groningen. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 71 (3):469-474.
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  24. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2008). Reichenbach's Posits Reposited. Erkenntnis 69 (1):93 - 108.
    Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under (...)
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  25. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2008). Achilles, the Tortoise, and Colliding Balls. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):187 - 201.
    It is widely held that the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, introduced by Zeno of Elea around 460 B.C., was solved by mathematical advances in the nineteenth century. The techniques of Weierstrass, Dedekind and Cantor made it clear, according to this view, that Achilles’ difficulty in traversing an infinite number of intervals while trying to catch up with the tortoise does not involve a contradiction, let alone a logical absurdity. Yet ever since the nineteenth century there have been dissidents (...)
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  26. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2008). Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem. Studia Logica 89 (3):333 - 341.
    We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.
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  27. David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers, How to Confirm the Disconfirmed. On Conjunction Fallacies and Robust Confirmation.
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for nine different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
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  28. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2007). Infinitism Regained. Mind 116 (463):597 - 602.
    Consider the following process of epistemic justification: proposition $E_{0}$ is made probable by $E_{1}$ which in turn is made probable by $E_{2}$ , which is made probable by $E_{3}$ , and so on. Can this process go on indefinitely? Foundationalists, coherentists, and sceptics claim that it cannot. I argue that it can: there are many infinite regresses of probabilistic reasoning that can be completed. This leads to a new form of epistemic infinitism.
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  29. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2007). On Poor and Not so Poor Thought Experiments. A Reply to Daniel Cohnitz. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):159 - 161.
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  30. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2006). Probability All the Way Up. Synthese 153 (2):187 - 197.
    Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism (‘probability all the way down’) is augmented by the claim that probability cannot be turned into certainty, except by data that logically exclude all alternatives. Once we start being uncertain, no amount of updating will free us from the treadmill of uncertainty. This claim is cast first in objectivist and then in subjectivist terms.
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  31. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2006). Probability Without Certainty: Foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach Debate. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453.
    Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C.I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie ambiguous, but (...)
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  32. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2006). Shaping Your Own Life. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):240–253.
    A distinction is made between imagination in the narrow sense and in the broad sense. Narrow imagination is characterised as the ability to "see" pictures in the mind's eye or to "hear" melodies in the head. Broad imagination is taken to be the faculty of creating, either in the strict sense of making something ex nihilo or in the looser sense of seeing patterns in some data. The article focuses on a particular sort of broad imagination, the kind that has (...)
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  33. Roberto Festa, Atocha Aliseda & Jeanne Peijnenburg (eds.) (2005). Confirmation, Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers. Rodopi.
    Theo AF Kuipers THE THREEFOLD EVALUATION OF THEORIES A SYNOPSIS OF FROM INSTRUMENTALISM TO CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM. ON SOME RELATIONS BETWEEN CONFIRMATION, EMPIRICAL PROGRESS, AND TRUTH APPROXIMATION (2000) ABSTRACT.
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  34. Roberto Festa, Atocha Aliseda & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2005). Introduction. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):11-20.
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  35. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2005). Classical, Nonclassical and Neoclassical Intentions. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):217-233.
    Kuipers' model of action explanation is compared, first with that of Anscombe, and then with models in the post-Anscombian tradition. Whereas Kuipers and Anscombe differ on the question of the first-person view, the difference with post-Anscombian writers concerns the so-called intentional statement. Kuipers criticizes the models of both Hempel and von Wright for their lack of an intentional statement. Kuipers' own model seems immune to this criticism, since it contains no less than two intentional statements, a "specific" and an "unspecific" (...)
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  36. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2005). Is What 'Is Done Done? O_n Regret and Remorse. Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):219-226.
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  37. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2005). Shaping Your Past Selves. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):657-658.
    I propose to complement Ainslie's idea of “bargaining with your future selves” with that of “shaping your past selves.” The result of such a complementation is that an action can work in two ways: (1) as a predecent for future behavior and (2) as a shaper of past behavior. I argue that this diminishes the unwanted effects of hyperbolic discounting even further.
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  38. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2004). Probability Without Certainty? Foundationalism and the Lewis. Philosophy of Science 52:95-124.
     
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  39. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2004). Ziekenfondsbrilletjes en de kromming in mimte-tijd: Over wat wel en niet vevbeeldbaar is. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Wijsbegeerte 96 (1):81-82.
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  40. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2004). Nemen gedane zaken geen keer?: Opmerkingen over spijt. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Wijsbegeerte 96 (2).
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  41. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2003). On the Concept of Discovery. Comments on Gerd Gigerenzer. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 232:153-158.
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  42. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2003). When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 34 (2):305-322.
    A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of thought experiments is more successful in (...)
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  43. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2002). Reichenbach's Philosophy of Mind. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10 (3):437 – 453.
  44. Jeanne Peijnenburg & Ronald Hünneman (2001). Translations and Theories: On the Difference Between Indeterminacy and Underdetermination. Ratio 14 (1):18–32.
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  45. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2000). Identity and Difference: A Hundred Years of Analytic Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 31 (4):365-381.
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  46. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2000). Akrasia, Dispositions and Degrees. Erkenntnis 53 (3):285-308.
    It is argued that the recent revival of theakrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is adirect, albeit unforeseen result of the debate onaction explanation in the philosophy of science. Asolution of the problem is put forward that takesaccount of the intimate links between the problem ofakrasia and this debate. This solution is basedon the idea that beliefs and desires have degrees ofstrength, and it suggests a way of giving a precisemeaning to that idea. Finally, it is pointed out thatthe (...)
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  47. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (1999). Probability as a Theory Dependent Concept. Synthese 118 (3):307-328.
    It is argued that probability should be defined implicitly by the distributions of possible measurement values characteristic of a theory. These distributions are tested by, but not defined in terms of, relative frequencies of occurrences of events of a specified kind. The adoption of an a priori probability in an empirical investigation constitutes part of the formulation of a theory. In particular, an assumption of equiprobability in a given situation is merely one hypothesis inter alia, which can be tested, like (...)
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  48. Jeanne Peijnenburg (1999). Are There Mental Entities? Some Lessons From Hans Reichenbach. Sorites 11 (11):66-81.
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  49. Jeanne Peijnenburg (1994). Formal Proof or Linguistic Process? Beth and Hintikka on Kant's Use of 'Analytic'. Kant-Studien 85 (2):160-178.
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