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Profile: Jeffrey C. King (Rutgers University)
  1. Jeffrey C. King (forthcoming). Acquaintance, Singular Thought and Propositional Constituency. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    In a recent paper, Armstrong and Stanley (Philos Stud 154:205–222, 2011) argue that despite being initially compelling, a Russellian account of singular thought has deep difficulties. I defend a certain sort of Russellian account of singular thought against their arguments. In the process, I spell out a notion of propositional constituency that is independently motivated and has many attractive features.
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  2. Jeffrey C. King (2014). Speaker Intentions in Context. Noûs 48 (2):219-237.
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  3. Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames & Jeff Speaks (2014). New Thinking About Propositions. Oup Oxford.
    Philosophy, science, and common sense all refer to propositions--things we believe and say, and things which are true or false. But there is no consensus on what sorts of things these entities are. Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks argue that commitment to propositions is indispensable, and each defend their own views on the debate.
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  4. Jeffrey C. King (2013). On Fineness of Grain. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):763-781.
    A central job for propositions is to be the objects of the attitudes. Propositions are the things we doubt, believe and suppose. Some philosophers have thought that propositions are sets of possible worlds. But many have become convinced that such an account individuates propositions too coarsely. This raises the question of how finely propositions should be individuated. An account of how finely propositions should be individuated on which they are individuated very finely is sketched. Objections to the effect that the (...)
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  5. Jeffrey C. King (2013). Propositional Unity: What's the Problem, Who has It and Who Solves It? Philosophical Studies 165 (1):71-93.
    At least since Russell’s influential discussion in The Principles of Mathematics, many philosophers have held there is a problem that they call the problem of the unity of the proposition. In a recent paper, I argued that there is no single problem that alone deserves the epithet the problem of the unity of the proposition. I there distinguished three problems or questions, each of which had some right to be called a problem regarding the unity of the proposition; and I (...)
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  6. Jeffrey C. King (2013). Supplementives, the Coordination Account, and Conflicting Intentions. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):288-311.
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  7. Jeffrey C. King (2009). Questions of Unity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):257 - 277.
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  8. Jeffrey C. King (2009). XIII-Questions of Unity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):257-277.
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  9. Jeffrey C. King, Anaphora. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  10. Jeffrey C. King (2008). Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):209 - 242.
    In “Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account” (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work, I lay out these objections and respond to them.
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  11. Jeffrey C. King (2008). Complex Demonstratives, QI Uses, and Direct Reference. Philosophical Review 117 (1):99-117.
    result from combining the determiners `this' or `that' with syntactically simple or complex common noun phrases such as `woman' or `woman who is taking her skis off'. Thus, `this woman', and `that woman who is taking her skis off' are complex demonstratives. There are also plural complex demonstratives such as `these skis' and `those snowboarders smoking by the gondola'. My book Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account argues against what I call the direct reference account of complex demonstratives (henceforth DRCD) and (...)
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  12. Jeffrey C. King, Structured Propositions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  13. Jeffrey C. King (2007). The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford University Press.
    Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the (...)
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  14. Jeffrey C. King (2007). What in the World Are the Ways Things Might Have Been? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):443 - 453.
    Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a (metaphysically) necessary proposition is true in all (metaphysically) possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, (...)
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  15. Jeffrey C. King (2006). Semantics for Monists. Mind 115 (460):1023-1058.
    Assume that the only thing before you is a statue made of some alloy. Call those who think that there is one thing before you in such a case monists. Call those who think there are at least two things before you in such a case pluralists. The most common arguments for pluralism run as follows. The statue is claimed to have some property P that the piece of alloy lacks (or vice versa), and hence it is concluded that they (...)
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  16. Jeffrey C. King (2006). Singular Terms, Reference and Methodology in Semantics. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):141–161.
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  17. Jeffrey C. King (2004). Context Dependent Quantifiers and Donkey Anaphora. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):97-127.
  18. Jeffrey C. King (2003). Tense, Modality, and Semantic Values. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):195–246.
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  19. Jeffrey C. King (2002). Designating Propositions. Philosophical Review 111 (3):341-371.
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  20. David Braun, Jeffrey C. King & Edward N. Zalta (2001). The Metaphysics of Reference. Philosophical Perspectives 15:253-359.
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  21. Jeffrey C. King (2001). Remarks on the Syntax and Semantics of Day Designators. Noûs 35 (s15):291 - 333.
    Though these expressions are often called “names of months”, there is good reason to hold that they are not names at all. Syntactically, these words behave as count nouns. They combine with determiners such as ‘every’, ‘many’, ‘exactly three’ etc. to form restricted quantifiers:3 (1) Every January I go skiing. (2) I spent many Januarys at Squaw Valley. (3) I wasted exactly three Januarys in Bakersfield. Like other count nouns, they can take relative clauses in constructions such as (1)-(3): (1a) (...)
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  22. Jeffrey C. King (2001). Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account. Mit Press.
    A challenge to the orthodoxy, which shows that quantificational accounts are not only as effective as direct reference accounts but also handle a wider range of ...
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  23. Jeffrey C. King (2000). On the Possibility of Correct Apparently Circular Dispositional Analyses. Philosophical Studies 98 (3):257-278.
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  24. Jeffrey C. King (1999). Are Complex 'That' Phrases Devices of Direct Reference? Noûs 33 (2):155-182.
  25. Jeffrey C. King (1998). What is a Philosophical Analysis? Philosophical Studies 90 (2):155-179.
    It is common for philosophers to offer philosophical accounts or analyses, as they are sometimes called, of knowledge, autonomy, representation, (moral) goodness, reference, and even modesty. These philosophical analyses raise deep questions.What is it that is being analyzed (i.e. what sorts of things are the objects of analysis)? What sort of thing is the analysis itself (a proposition? sentence?)? Under what conditions is an analysis correct? How can a correct analysis be informative? How, if at all, does the production of (...)
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  26. Jeffrey C. King (1995). Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates. Noûs 29 (4):516-535.
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  27. Jeffrey C. King (1994). Can Propositions Be Naturalistically Acceptable? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):53-75.
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  28. Jeffrey C. King (1994). Anaphora and Operators. Philosophical Perspectives 8:221-250.
  29. Jeffrey C. King (1993). Intentional Identity Generalized. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (1):61 - 93.
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  30. Jeffrey C. King (1991). Instantial Terms, Anaphora and Arbitrary Objects. Philosophical Studies 61 (3):239 - 265.
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  31. Jeffrey C. King (1988). Are Indefinite Descriptions Ambiguous? Philosophical Studies 53 (3):417 - 440.
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  32. Jeffrey C. King (1987). Pronouns, Descriptions, and the Semantics of Discourse. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):341--363.