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  1. Jeffrey Goldsworthy (2009). Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism. Philosophy Compass 4 (4):682-702.
    Constitutional interpretation is problematic because it can be difficult to distinguish legitimate interpretation from illegitimate change. The distinction depends largely on what a constitution is. A constitution, like any other law, necessarily has a meaning, which pre-exists judicial interpretation: it is not a set of meaningless marks on paper. Any plausible constitutional theory must offer an account of the nature of that meaning. In doing so, it must address two main questions. The first is whether the meaning of the constitution (...)
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  2.  46
    Jeffrey Goldsworthy (1992). Well-Being and Value. Utilitas 4 (1):1.
    Something can be said to be good for a particular person, whether or not it is good for anyone else, let alone good ‘overall’ or ‘good simpliciter ’. Sometimes we speak of ‘John's good’ as well as of things that are ‘good for John’. What is ‘good for John’ is whatever enhances his ‘good’ or, to use an apparently synonymous term, his ‘well-being’. But what is a person's well-being: in what does it consist?
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  3.  18
    Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Adrienne Stone (eds.) (2003). Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions. OUP Oxford.
    What should and what should not to be counted as a human right? What does it mean to identify a right as a human right? And what are the most effective and legitimate means of promoting human rights? This book addresses these questions and the complex relationship between the answers to them.
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  4.  9
    Jeffrey Goldsworthy (1995). Marmor on Meaning, Interpretation, and Legislative Intention. Legal Theory 1 (4):439-464.
    In his recent book Interpretation and Legal Theory , Andrei Marmor makes a number of claims about meaning and interpretation, both in general and in law, which I will argue are mistaken. Actually, there is some confusion in his book between what I take to be his “official” view of the nature of meaning and interpretation, and a very different view which keeps surfacing despite his official rejection of it. I will argue that this alternative, rejected view, when properly developed, (...)
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  5.  5
    Jeffrey Goldsworthy (1993). Is Jurisprudence Liberal Ideology? Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13 (4):548-570.
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  6.  17
    Jeffrey Goldsworthy (2013). Legislative Intention Vindicated? Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (4):821-842.
    This review article examines Richard Ekins’ attempt to defend the concept of legislative intention from influential criticism, and to demonstrate its indispensable and central role in statutory interpretation. He rejects accounts of legislative intention in terms of the aggregation of the intentions of individual legislators, and instead, draws on recent philosophical work on the nature of group agency to propose a unitary model, in which the relevant intention is that of the legislature itself, although it is supported by the ‘interlocking’ (...)
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  7.  18
    Jeffrey Goldsworthy (1992). Externalism, Internalism and Moral Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):40 – 60.
    In "Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics", David Brink defendsexternalist moral realism against Mackie's sceptical arguments, whichpresuppose some kind of internalism. But Brink confuses the issues by failing to distinguish different kinds of internalism. What he calls conceptual internalism may be false, but Mackie can retreat to sociological internalism, which holds that most people believe moral requirements to be capable of motivating action regardless of pre-existing desires. Brink does not challenge that thesis, which isall that Mackie's sceptical arguments necessarily (...)
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  8.  3
    Jeffrey D. Goldsworthy (1990). The Self-Destruction of Legal Positivism. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 10 (4):449-486.
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  9.  4
    Jeffrey Goldsworthy (2012). Balkin , Jack . Constitutional Redemption . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. Pp. 304. $35.00 (Cloth). Balkin , Jack . Living Originalism . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. Pp. 480. $35.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (4):785-790.
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  10.  6
    Jeffrey Goldsworthy (1995). Some Scepticism About Moral Realism. Law and Philosophy 14 (3/4):357 - 374.
    The lesson is that while externalists avoid devastating objections to internalist moral realism, they thereby sacrifice most of thepractical significance of moral realism as an alternative to noncognitivism. They defend the objectivity of moral beliefs, but are forced to concede that the practical relevance and appeal of those beliefs depends on subjective desires. It is because they correctly reject internalism that they succumb to the non-cognitivists'tu quoque.
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  11. Tom Campbell & Jeffrey Denys Goldsworthy (2000). Judicial Power, Democracy and Legal Positivism. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  12. Jeffrey Goldsworthy (2003). Judicial Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy. In Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Adrienne Stone (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions. OUP Oxford
     
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  13. Jeffrey D. Goldsworthy (1987). Nozick's Libertarianism and the Justification of the State. Ratio 29 (2):180.
     
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  14. Jeffrey Goldsworthy (2011). The Case for Originalism. In Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller (eds.), The Challenge of Originalism: Essays in Constitutional Theory. Cambridge University Press
     
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  15. Jeffrey Goldsworthy (1999). The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has long been regarded as the most fundamental element of the British Constitution. It holds that Parliament has unlimited legislative authority, and that the courts have no authority to judge statutes invalid. This doctrine has now been criticized on historical and philosophical grounds and critics claim that it is a relatively recent invention of academic lawyers that superseded an earlier tradition in which Parliament's authority was limited to common law. The critics also argue that it (...)
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  16. Jeffrey Goldsworthy (2001). The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy. Oxford University Press Uk.
    In British constitutional law, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty maintains that Parliament has unlimited legislative authority. Critics have recently challenged this doctrine, on historical and philosophical grounds. This book describes its historical origins and development.
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