5 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Jeffrey Seidman [4]Jeffrey S. Seidman [1]
See also:
Profile: Jeffrey Seidman (Vassar College)
  1. Jeffrey Seidman (2012). Jollimore , Troy . Love's Vision . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Pp. 220. $35.00 (Cloth). Ethics 122 (4):815-819.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jeffrey Seidman (2010). Caring and Incapacity. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):301 - 322.
    This essay seeks to explain a morally important class of psychological incapacity—the class of what Bernard Williams has called “incapacities of character.” I argue for two main claims: (1) Caring is the underlying psychological disposition that gives rise to incapacities of character. (2) In competent, rational adults, caring is, in part, a cognitive and deliberative disposition. Caring is a mental state which disposes an agent to believe certain considerations to be good reasons for deliberation and action. And caring is a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jeffrey Seidman (2009). Valuing and Caring. Theoria 75 (4):272-303.
    What is it to "value" something, in the semi-technical sense of the term that Gary Watson establishes? I argue that valuing something consists in caring about it. Caring involves not only emotional dispositions of the sort that Agnieszka Jaworska has elaborated, but also a distinctive cognitive disposition – namely, a (defeasible) disposition to believe the object cared about to be a source of agent-relative reasons for action and for emotion. Understood in this way, an agent's carings have a stronger claim (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jeffrey Seidman (2005). Two Sides of 'Silencing'. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):68 - 77.
    John McDowell argues that for virtuous agents the requirements of virtue do not outweigh competing considerations, but 'silence' them. He explains this claim in two different ways: a virtuous agent (a) will not be tempted to act in a way which is incompatible with virtue ('motivational silencing'), or (b) will not believe that he has any reason to act in a way which is incompatible with virtue ('rational silencing'). I identify a small class of cases in which alone McDowell's claims (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jeffrey S. Seidman (2003). Rationality and Reflection. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):201-214.
    Christine Korsgaard claims that an agent is less than fully rational if she allows some attitude to inform her deliberation even though she cannot justify doing so. I argue that there is a middle way, which Korsgaard misses, between the claim that our attitudes neither need nor admit of rational assessment, on the one hand, and Korsgaard's claim that the attitudes which inform our deliberation always require justification, on the other: an agent needs reasons to opt out of her concerns (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation