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Profile: Jennifer Duke-Yonge (Macquarie University)
  1.  36
    Jennifer Duke-Yonge (2016). Replacing Truth. Analysis 76 (1):88-96.
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    Jennifer Duke-Yonge (2006). Unknowable Truths: A Reply to Cook. Analysis 66 (292):295-299.
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    Jennifer Duke-Yonge (2006). Unknowable Truths: A Reply to Cook. Analysis 66 (292):295–299.
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    Jennifer Duke-Yonge (2009). Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions • by Jennifer Saul. Analysis 69 (1):174-176.
    Philosophers of language have long recognized that in opaque contexts, such as those involving propositional attitude reports, substitution of co-referring names may not preserve truth value. For example, the name ‘Clark Kent’ cannot be substituted for ‘Superman’ in a context like:1. Lois believes that Superman can flywithout a change in truth value. In an earlier paper , Jennifer Saul demonstrated that substitution failure could also occur in ‘simple sentences’ where none of the ordinary opacity-producing conditions existed, such as:2. Superman leaps (...)
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    Jennifer Duke-Yonge (2013). Ownership, Authorship and External Justification. Acta Analytica 28 (2):237-252.
    Some of the most well-known arguments against epistemic externalism come in the form of thought experiments involving subjects who acquire beliefs through anomolous means such as clairvoyance. These thought experiments purport to provide counterexamples to the reliabilist conception of justification: their subjects are intuitively epistemically unjustified, yet meet reliabilist externalist criteria for justification. In this article, I address a recent defence of externalism due to Daniel Breyer, who argues that externalists need not consider such subjects justified, since they fail to (...)
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  6. Jennifer Duke-Yonge (2014). Logic: The Laws of Truth by Nicholas J. J. Smith. [REVIEW] Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (2):202-3.
     
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    Jennifer Duke-Yonge (2012). 'The Concept of Truth', by Richard Campbell. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):615 - 615.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 3, Page 615, September 2012.
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    Jennifer Duke-Yonge & Colleen Mccluskey (2005). General Philosophy. Philosophical Books 46 (2):152-155.
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