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Profile: Jennifer J Matey (Southern Methodist University)
Profile: Jennifer Matey (Southern Methodist University)
  1.  36
    Jennifer Matey (forthcoming). Good Looking. Philosophical Issues.
    Studies show that people we judge to have good character we also evaluate to be more attractive. I argue that in these cases, evaluative perceptual experiences represent morally admirable people as having positive (often intrinsic) value. Learning about a person's positive moral attributes often leads us to feel positive esteem for them. These feelings of positive esteem can come to partly constitute perceptual experiences. Such perceptual experiences evaluate the subject in an aesthetic way and seem to attribute aesthetic qualities like (...)
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  2. Jennifer Matey (2012). Representing the Impossible. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.
    A theory of perception must be capable of explaining the full range of conscious perception, including amodal perception. In amodal perception we perceive the world to contain physical features that are not directly detectable by the sensory receptors. According to the active-externalist theory of perception, amodal perception depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. This paper focuses on amodal visual perception and presents a counter-example to the idea that active-externalism can account for amodal perception. The counterexample involves the experience of (...)
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  3.  83
    Jennifer Matey (2006). Two HOTS to Handle: The Concept of State Consciousness in the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.
    David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is typically used, both by philosophers and scientists, (...)
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  4.  72
    Jennifer Matey (2011). Reduction and the Determination of Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):291-316.
    A central task of philosophy of mind in recent decades has been to come up with a comprehensive account of the mind that is consistent with materialism. To this end, philosophers have offered useful reductive accounts of mentality in terms that are ultimately explainable by neurobiology. Although these accounts have been useful for explaining some psychological states, one feature?phenomenality or consciousness?has proven to be particularly intractable. The Higher-Order Thought theory (HOT) has been offered as one reductive theory of consciousness. According (...)
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  5.  83
    Sean Allen-Hermanson & Jennifer Matey (2012). Synesthesia. In J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is an encyclopedia entry on Synesthesia. It provides a summary of our current knowledge about the condition and it reviews the philosophical implications that have been drawn from considerations about synesthesia. It's import for debates about consciousness, perception, modular theories of mind, creativity and aesthetics are discussed.
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  6.  59
    Jennifer Matey (2013). You Can See What 'I' Means. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):57-70.
    This paper takes up the question of whether we can visually represent something as having semantic value. Something has semantic value if it represents some property, thing or concept. An argument is offered that we can represent semantic value based on a variety of number-color synesthesia. This argument is shown to withstand several objections that can be lodged against the popular arguments from phenomenal contrast and from the mundane example of reading.
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  7.  28
    Jennifer Matey (2014). Can Blue Mean Four? In Christopher Hill David Bennett (ed.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press
    This paper develops the case for the representation of high-level properties in visual experience from synesthesia. I draw on a special variety of number– color synesthesia to argue that we can visually experience graphemes (like ‘4’) to have numerical values (or to represent numbers). A small subset of number-color synesthetes seem to have a heightened ability to perform mental arithmetic in virtue of their synesthesia. How can we explain the apparently facilitative effect of synesthesia on mental arithmetic in synesthete savants? (...)
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  8.  26
    Jennifer Matey (2012). Review of Perception, Reference and the Problem of Realism. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  9. Jennifer Matey (forthcoming). Phenomenal Intentionality and Color Experience. Topics in Cognitive Science.
     
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  10. Jennifer Matey (forthcoming). Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness.
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