39 found
Sort by:
  1. Jennifer Lackey, Group Knowledge Attributions.
    A view growing in popularity in the current philosophical literature is that the purpose of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag good informants. Such a thesis has its origin in the work of Bernard Williams and Edward Craig. Williams, for instance, claims that the central point of the concept of knowledge is “to find somebody who is a source of reliable information about something” (1973, p.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jennifer Lackey, Testimonial Knowledge.
    Testimony is responsible, either directly or indirectly, for much of what we know, not only about the world around us but also about who we are. Despite its relative historical neglect, recent work in epistemology has seen a growing recognition of the importance and scope of testimonial knowledge. Most of this work has focused on two central questions, which will be the main topics of this article. First, is testimonial knowledge necessarily acquired through transmission from speaker to hearer, or can (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jennifer Lackey (forthcoming). Acquiring Knowledge From Others. Social Epistemology: Essential Readings.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.) (forthcoming). An OUP Volume on Disagreement. OUP.
  5. Jennifer Lackey (2014). Assertion and Expertise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).
  6. Jennifer Lackey (2014). Socially Extended Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):282-298.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) (2013). The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jennifer Lackey (2013). The Virtues of Testimony. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. 193--204.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Jennifer Lackey (2013). Why Numbers Matter. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 243.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.) (2013). The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jennifer Lackey (ed.) (2012). New Essays on Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jennifer Lackey (2012). What's the Rational Response to Everyday Disagreements? The Philosophers' Magazine 59 (59):101-106.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jennifer Lackey (2011). Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 251--276.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jennifer Lackey (2010). Acting on Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jennifer Lackey (2010). Testimony: Acquiring Knowledge From Others. In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.
    Virtually everything we know depends in some way or other on the testimony of others—what we eat, how things work, where we go, even who we are. We do not, after all, perceive firsthand the preparation of the ingredients in many of our meals, or the construction of the devices we use to get around the world, or the layout of our planet, or our own births and familial histories. These are all things we are told. Indeed, subtracting from our (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jennifer Lackey (2009). Knowledge and Credit. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
    A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses have been offered to my argument and I here consider each (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Jennifer Lackey (2008). A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance. In Alan Millar Adrian Haddock & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oup. 145-154.
    The question that will be the focus of this paper is this: what is the significance of disagreement between those who are epistemic peers? There are two answers to this question found in the recent literature. On the one hand, there are those who hold that one can continue to rationally believe that p despite the fact that one’s epistemic peer explicitly believes that not-p. I shall call those who hold this view nonconformists. In contrast, there are those who hold (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jennifer Lackey (2008/2010). Learning From Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Testimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. We rely on the reports of those around us for everything from the ingredients in our food and medicine to the identity of our family members. Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemology of testimony. Despite the multitude of views offered, a single thesis is nearly universally accepted: testimonial knowledge is acquired through the process of transmission from speaker to hearer. In this book, Jennifer Lackey shows that this thesis (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jennifer Lackey (2008). What Luck is Not. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267.
    In this paper, I critically examine the two dominant views of the concept of luck in the current literature: lack of control accounts and modal accounts. In particular, I argue that the conditions proposed by such views—that is, a lack of control and the absence of counterfactual robustness—are neither necessary nor sufficient for an event's being lucky. Hence, I conclude that the two main accounts in the current literature both fail to capture what is distinctive of, and central to, the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Jennifer Lackey (2008). What Should We Do When We Disagree? In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oup. 274-93.
    You and I have been colleagues for ten years, during which we have tirelessly discussed the reasons both for and against the existence of God. There is no argument or piece of evidence bearing directly on this question that one of us is aware of that the other is not—we are, then, evidential equals1 relative to the topic of God’s existence.2 There is also no cognitive virtue or capacity, or cognitive vice or incapacity, that one of us possesses that the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jennifer Lackey (2007). Introduction: Perspectives on Testimony. Episteme 4 (3):233-237.
    Almost everything we know depends in some way on testimony. Without the ability to learn from others, it would be virtually impossible for any individual person to know much beyond what has come within the scope of her immediate perceptual environment. The fruits of science, history, geography – all of these would be beyond our grasp, as would much of what we know about ourselves. We do not, after all, perceive that we belong to one family rather than to another (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Jennifer Lackey (2007). Norms of Assertion. Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Jennifer Lackey (2007). Why Memory Really is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):209–219.
  24. Jennifer Lackey (2007). Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese 158 (3):345--361.
    A view of knowledge—what I call the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge(DCVK)—found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck—the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jennifer Lackey (2006). Pritchard's Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):284–289.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jennifer Lackey (2006). It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. 160--89.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Jennifer Lackey (2006). Knowledge by Agreement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):235-237.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Jennifer Lackey (2006). Knowing From Testimony. Philosophy Compass 1 (5):432–448.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jennifer Lackey (2006). Learning From Words. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77–101.
    Testimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. We rely on the reports of those around us for everything from the ingredients in our food and medicine to the identity of our family members. Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemology of testimony. Despite the multitude of views offered, a single thesis is nearly universally accepted: testimonial knowledge is acquired through the process of transmission from speaker to hearer. In this book, Jennifer Lackey shows that this thesis (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Jennifer Lackey (2006). 1. Reductionism. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. 160.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Jennifer Lackey (2006). Review: Pritchard's Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):284 - 289.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Jennifer Lackey (2006). The Nature of Testimony. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):177–197.
    I discuss several views of the nature of testimony and show how each proposal has importantly different problems. I then offer a diagnosis of the widespread disagreement regarding this topic; specifically, I argue that our concept of testimony has two different aspects to it. Inadequate views of testimony, I claim, result either from collapsing these two aspects into a single account or from a failure to recognize one of them. Finally, I develop an alternative view of testimony that captures both (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.) (2006). The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press.
    Testimony is a crucial source of knowledge: we are to a large extent reliant upon what others tell us. It has been the subject of much recent interest in epistemology, and this volume collects twelve original essays on the topic by some of the world's leading philosophers. It will be the starting point for future research in this fertile field. Contributors include Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford C. Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith Lehrer, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Jennifer Lackey (2005). Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):636–658.
    It is widely assumed that memory has only the capacity to preserve epistemic features that have been generated by other sources. Specifically, if S knows (justifiedly believes/rationally believes) that p via memory at T2, then it is argued that (i) S must have known (justifiedly believed/rationally believed) that p when it was originally acquired at Tl, and (ii) S must have acquired knowledge that p (justification with respect to p/rationality with respect to p) at Tl via a non-memorial source. Thus, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Jennifer Lackey (2005). Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):163 - 190.
    One of the central problems afflicting reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is the apparent fact that infants and small children are not cognitively capable of having the inductively based positive reasons required by this view. Since non-reductionism does not impose a requirement of this sort, it is thought to avoid this problem and is therefore taken to have a significant advantage over reductionism. In this paper, however, I argue that if this objection undermines reductionism, then a variant of it (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Jennifer Lackey (2004). Review of Michael DePaul (Ed.), Linda Zagzebski (Ed.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (8).
    While there is a vast amount of writing on the concept of a virtue and its role in various areas of philosophy, this literature is fairly fragmented, with historians, ethicists, and epistemologists rarely engaged in direction conversation with one another. In light of this, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology is a most welcome collection of essays in which virtue epistemologists and virtue ethicists—including ethicists grounded in the history of philosophy—for the first time take up various issues in consultation (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Jennifer Lackey (2003). A Minimal Expression of Non–Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Noûs 37 (4):706–723.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Jennifer Lackey (2002). Explanation and Mental Causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):375-393.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Jennifer Lackey (1999). Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):471-490.
    We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial knowledge. The stronger thesis is that each speaker in a chain of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation