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Profile: Jeffrey Yoshimi (University of California, Merced)
  1.  74
    Scott Hotton & Jeff Yoshimi (2011). Extending Dynamical Systems Theory to Model Embodied Cognition. Cognitive Science 35 (3):444-479.
    We define a mathematical formalism based on the concept of an ‘‘open dynamical system” and show how it can be used to model embodied cognition. This formalism extends classical dynamical systems theory by distinguishing a ‘‘total system’’ (which models an agent in an environment) and an ‘‘agent system’’ (which models an agent by itself), and it includes tools for analyzing the collections of overlapping paths that occur in an embedded agent's state space. To illustrate the way this formalism can be (...)
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  2. Jeffrey Yoshimi (2007). Mathematizing Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):271-291.
    Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper I (...)
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  3.  37
    Jeff Yoshimi (2011). Active Internalism and Open Dynamical Systems. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):1 - 24.
    The question whether cognition is subserved by internal processes in the brain (internalism) or extends in to the world (active externalism) has been vigorously debated in recent years. I show how internalist and externalist ideas can be pursued in a common framework, using (1) open dynamical systems, which allow for separate analysis of an agent's intrinsic and embodied dynamics, and (2) supervenience functions, which can be used to study how low-level dynamical systems give rise to higher-level dynamical structures.
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  4.  18
    Jeff Yoshimi (2010). Husserl on Psycho-Physical Laws. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):25-42.
  5.  46
    Jeff Yoshimi (2012). Supervenience, Dynamical Systems Theory, and Non-Reductive Physicalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):373-398.
    It is often claimed (1) that levels of nature are related by supervenience, and (2) that processes occurring at particular levels of nature should be studied using dynamical systems theory. However, there has been little consideration of how these claims are related. To address the issue, I show how supervenience relations give rise to ‘supervenience functions’, and use these functions to show how dynamical systems at different levels are related to one another. I then use this analysis to describe a (...)
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  6.  75
    Jeffrey Yoshimi (2009). Husserl's Theory of Belief and the Heideggerean Critique. Husserl Studies 25 (2):121-140.
    I develop a “two-systems” interpretation of Husserl’s theory of belief. On this interpretation, Husserl accounts for our sense of the world in terms of (1) a system of embodied horizon meanings and passive synthesis, which is involved in any experience of an object, and (2) a system of active synthesis and sedimentation, which comes on line when we attend to an object’s properties. I use this account to defend Husserl against several forms of Heideggerean critique. One line of critique, recently (...)
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  7.  22
    Jeff Yoshimi (2015). The Metaphysical Neutrality of Husserlian Phenomenology. Husserl Studies 31 (1):1-15.
    I argue that Husserlian phenomenology is metaphysically neutral, in the sense of being compatible with multiple metaphysical frameworks. For example, though Husserl dismisses the concept of an unknowable thing in itself as “material nonsense”, I argue that the concept is coherent and that the existence of such things is compatible with Husserl’s phenomenology. I defend this metaphysical neutrality approach against a number of objections and consider some of its implications for Husserl interpretation.
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  8.  11
    Jeff Yoshimi & David W. Vinson (2015). Extending Gurwitsch’s Field Theory of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 34:104-123.
    Aron Gurwitsch’s theory of the structure and dynamics of consciousness has much to offer contemporary theorizing about consciousness and its basis in the embodied brain. On Gurwitsch’s account, as we develop it, the field of consciousness has a variable sized focus or "theme" of attention surrounded by a structured periphery of inattentional contents. As the field evolves, its contents change their status, sometimes smoothly, sometimes abruptly. Inner thoughts, a sense of one’s body, and the physical environment are dominant field contents. (...)
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  9.  94
    Jeffrey Yoshimi (2007). Supervenience, Determination, and Dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):114–133.
    I show how existing concepts of supervenience relate to two more fundamental ontological relations: determination and dependence. Determination says that the supervenient properties of a thing are a function of its base properties, while dependence says that having a supervenient property implies having a base property. I show that most varieties of supervenience are either determination relations or determination relations conjoined with dependence relations. In the process of unpacking these connections I identify limitations of existing concepts of supervenience and provide (...)
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  10. Jeff Yoshimi (2004). Field Theories of Mind and Brain. In Lester Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevancy for Cognitive Science. Springer 111--129.
    Aron Gurwitsch’s Gestalt-inspired “field theory of consciousness” was introduced in the same period as Wolfgang Köhler’s theory of “electrical brain fields.” I consider parallels between these theories, drawing on results that have emerged in the last five years. First, I consider the claim that fields of consciousness supervene on electromagnetic fields in the brain, then I outline Gurwitsch’s field theory of consciousness, and finally I consider how the structures described by Gurwitsch might relate to structures in the brain’s electro-magnetic field. (...)
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  11.  59
    Jeffrey Yoshimi (2004). Mapping the Structure of Debate. Informal Logic 24 (1):1-22.
    Although debate is a richly structured and prevalent form of discourse, it has received little scholarly attention. Logicians have focused on the structure of individual arguments—how they divide into premises and conclusions, which in turn divide into various constituents. In contrast, I focus on the structure of sets of arguments, showing how arguments are themselves constituents in high-level dialectical structures. I represent debates and positions by graphs whose vertices correspond to arguments and whose edges correspond to two inter-argument relations: “dispute” (...)
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  12.  3
    Jeff Yoshimi (2012). Two Dynamical Themes in Husserl. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins Pub. Co. 88--165.
    I describe and partially formalize two aspects of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy, in a way that highlights their relevance to cognitive science. First, I describe “constitutive phenomenology”, the study of structures (what I call phenomenological “models”) that constitute a person’s sense of reality. These structures develop incrementally over the course of a person’s life, and serve a variety of functions, e.g. generating expectations relative to actions, and determining the contents of context awareness. Second, I describe “transcendental-eidetic phenomenology”, which posits a (...)
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