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Profile: Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck College)
  1. Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley (2005). Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107-145.
    The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised aby people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents' knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.
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  2. Jennifer Hornsby (2016). Intending, Knowing How, Infinitives. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-17.
    Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to (...)
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  3. Jennifer Hornsby (1980). Actions. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
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  4.  90
    Jennifer Hornsby, Causality and "the Mental".
    Many analytic philosophers of mind take for granted a certain conception of causality. Assumptions deriving from that conception are in place when they problematize what they call mental causation or argue for physicalism in respect of the mental. I claim that a different conception of causality is needed for understanding many ordinary causal truths about things which act, including truths about human, minded beings — sc. rational beings who lead lives.
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  5. Jennifer Hornsby (2012). Actions and Activity. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):233-245.
    Contemporary literature in philosophy of action seems to be divided overthe place of action in the natural causal world. I think that a disagreementabout ontology underlies the division. I argue here that human action isproperly understood only by reference to a category of process or activity,where this is not a category of particulars.
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  6. Jennifer Hornsby (2005). Truth Without Truthmaking Entities. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon 33.
  7. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.) (2011). Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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  8.  42
    Jennifer Hornsby (2001). Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Harvard University Press.
    These questions provide the impetus for the detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation presented in this book.
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  9. Rae Langton & Jennifer Hornsby (1998). Free Spech and Illocution. Legal Theory 4 (1):21-37.
    We defend the view of some feminist writers that the notion of silencing has to be taken seriously in discussions of free speech. We assume that what ought to be meant by ‘speech’, in the context ‘free speech’, is whatever it is that a correct justification of the right to free speech justifies one in protecting. And we argue that what one ought to mean includes illocution, in the sense of J.L. Austin.
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  10.  64
    Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.) (2000). Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide through an area of philosophical thought ...
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  11. Jennifer Hornsby (2008). A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press
     
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  12. Jennifer Hornsby (1995). Disempowered Speech. Philosophical Topics 23 (2):127-147.
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  13. Jennifer Hornsby (2013). Basic Activity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):1-18.
    I present a view of activity, taking it that an agent is engaged in activity so long as an action of hers is occurring. I suggest that this view (a) helps in understanding what goes wrong in an argument in Thompson (2008) known sometimes as the ‘initial segment argument’, and (b) enables us to see that there could be an intelligible conception of what is basic when agents' knowledge is allowed into an account of that.
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  14. Jennifer Hornsby (2000). Personal and Sub-Personal: A Defence of Dennett's Early Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.
    Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a (...)
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  15.  19
    Jennifer Hornsby, Intending, Knowing How, Infinitives.
    Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to (...)
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  16. Jennifer Hornsby (2001). Meaning and Uselessness: How to Think About Derogatory Words. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):128–141.
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  17. Jennifer Hornsby (2004). Agency and Actions. In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 1-23.
    Among philosophical questions about human agency, one can distinguish in a rough and ready way between those that arise in philosophy of mind and those that arise in ethics. In philosophy of mind, one central aim has been to account for the place of agents in a world whose operations are supposedly ‘physical’. In ethics, one central aim has been to account for the connexion between ethical species of normativity and the distinctive deliberative and practical capacities of human beings. Ethics (...)
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  18. Jennifer Hornsby (2009). Physicalism, Conceptual Analysis, and Acts of Faith. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press 43.
    Frank Jackson and the author each take the other to hold a position in philosophy of mind that it is extremely difficult to sustain. This chapter tries to say something about how that can be. It seeks to demonstrate the sanity of Jackson's opponents and the fragility of his own position than to hold out for the truth of any particular doctrine. It wants to bring to the surface an assumption in ontology, which is seen as a crucial part of (...)
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  19.  42
    Jennifer Hornsby, Book Review: Knowing How and Knowing That. [REVIEW]
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  20. Jennifer Hornsby (1986). Physicalist Thinking and Conceptions of Behaviour. In Philip Pettit & John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context. Oxford University Press
     
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  21. Jennifer Hornsby (2001). Dealing with Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Stephen Neale's Facing Facts. I bring to the discussion a different theory of facts from any Neale considers, and argue that it avoids flaws in Russell’s theory.
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  22. Jennifer Hornsby, Truth: The Identity Theory.
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  23. Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley (2005). II Reply by Jason Stanley. Hornsby on the Phenomenology of Speech. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131–145.
    The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents’ knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.
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  24. Jennifer Hornsby (1993). Agency and Causal Explanation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
    I. There are two points of view: ___ From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. ___ From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference to the world's causal workings.
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  25.  31
    Jennifer Hornsby (2011). Ryle's Knowing How and Knowing How to Act. In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, Usa 80.
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  26. Jennifer Hornsby (2012). Know How, by Jason Stanley,(Oxford University Press), $45/£ 25. The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57):120-121.
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  27. Jennifer Hornsby (1977). Singular Terms in Contexts of Propositional Attitude. Mind 86 (341):31-48.
  28. Jennifer Hornsby, Louise Antony, Jennifer Saul, Natalie Stoljar, Nellie Wieland & Rae Langton (2011). Subordination, Silencing, and Two Ideas of Illocution. Jurisprudence 2 (2):379-440.
    This section gathers together five reviews of Rae Langton?s book Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification followed by a response from the author.
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  29. Jennifer Hornsby (2004). Agency and Alienation. Ch. In _Naturalism in Question_. Eds. M. De Caro and D. Macarthur (Harvard UP):173-87.
    It is argued that the standard story of human action, as it is standardly naturalistically understood, should be rejected. Rather than seeking an agent amidst the workings of the mind (as in Velleman's "What Happens When Someone Acts"), we need to recognize an agent’s place in the world she inhabits. And in order to do so we have to resist the naturalistic assumptions of the standard causal story.
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  30. Jennifer Hornsby (1977). Saying Of. Analysis 37 (4):177 - 185.
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  31.  59
    Jennifer Hornsby (1997). The Presidential Address: Truth: The Identity Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):1–24.
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  32. Jennifer Hornsby (2000). Feminism in Philosophy of Language: Communicative Speech Acts. In Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press 87--106.
  33. Jennifer Hornsby (1997). Collectives and Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):429-434.
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  34.  66
    Jennifer Hornsby (1979). Reply to Guttenplan. Analysis 39 (3):136 - 137.
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  35.  40
    Jennifer Hornsby (1981). Which Physical Events Are Mental Events? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:73-92.
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  36.  59
    Jennifer Hornsby (1995). Reasons for Trying. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:525-539.
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  37. Jennifer Hornsby (2002). Review: Causing Actions. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (441):159-161.
  38.  79
    Jennifer Hornsby (1979). Actions and Identities. Analysis 39 (4):195 - 201.
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  39.  9
    Jennifer Hornsby & N. Goulder, Action.
    Book synopsis: Background In 1998 Routledge published the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy to critical acclaim. The first multi-volume Encyclopedia to be published in the discipline in over thirty years, REP is now regarded as the definitive resource in the field. Featuring 2,000 original entries from a team of over 1,300 of the world's most respected scholars and philosophers, REP swiftly accumulated rave reviews and awards, including selection by Library Journal as one of its 50 Sources for the Millenium, and recognition (...)
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  40. Jennifer Hornsby (2006). Neale, Russell and Frege on Facts. Protosociology 23.
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  41. Jennifer Hornsby, Free Speech and Hate Speech: Language and Rights.
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  42.  50
    Jennifer Hornsby (1976). Proper Names: A Defence of Burge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 30 (4):227 - 234.
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  43.  31
    Jennifer Hornsby (2010). The Standard Story of Action: An Exchange. In J. H. Aguilar & A. A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. The MIT Press 57-68.
    Book synopsis: The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources (...)
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  44.  77
    Jennifer Hornsby (1982). Reply to Lowe on Actions. Analysis 42 (3):152 - 153.
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  45. Jennifer Hornsby (1992). Physics, Biology, and Common-Sense Psychology. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press
  46. Elizabeth Frazer, Jennifer Hornsby & Sabina Lovibond (eds.) (1992). Ethics: A Feminist Reader. Blackwell.
     
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  47. Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.) (2000). The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of and a contribution to the relevant debates. Together they testify (...)
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  48. Jennifer Hornsby (2011). A Disjunctivist Conception of Acting for Reasons. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. OUP Oxford
     
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  49.  56
    Julian Dodd & Jennifer Hornsby (1992). The Identity Theory of Truth: Reply to Baldwin. Mind 101 (402):319-322.
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  50.  68
    Jennifer Hornsby (1983). Events That Are Causings: A Response to Lowe. Analysis 43 (3):141 - 142.
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