1. Jennifer Cole Wright & Galen L. Baril (2013). Understanding the Role of Dispositional and Situational Threat Sensitivity in Our Moral Judgments. Journal of Moral Education 42 (3):383-397.
    Previous research has identified different moral judgments in liberals and conservatives. While both care about harm/fairness (?individualizing? foundations), conservatives emphasize in-group/authority/purity (?binding? foundations) more than liberals. Thus, some argue that conservatives have a more complex morality. We suggest an alternative view?that consistent with conservatism as ?motivated social cognition?, binding foundation activation satisfies psychological needs for social structure/security/certainty. Accordingly, we found that students who were dispositionally threat-sensitive showed stronger binding foundation activation, and that conservatives are more dispositionally threat-sensitive than liberals. We (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jennifer Cole Wright & John Bengson (2009). Asymmetries in Judgments of Responsibility and Intentional Action. Mind and Language 24 (1):24-50.
    Abstract: Recent experimental research on the 'Knobe effect' suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that there is a bi-directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative considerations. We defend a novel account of this phenomenon that exploits two factors: (i) an intuitive asymmetry in judgments of responsibility (e.g. praise/blame) and (ii) the fact that intentionality commonly connects the evaluative status of actions to the responsibility of actors. We present the results of several new studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Karen Bartsch & Jennifer Cole Wright (2005). Towards an Intuitionist Account of Moral Development. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):546-547.
    Sunstein's characterization of moral blunders jointly indicts an intuitive process and the structure of heuristics. But intuitions need not lead to error, and the problems with moral heuristics apply also to moral principles. Accordingly, moral development may well involve more, rather than less, intuitive responsiveness. This suggests a novel trajectory for future research into the development of appropriate moral judgments.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation