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Profile: J. L., Jeff, Jeffrey, Jeffrey L. Kasser (Colorado State University)
  1.  9
    Jeffrey L. Kasser (2015). Structure and Content in "The Will to Believe". Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (3):320-337.
    This paper argues that sustained attention to the highlighted structure of William James's “The Will to Believe” yields surprising insights into the essay. “Highlighted structure” includes James's announcements of his intentions, his section breaks, and, especially, patterns of repetition and contrast within the work. Particular attention is paid to a criticism to which James frequently returns, viz. that evidentialists are driven by their passions to adopt evidentialism. I argue that James does not take this to constitute an objection to evidentialism (...)
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  2.  18
    Jeff Kasser (forthcoming). Two Conceptions of Weight of Evidence in Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Weight of evidence continues to be a powerful metaphor within formal approaches to epistemology. But attempts to construe the metaphor in precise and useful ways have encountered formidable obstacles. This paper shows that two quite different understandings of evidential weight can be traced back to one 1878 article by C.S. Peirce. One conception, often associated with I.J. Good, measures the balance or net weight of evidence, while the other, generally associated with J.M. Keynes, measures the gross weight of evidence. Conflations (...)
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  3.  10
    Jeff Kasser (2015). The Problem of Evil, by Daniel Speak. Teaching Philosophy 38 (3):350-353.
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  4.  61
    Jeff Kasser (2011). How Settled Are Settled Beliefs in “the Fixation of Belief”? Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2):226-247.
    Despite its prominence in Peirce’s best-known works, the notion of fixed, stable, or settled belief (I will follow Peirce in using these terms more or less interchangeably) has received relatively little explicit attention. Need a belief be permanently stable in order to count as fixed? Or, to take the other extreme, does a belief count as fixed as long as it is currently stable? More fundamentally, what is involved in predicating stability of a belief? Talk of stability suggests a disposition (...)
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  5. Nishi Shah & Jeffrey Kasser (2006). The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of “The Will to Believe”. Social Epistemology 20 (1):1-17.
  6.  1
    Jeff Kasser (2016). Two Conceptions of Weight of Evidence in Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science. Erkenntnis 81 (3):629-648.
    Weight of evidence continues to be a powerful metaphor within formal approaches to epistemology. But attempts to construe the metaphor in precise and useful ways have encountered formidable obstacles. This paper shows that two quite different understandings of evidential weight can be traced back to one 1878 article by C.S. Peirce. One conception, often associated with I.J. Good, measures the balance or net weight of evidence, while the other, generally associated with J.M. Keynes, measures the gross weight of evidence. Conflations (...)
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  7.  82
    Jeff Kasser & Nishi Shah (2006). The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of "the Will to Believe". Social Epistemology 20 (1):1 – 17.
    We argue that an expressivist interpretation of "The Will to Believe" provides a fruitful way of understanding this widely-read but perplexing document. James approaches questions about our intellectual obligations from two quite different standpoints. He first defends an expressivist interpretation of judgments of intellectual obligation; they are "only expressions of our passional life". Only then does James argue against evidentialism, and both his criticisms of Clifford and his defense of a more flexible ethics of belief presuppose this independently-defended expressivism. James (...)
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  8.  18
    Jeffrey L. Kasser & Daniel Cohen (2002). Putnam, Truth and Informal Logic. Philosophica 70:85-108.
  9.  17
    Jeff Kasser (2013). Ransdell on Socrates, Peirce, and Intellectual Modesty. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 49 (4):467-489,.
    “Peirce and the Socratic Tradition” is a bold and suggestive paper. In it, Joseph Ransdell draws out a particular tradition of modesty allegedly exemplified by Socrates, Peirce, and few others in philosophy. At its heart, this tradition involves a clear-headed acceptance of some surprising implications of an obvious fact, viz. that human wisdom cannot involve taking a god’s eye view of things. The elenchus of Socrates and the doubt-belief theory of Peirce, Ransdell thinks, accurately reflect the starting points and aspirations (...)
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  10. Jeff Kasser (2014). Prospects for a Jamesian Expressivism. William James Studies 10.
     
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  11.  8
    Jeffrey L. Kasser (2013). Peirce on God, Reality and Personality. In Jeanine Diller & Asa Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities. Springer 431--440.
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  12.  15
    Jeff Kasser (1999). Peirce's Supposed Psychologism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (3):501 - 526.
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  13.  5
    Jeff Kasser (2003). Adler's Beliej's Own Ethics. Informal Logic 23 (3).
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  14. Jeff Kasser (2003). Belief's Own Ethics. [REVIEW] Informal Logic 23 (3):293-297.
     
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  15. Aaron Wilson, Eino Kaila, Heikki A. Kovailanen, Sami Pihlström, Zach VanderVeen, Charles A. Hobbs, Sor-Hoon Tan, Jeff Kasser, Michael Brodrick & Sami Paavola (2011). 1. Peirce Versus Davidson on Metaphorical Meaning Peirce Versus Davidson on Metaphorical Meaning (Pp. 117-135). Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2).
     
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