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Jeff Kasser [6]Jeffrey L. Kasser [2]Jeffrey Kasser [1]
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Profile: Jeff Jeffrey Jeffrey L. Kasser (Colorado State University)
  1. Jeff Kasser (2014). Ransdell on Socrates, Peirce, and Intellectual Modesty. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 49 (4):467-489,.
    “Peirce and the Socratic Tradition” is a bold and suggestive paper. In it, Joseph Ransdell draws out a particular tradition of modesty allegedly exemplified by Socrates, Peirce, and few others in philosophy. At its heart, this tradition involves a clear-headed acceptance of some surprising implications of an obvious fact, viz. that human wisdom cannot involve taking a god’s eye view of things. The elenchus of Socrates and the doubt-belief theory of Peirce, Ransdell thinks, accurately reflect the starting points and aspirations (...)
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  2. Jeffrey L. Kasser (2013). Peirce on God, Reality and Personality. In. In Jeanine Diller & Asa Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities. Springer. 431--440.
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  3. Jeff Kasser (2011). How Settled Are Settled Beliefs in “the Fixation of Belief”? Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2):226-247.
    Despite its prominence in Peirce’s best-known works, the notion of fixed, stable, or settled belief (I will follow Peirce in using these terms more or less interchangeably) has received relatively little explicit attention. Need a belief be permanently stable in order to count as fixed? Or, to take the other extreme, does a belief count as fixed as long as it is currently stable? More fundamentally, what is involved in predicating stability of a belief? Talk of stability suggests a disposition (...)
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  4. Aaron Wilson, Eino Kaila, Heikki A. Kovailanen, Sami Pihlström, Zach VanderVeen, Charles A. Hobbs, Sor-Hoon Tan, Jeff Kasser, Michael Brodrick & Sami Paavola (2011). 1. Peirce Versus Davidson on Metaphorical Meaning Peirce Versus Davidson on Metaphorical Meaning (Pp. 117-135). Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2).
     
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  5. Jeff Kasser & Nishi Shah (2006). The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of "the Will to Believe&Quot;. Social Epistemology 20 (1):1 – 17.
    We argue that an expressivist interpretation of "The Will to Believe" provides a fruitful way of understanding this widely-read but perplexing document. James approaches questions about our intellectual obligations from two quite different standpoints. He first defends an expressivist interpretation of judgments of intellectual obligation; they are "only expressions of our passional life". Only then does James argue against evidentialism, and both his criticisms of Clifford and his defense of a more flexible ethics of belief presuppose this independently-defended expressivism. James (...)
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  6. Nishi Shah & Jeffrey Kasser (2006). The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of “The Will to Believe”. Social Epistemology 20 (1):1-17.
    Taylor and Francis Ltd TSEP_A_151217.sgm..
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  7. Jeff Kasser (2003). Adler's Beliej's Own Ethics. Informal Logic 23 (3).
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  8. Jeffrey L. Kasser & Daniel Cohen (2002). Putnam, Truth and Informal Logic. Philosophica 70:85-108.
  9. Jeff Kasser (1999). Peirce's Supposed Psychologism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (3):501 - 526.
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