Search results for 'Jennifer S. Lipton' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jennifer S. Lipton & Elizabeth S. Spelke, Preschool Children's Mapping of Number Words to Nonsymbolic Numerosities.score: 1320.0
    Five-year-old children categorized as skilled versus unskilled counters were given verbal estimation and number word comprehension tasks with numerosities 20 – 120. Skilled counters showed a linear relation between number words and nonsymbolic numerosities. Unskilled counters showed the same linear relation for smaller numbers to which they could count, but not for larger number words. Further tasks indicated that unskilled counters failed even to correctly order large number words differing by a 2 : 1 ratio, whereas they performed well on (...)
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  2. Jennifer S. Lipton & Elizabeth S. Spelke (2006). Preschool Children Master the Logic of Number Word Meanings. Cognition 98 (3):57-66.score: 870.0
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  3. Peter Lipton (2002). Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):579-583.score: 360.0
  4. Helen Rodnite Lemay & Sara Lipton (1999). Ron Barkai, A History of Jewish Gynaecological Texts in the Middle Ages.(Brill's Series in Jewish Studies, 20.) Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill, 1998. Pp. Xiii, 241; 1 Table. [REVIEW] Speculum 74 (3):692-693.score: 360.0
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  5. Diana Lipton (2008). God's Back! : What Did Moses See on Sinai? In George J. Brooke, Hindy Najman & Loren T. Stuckenbruck (eds.), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions About Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity. Brill.score: 360.0
     
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  6. Hilary Barth, Kristen La Mont, Jennifer Lipton, Stanislas Dehaene, Nancy Kanwisher & Elizabeth Spelke (2006). Non-Symbolic Arithmetic in Adults and Young Children. Cognition 98 (3):199-222.score: 240.0
  7. Daniel G. Campos (2011). On the Distinction Between Peirce's Abduction and Lipton's Inference to the Best Explanation. Synthese 180 (3):419 - 442.score: 144.0
    I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peireean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peireean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning. In (...)
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  8. Peter Lipton (2004). Genetic and Generic Determinism: A New Threat to Free Will? In D. Rees & Steven P. R. Rose (eds.), The New Brain Sciences: Perils and Prospects. Cambridge University Press. 88.score: 120.0
    We are discovering more and more about the human genotypes and about the connections between genotype and behaviour. Do these advances in genetic information threaten our free will? This paper offers a philosopher’s perspective on the question.
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  9. Peter Lipton (1991). Contrastive Explanation and Causal Triangulation. Philosophy of Science 58 (4):687-697.score: 120.0
    Alan Garfinkel (1981) and Bas van Fraassen (1980), among others, have proposed a contrastive theory of explanation, according to which the proper form of an explanatory why-question is not simply "Why P?" but "Why P rather than Q?". Dennis Temple (1988) has argued in this journal that the contrastive explanandum "P rather than Q" is equivalent to the conjunction, "P and not-Q". I show that the contrast is not equivalent to the conjunction, nor to other plausible noncontrastive candidates. I then (...)
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  10. Peter Lipton (2006). What Can Bas Believe? Musgrave and Van Fraassen on Observability. Analysis 66 (3):226 - 233.score: 120.0
    There is a natural objection to the epistemic coherence of Bas van Fraassen’s use of a distinction between the observable and unobservable in his constructive empiricism, an objection that has been raised with particular clarity by Alan Musgrave. We outline Musgrave’s objection, and then consider how one might interpret and evaluate van Fraassen’s response. According to the constructive empiricist, observability for us is measured with respect to the epistemic limits of human beings qua measuring devices, limitations ‘which will be described (...)
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  11. Peter Lipton (2003). Is Explanation a Guide to Inference? A Reply to Wesley Salmon. In G. Hon & Sam S. Rakover (eds.), Explanation: Theoretical Approaches and Applications. Springer.score: 120.0
    Earlier in this volume, Wesley Salmon has given a characteristically clear and trenchant critique of the account of non-demonstrative reasoning known by the slogan `Inference to the Best Explanation'. As a long-time fan of the idea that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference, I was delighted by the suggestion that Wes and I might work together on a discussion of the issues. In the event, this project has exceeded my high expectations, for in addition to the intellectual gain that (...)
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  12. Peter Lipton (2005). Waiting for Hume. In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press. 59.score: 120.0
    It was David Hume’s great sceptical argument about non-demonstrative reasoning—the problem of induction—that hooked me on philosophy. I am still wriggling, but in the present essay I will not consider how the Humean challenge to justify our inductive practices might be met; rather, I ask why we had to wait until Hume for the challenge to be raised. The question is a natural one to ask, given the intense interest in scepticism before Hume for as far back as we can (...)
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  13. Steven Rappaport (1996). Inference to the Best Explanation: Is It Really Different From Mill's Methods? Philosophy of Science 63 (1):65-80.score: 54.0
    Peter Lipton has attempted to flesh out a model of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) by clarifying explanation in terms of a causal model. But Lipton's account of explanation makes an adequate explanation depend on a principle which is virtually identical to Mill's Method of Difference. This has the result of collapsing IBE on Lipton's account of it into causal inference as conceived by the Causal-Inference model of induction. According to this model, many of our inductions (...)
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  14. S. Feferman (1996). O'Donnell, MJ, see Lipton, J. 187-239 Remmel, JB, see Nerode, A. 125-170. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 81:241.score: 36.0
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  15. M. F.-S. & N. J. (2008). Peter Lipton (9th October 1954–25th November 2007). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):1-.score: 36.0
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  16. Jonah N. Schupbach (2007). Must the Scientific Realist Be a Rationalist? Synthese 154 (2):329-334.score: 24.0
    Marc Alspector-Kelly claims that Bas van Fraassen’s primary challenge to the scientific realist is for the realist to find a way to justify the use of some mode of inference that takes him from the world of observables to knowledge of the world of unobservables without thereby abandoning empiricism. It is argued that any effort to justify such an “inferential wand” must appeal either to synthetic a priori or synthetic a posteriori knowledge. This disjunction turns into a dilemma for the (...)
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  17. K. Brad Wray (2008). The Argument From Underconsideration as Grounds for Anti-Realism: A Defence. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):317 – 326.score: 24.0
    The anti-realist argument from underconsideration focuses on the fact that, when scientists evaluate theories, they only ever consider a subset of the theories that can account for the available data. As a result, when scientists judge one theory to be superior to competitor theories, they are not warranted in drawing the conclusion that the superior theory is likely true with respect to what it says about unobservable entities and processes. I defend the argument from underconsideration from the objections of Peter (...)
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  18. K. Khalifa (2013). The Role of Explanation in Understanding. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):161-187.score: 24.0
    Peter Lipton has argued that understanding can exist in the absence of explanation. We argue that this does not denigrate explanation's importance to understanding. Specifically, we show that all of Lipton's examples are consistent with the idea that explanation is the ideal of understanding, i.e. other modes of understanding ought to be assessed by how well they replicate the understanding provided by a good and correct explanation. We defend this idea by showing that for all of Lipton's (...)
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  19. Alexander Bird (2007). Inference to the Only Explanation. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):424--32.score: 24.0
    I propose that in some cases we may infer the truth of an hypothesis, since it is the only hypothesis left unrefuted by the evidence (a la Sherlock Holmes). Peter Lipton's description of the Semmelweis case seems to provide an example of this. But he takes it to be a case of interence to the best (loveliest) explanation. I locate this source of difference of opinion in Lipton's equation of evidence with (non-factive) observation. This equation gives us too (...)
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  20. Sami Paavola (2006). Hansonian and Harmanian Abduction as Models of Discovery. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):93 – 108.score: 24.0
    In this article, I compare two varieties of abduction as reconstructive models for analysing discovery. The first is 'Hansonian abduction', which is based on N. R. Hanson's formulations of abduction. The other is 'Harmanian abduction', the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) model, formulated especially by Gilbert Harman. Peter Lipton has analysed processes of discovery on the basis of his developed form of Harmanian abduction. I argue that Hansonian abduction would, however, be a more apt model for this purpose. (...)
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  21. Valeriano Iranzo (2001). Bad Lots, Good Explanations (Malos lotes, buenas explicaciones). Critica 33 (98):71 - 96.score: 24.0
    Van Fraassen's argument from the "bad lot" challenges realist interpretations of inference to the best explanation (IBE). In this paper I begin by discussing the replies suggested by S. Psillos and P. Lipton. I do not find them convincing. However, I think that van Fraassen's argument is flawed. First of all, it is a non sequitur. Secondly, I think that the real target for the scientific realist is the underlying assumption that epistemic justification results from a comparative assessment among (...)
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  22. Jane Suilin Lavelle, George Botterill & Suzanne Lock (2013). Contrastive Explanation and the Many Absences Problem. Synthese 190 (16):3495-3510.score: 24.0
    We often explain by citing an absence or an omission. Apart from the problem of assigning a causal role to such apparently negative factors as absences and omissions, there is a puzzle as to why only some absences and omissions, out of indefinitely many, should figure in explanations. In this paper we solve this ’many absences problem’ by using the contrastive model of explanation. The contrastive model of explanation is developed by adapting Peter Lipton’s account. What initially appears to (...)
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  23. Eric Barnes (1994). Explaining Brute Facts. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:61 - 68.score: 24.0
    I aim to show that one way of testing the mettle of a theory of scientific explanation is to inquire what that theory entails about the status of brute facts. Here I consider the nature of brute facts, and survey several contemporary accounts of explanation vis a vis this subject (the Friedman-Kitcher theory of explanatory unification, Humphreys' causal theory of explanation, and Lipton's notion of 'explanatory loveliness'). One problem with these accounts is that they seem to entail that (...)
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  24. James Ladyman, Review Symposium.score: 24.0
    The second edition of Peter Lipton’s classic text contains new and important material on the causal model of explanation, the relation of inference to the best explanation to the Bayesian account of scientific reasoning, how exactly explanation guides inference, and why we ought to think that explanatory virtues are truth-tropic. Lipton is a wonderfully clear writer and a thorough and subtle philosopher, and his book is both a student-friendly introduction to the issues addressed, and essential reading for expert (...)
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  25. D. Tulodziecki (forthcoming). Shattering the Myth of Semmelweis. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1065-1075.score: 24.0
    The case of Semmelweis has been well known since Hempel. More recently, it has been revived by Peter Lipton, Donald Gillies, Alexander Bird, Alex Broadbent, and Raphael Scholl. While these accounts differ on what exactly the case of Semmelweis shows, they all agree that Semmelweis was an excellent reasoner. This widespread agreement has also given rise to a puzzle: why Semmelweis’s views were rejected for so long. I aim to dissolve both this puzzle and the standard view of Semmelweis (...)
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  26. Adam Grobler & Andrzej Wiśniewski (2005). Explanation and Theory Evaluation. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):299-310.score: 24.0
    It is claimed that Kuipers' approach to explanation opens the possibility for a further refinement of his own refined HD method for the evaluation of theories. One severe problem for the HD method, refined or not, is theory-ladeness. Given that experimental results are theory-laden, the comparative evaluation of alternative hypotheses is always relative to background knowledge. This difficulty can be avoided by supplementing HD considerations with the principle of inference to the best explanation. The authors sketch a program for doing (...)
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  27. John Worrall (2000). Tracking Track Records. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):207-35.score: 24.0
    [Peter Lipton] From a reliabilist point of view, our inferential practices make us into instruments for determining the truth value of hypotheses where, like all instruments, reliability is a central virtue. I apply this perspective to second-order inductions, the inductive assessments of inductive practices. Such assessments are extremely common, for example whenever we test the reliability of our instruments or our informants. Nevertheless, the inductive assessment of induction has had a bad name ever since David Hume maintained that any (...)
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  28. John Worrall (2000). Tracking Track Records, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):207–235.score: 24.0
    [Peter Lipton] From a reliabilist point of view, our inferential practices make us into instruments for determining the truth value of hypotheses where, like all instruments, reliability is a central virtue. I apply this perspective to second-order inductions, the inductive assessments of inductive practices. Such assessments are extremely common, for example whenever we test the reliability of our instruments or our informants. Nevertheless, the inductive assessment of induction has had a bad name ever since David Hume maintained that any (...)
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  29. Philippe Gagnon (2012). A Look at the Inference Engine Underlying ‘Evolutionary Epistemology’ Accounts of the Production of Heuristics. In Dirk Evers, Antje Jackelén, Michael Fuller & Taede A. Smedes (eds.), Is Religion Natural? Studies in Science and Theology, No. 13. ESSSAT Biennial Yearbook 2011-2012. Martin-Luther-Universität.score: 18.0
    This paper evaluates the claim that it is possible to use nature’s variation in conjunction with retention and selection on the one hand, and the absence of ultimate groundedness of hypotheses generated by the human mind as it knows on the other hand, to discard the ascription of ultimate certainty to the rationality of human conjectures in the cognitive realm. This leads to an evaluation of the further assumption that successful hypotheses with specific applications, in other words heuristics, seem to (...)
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