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Jennifer Nagel [27]Jennifer A. Nagel [5]
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Profile: Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto)
  1. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). Knowledge and Reliability. In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Alvin Goldman and his Critics. Blackwell.
    Internalists have criticised reliabilism for overlooking the importance of the subject's point of view in the generation of knowledge. This paper argues that there is a troubling ambiguity in the intuitive examples that internalists have used to make their case, and on either way of resolving this ambiguity, reliabilism is untouched. However, the argument used to defend reliabilism against the internalist cases could also be used to defend a more radical form of externalism in epistemology.
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  2. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). Sensitive Knowledge: Locke on Sensation and Skepticism. In Matthew Stuart (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Locke. Blackwell.
    In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke insists that all knowledge consists in perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. However, he also insists that knowledge extends to outer reality, claiming that perception yields ‘sensitive knowledge’ of the existence of outer objects. Some scholars have argued that Locke did not really mean to restrict knowledge to perceptions of relations within the realm of ideas; others have argued that sensitive knowledge is not strictly speaking a form of knowledge for Locke. (...)
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  3. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Meanings of Metacognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Noetic feelings, like the feeling of certainty and the tip-of-the-tongue state, have an interesting place in our cognitive economy. Joelle Proust’s account of these feelings emphasizes the procedural guidance they supply, while arguing that this guidance does not depend on any conceptual ability to attribute mental states. I argue that she has made a strong case for their procedural value but hasn’t conclusively shown that they work in a way that is independent of our capacities for mental state attribution.
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  4. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Social Value of Reasoning. Episteme.
    When and why does it matter whether we can give an explicit justification for what we believe? This paper examines these questions in the light of recent empirical work on the social functions served by our capacity to reason, in particular, Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning.
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  5. Jennifer Nagel & Kaija Mortensen (forthcoming). Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy. In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Blackwell.
    Once symbolized by a burning armchair, experimental philosophy has in recent years shifted away from its original hostility to traditional methods. Starting with a brief historical review of the experimentalist challenge to traditional philosophical practice, this chapter looks at research undercutting that challenge, and at ways in which experimental work has evolved to complement and strengthen traditional approaches to philosophical questions.
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  6. Kenneth Boyd & Jennifer Nagel (2014). The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. In Edouard Machery & O'Neill Elizabeth (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge. 109-127.
  7. Jennifer Nagel (2014). Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):219-241.
    Action is not always guided by conscious deliberation; in many circumstances, we act intuitively rather than reflectively. Tamar Gendler (2014) contends that because intuitively guided action can lead us away from our reflective commitments, it limits the power of knowledge to guide action. While I agree that intuition can diverge from reflection, I argue that this divergence does not constitute a restriction on the power of knowledge. After explaining my view of the contrast between intuitive and reflective thinking, this paper (...)
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  8. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199.
    Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epistemic intuitions of their evidential (...)
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  9. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Knowledge as a Mental State. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is traced back to a (...)
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  10. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Motivating Williamson's Model Gettier Cases. Inquiry 56 (1):54-62.
    Williamson has a strikingly economical way of showing how justified true belief can fail to constitute knowledge: he models a class of Gettier cases by means of two simple constraints. His constraints can be shown to rely on some unstated assumptions about the relationship between reality and appearance. These assumptions are epistemologically non-trivial but can be defended as plausible idealizations of our actual predicament, in part because they align well with empirical work on the metacognitive dimension of experience.
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  11. Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond Mar (2013). Authentic Gettier Cases: A Reply to Starmans and Friedman. Cognition 129 (3):666-669.
    Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking ‘authentic evidence’ Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between ‘authentic evidence’ and ‘apparent evidence’. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands.
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  12. Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar (2013). Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs. Cognition 129:652-661.
    Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as “Gettier cases.” Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers’ intuitions about these (...)
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  13. Jennifer Nagel (2012). Gendler on Alief. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (4):774-788.
    Contribution to a book symposium on Tamar Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.
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  14. Jennifer Nagel (2012). Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
    Many epistemologists use intuitive responses to particular cases as evidence for their theories. Recently, experimental philosophers have challenged the evidential value of intuitions, suggesting that our responses to particular cases are unstable, inconsistent with the responses of the untrained, and swayed by factors such as ethnicity and gender. This paper presents evidence that neither gender nor ethnicity influence epistemic intuitions, and that the standard responses to Gettier cases and the like are widely shared. It argues that epistemic intuitions are produced (...)
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  15. Jennifer Nagel (2012). Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
    To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain intuitive epistemic assessments while discounting others as misleading. This paper focuses on the viability of endorsing the legitimacy of Gettier intuitions while resisting the intuitive pull of skepticism – a combination of moves that most mainstream epistemologists find appealing. Awkwardly enough, the “good” Gettier intuitions and the “bad” skeptical intuitions seem to (...)
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  16. Jennifer Nagel (2012). The Attitude of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):678-685.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's The Case for Contextualism, Volume 1.
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  17. Jennifer Nagel (2011). The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (5):1-28.
    Harman’s lottery paradox, generalized by Vogel to a number of other cases, involves a curious pattern of intuitive knowledge ascriptions: certain propositions seem easier to know than various higher-probability propositions that are recognized to follow from them. For example, it seems easier to judge that someone knows his car is now on Avenue A, where he parked it an hour ago, than to judge that he knows that it is not the case that his car has been stolen and driven (...)
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  18. Jennifer Nagel (2010). Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.
    Do we apply higher epistemic standards to subjects with high stakes? This paper argues that we expect different outward behavior from high-stakes subjects—for example, we expect them to collect more evidence than their low-stakes counterparts—but not because of any change in epistemic standards. Rather, we naturally expect subjects in any condition to think in a roughly adaptive manner, balancing the expected costs of additional evidence collection against the expected value of gains in accuracy. The paper reviews a body of empirical (...)
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  19. Jennifer Nagel (2010). Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking About Error. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):286-306.
    Epistemologists generally agree that the stringency of intuitive ascriptions of knowledge is increased when unrealized possibilities ofenor are mentioned. Non-sceptical invanantists (Williamson, Hawthorne) think it a mistake to yield in such cases to the temptation to be more stringent, but they do not deny that we feel it. They contend that the temptation is best explained as the product of a psychological bias known as the availability heuristic. I argue against the availability explanation, and sketch a rival account of what (...)
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  20. Jennifer Nagel (2008). Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
    Why do our intuitive knowledge ascriptions shift when a subject's practical interests are mentioned? Many efforts to answer this question have focused on empirical linguistic evidence for context sensitivity in knowledge claims, but the empirical psychology of belief formation and attribution also merits attention. The present paper examines a major psychological factor (called ?need-for-closure?) relevant to ascriptions involving practical interests. Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief; it also influences the accuracy of one's cognition. (...)
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  21. Jennifer Nagel (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.
    We naturally evaluate the beliefs of others, sometimes by deliberate calculation, and sometimes in a more immediate fashion. Epistemic intuitions are immediate assessments arising when someone’s condition appears to fall on one side or the other of some significant divide in epistemology. After giving a rough sketch of several major features of epistemic intuitions, this article reviews the history of the current philosophical debate about them and describes the major positions in that debate. Linguists and psychologists also study epistemic assessments; (...)
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  22. Jennifer Nagel (2006). Review of Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 115 (2):251-255.
    At any given time, an individual has certain beliefs and certain procedures or methods for modifying those beliefs. In The Realm of Reason, as in his previous book, Being Known (1999), Christopher Peacocke is concerned with the elusive question of what it is for someone to be “entitled” to a given belief or procedure.1..
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  23. Jennifer Nagel (2006). Empiricism. In Sarkar Pfeifer (ed.), The Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
    Having assigned experience this exclusive role in justification, empiricists then have a range of views concerning the character of experience, the semantics of our claims about unobservable entities, the nature of empirical confirmation, and the possibility of non-empirical warrant for some further class of claims, such as those accepted on the basis of linguistic or logical rules. Given the definitive principle of their position, empiricists can allow that we have knowledge independent of experience only where what is known is not (...)
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  24. Jennifer Nagel (2005). Contemporary Scepticism and the Cartesian God. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):465-497.
    Descartes claims that God is both incomprehensible and yet clearly and distinctly understood. This paper argues that Descartes’s development of the contrast between comprehension and understanding makes the role of God in his epistemology more interesting than is commonly thought. Section one examines the historical context of sceptical arguments about the difficulty of knowing God. Descartes describes the recognition of our inability to comprehend God as itself a source of knowledge of him; section two aims to explain how recognizing limits (...)
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  25. Jennifer Nagel (2001). Joel Pust, Intuitions as Evidence Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 21 (4):282-285.
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  26. Jennifer Nagel (2000). The Empiricist Conception of Experience. Philosophy 75 (293):345 - 376.
    One might think that a healthy respect for the deliverances of experience would require us to give up any claim to nontrivial a priori knowledge. One way it might not would be if the very admission of something as an episode of experience required the use of substantive a priori knowledge -- if there were certain a priori standards that a representation had to meet in order to count as an experience, rather than as, say, a memory or daydream. This (...)
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  27. Jennifer Nagel (1998). Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, With a Treatise of Freewill Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 18 (1):19-21.
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  28. Ernest D. Kemble & Jennifer A. Nagel (1976). Effect of Vibrissal Amputation or Anesthesia on Rearing Behavior in Rats. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 7 (4):405-406.
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  29. Ernest D. Kemble, Daniel R. Studelska & Jennifer A. Nagel (1976). Rearing Behavior of Rats After Amygdaloid, Hippocampal, Olfactory Bulb, Cortical, or Striatal Lesions. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 8 (3):163-166.
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  30. Ernest D. Kemble & Jennifer A. Nagel (1975). Decreased Sniffing Behavior in Rats Following Septal Lesions. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 5 (4):309-310.
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  31. Ernest D. Kemble & Jennifer A. Nagel (1974). Effects of Amygdaloid Lesions in Rats on Food and Water Intake and Body Weight Under Varied Ambient Temperatures. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 4 (1):31-32.
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  32. Ernest D. Kemble & Jennifer A. Nagel (1973). Failure to Form a Learned Taste Aversion in Rats with Amygdaloid Lesions. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 2 (3):155-156.
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