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Profile: Jennifer J Matey (Florida International University)
Profile: Jennifer Matey (Southern Methodist University)
  1. Jennifer Matey (forthcoming). Can Blue Mean Four? In Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness.
  2. Jennifer Matey (forthcoming). Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness.
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  3. Jennifer Matey (2013). You Can See What 'I' Means. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):57-70.
    This paper takes up the question of whether we can visually represent something as having semantic value. Something has semantic value if it represents some property, thing or concept. An argument is offered that we can represent semantic value based on a variety of number-color synesthesia. This argument is shown to withstand several objections that can be lodged against the popular arguments from phenomenal contrast and from the mundane example of reading.
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  4. Sean Allen-Hermanson & Jennifer Matey (2012). Synesthesia. In J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  5. Jennifer Matey (2012). Review of Perception, Reference and the Problem of Realism. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  6. Jennifer Matey (2012). Representing the Impossible. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.
    A theory of perception must be capable of explaining the full range of conscious perception, including amodal perception. In amodal perception we perceive the world to contain physical features that are not directly detectable by the sensory receptors. According to the active-externalist theory of perception, amodal perception depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. This paper focuses on amodal visual perception and presents a counter-example to the idea that active-externalism can account for amodal perception. The counterexample involves the experience of (...)
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  7. Jennifer Matey (2011). Reduction and the Determination of Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):291-316.
    A central task of philosophy of mind in recent decades has been to come up with a comprehensive account of the mind that is consistent with materialism. To this end, philosophers have offered useful reductive accounts of mentality in terms that are ultimately explainable by neurobiology. Although these accounts have been useful for explaining some psychological states, one feature?phenomenality or consciousness?has proven to be particularly intractable. The Higher-Order Thought theory (HOT) has been offered as one reductive theory of consciousness. According (...)
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  8. Jennifer Matey (2006). Two HOTS to Handle: The Concept of State Consciousness in the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.
    David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is typically used, both by philosophers and (...)
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