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Profile: Jeffrey W. Roland (Louisiana State University)
  1. Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland (2013). Safety and the True–True Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):246-267.
    Standard accounts of semantics for counterfactuals confront the true–true problem: when the antecedent and consequent of a counterfactual are both actually true, the counterfactual is automatically true. This problem presents a challenge to safety-based accounts of knowledge. In this paper, drawing on work by Angelika Kratzer, Alan Penczek, and Duncan Pritchard, we propose a revised understanding of semantics for counterfactuals utilizing machinery from generalized quantifier theory which enables safety theorists to meet the challenge of the true–true problem.
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  2. Jeffrey W. Roland (2013). Maddy, Penelope, Defending the Axioms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):809-812.
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  3. Jeffrey W. Roland (2013). Maddy, Penelope, Defending the Axioms: On the Philosophical Foundations of Set Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, Pp. X+ 150,£ 29/US $45 (Hardback). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  4. Jeffrey W. Roland (2013). On Naturalism in the Quinean Tradition. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory. Routledge.
     
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  5. Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland (2012). Strong, Therefore Sensitive: Misgivings About DeRose's Contextualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):237-253.
    According to an influential contextualist solution to skepticism advanced by Keith DeRose, denials of skeptical hypotheses are, in most contexts, strong yet insensitive. The strength of such denials allows for knowledge of them, thus undermining skepticism, while the insensitivity of such denials explains our intuition that we do not know them. In this paper we argue that, under some well-motivated conditions, a negated skeptical hypothesis is strong only if it is sensitive. We also consider how a natural response on behalf (...)
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  6. Jeffrey W. Roland (2010). Concept Grounding and Knowledge of Set Theory. Philosophia 38 (1):179-193.
    C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with ‘a priori’. I’m here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic—in (...)
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  7. Jeffrey W. Roland (2009). A Euthyphronic Problem for Kitcher's Epistemology of Science. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):205-223.
    Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.
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  8. Jeffrey W. Roland (2009). Nominalism and Causal Theories of Reference. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):51-67.
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  9. Jeffrey W. Roland (2009). On Naturalizing the Epistemology of Mathematics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):63-97.
    In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.
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  10. Jeffrey W. Roland (2008). Kitcher and the Obsessive Unifier. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):493-506.
    Philip Kitcher's account of scientific progress incorporates a conception of explanatory unification that invites the so-called 'obsessive unifier' worry, to wit, that in our drive to unify the phenomena we might impose artificial structure on the world and consequently produce an incorrect view of how things, in fact, are. I argue that Kitcher's attempt to address this worry is unsatisfactory because it relies on an ability to choose between rival patterns of explanation which itself rests on the relevant choice having (...)
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  11. Jeffrey W. Roland (2008). Kitcher, Mathematics, and Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):481 – 497.
    This paper argues that Philip Kitcher's epistemology of mathematics, codified in his Naturalistic Constructivism, is not naturalistic on Kitcher's own conception of naturalism. Kitcher's conception of naturalism is committed to (i) explaining the correctness of belief-regulating norms and (ii) a realist notion of truth. Naturalistic Constructivism is unable to simultaneously meet both of these commitments.
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  12. Jeffrey W. Roland (2007). Maddy and Mathematics: Naturalism or Not. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):423 - 450.
    Penelope Maddy advances a purportedly naturalistic account of mathematical methodology which might be taken to answer the question 'What justifies axioms of set theory?' I argue that her account fails both to adequately answer this question and to be naturalistic. Further, the way in which it fails to answer the question deprives it of an analog to one of the chief attractions of naturalism. Naturalism is attractive to naturalists and nonnaturalists alike because it explains the reliability of scientific practice. Maddy's (...)
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