44 found
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Jennifer Saul [23]Jennifer M. Saul [13]Jennifer Mather Saul [8]
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Profile: Jennifer Mather Saul (University of Sheffield)
  1.  77
    Jennifer Saul, Are Generics Especially Pernicious?
  2.  58
    Jennifer Saul, Dogwhistles, Political Manipulation, and Philosophy of Language.
  3.  24
    Jennifer Mather Saul (2012). Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    1. Lying -- 2. The problem of what is said -- 3. What is said -- 4. Is lying worse than merely misleading? -- 5. Some interesting cases.
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  4. Jennifer M. Saul (1997). Substitution and Simple Sentences. Analysis 57 (2):102–108.
  5. Jennifer M. Saul (2002). What is Said and Psychological Reality; Grice's Project and Relevance Theorists' Criticisms. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (3):347-372.
  6. Jennifer M. Saul (2002). Speaker Meaning, What is Said, and What is Implicated. Noûs 36 (2):228–248.
    [First Paragraph] Unlike so many other distinctions in philosophy, H P Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated has an immediate appeal: undergraduate students readily grasp that one who says 'someone shot my parents' has merely implicated rather than said that he was not the shooter [2]. It seems to capture things that we all really pay attention to in everyday conversation'this is why there are so many people whose entire sense of humour consists of deliberately ignoring (...)
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  7.  98
    Jennifer Saul (2012). Ranking Exercises in Philosophy and Implicit Bias. Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):256-273.
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  8. Jennifer Saul (2006). Pornography, Speech Acts and Context. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):227–246.
    Catharine MacKinnon has claimed that pornography is the subordination of women. Rae Langton has defended the plausibility and coherence of this claim by drawing on speech act theory. I argue that considering the role of context in speech acts poses serious problems for Langton's defence of MacKinnon. Langton's account can be altered in order to accommodate the role of context. Once this is done, however, her defence of MacKinnon no longer looks so plausible. Finally, I argue that the speech act (...)
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  9.  49
    Jennifer Mather Saul (2007). Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
    Substitution and simple sentences -- Simple sentences and semantics -- Simple sentences and implicatures -- The enlightenment problem and a common assumption -- Abandoning (EOI) -- Beyond matching propositions -- App. A : extending the account -- App. B : belief reporting.
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  10. Sally Haslanger & Jennifer Saul (2006). Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):89-118.
    [Sally Haslanger] In debates over the existence and nature of social kinds such as 'race' and 'gender', philosophers often rely heavily on our intuitions about the nature of the kind. Following this strategy, philosophers often reject social constructionist analyses, suggesting that they change rather than capture the meaning of the kind terms. However, given that social constructionists are often trying to debunk our ordinary (and ideology-ridden?) understandings of social kinds, it is not surprising that their analyses are counterintuitive. This article (...)
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  11.  98
    David Braun & Jennifer Saul (2002). Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations. Philosophical Studies 111 (1):1 - 41.
    Many competent speakers initially judge that (i) is true and (ii) isfalse, though they know that (iii) is true. (i) Superman leaps more tallbuildings than Clark Kent. (ii) Superman leaps more tall buildings thanSuperman. (iii) Superman is identical with Clark Kent. Semanticexplanations of these intuitions say that (i) and (ii) really can differin truth-value. Pragmatic explanations deny this, and say that theintuitions are due to misleading implicatures. This paper argues thatboth explanations are incorrect. (i) and (ii) cannot differ intruth-value, yet (...)
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  12. Jennifer Mather Saul (2003). Feminism: Issues & Arguments. Oxford University Press.
    Filling a gap in the textbook market, Feminism: Issues & Arguments provides an accessible and stimulating introduction to feminist philosophy that assumes no background in the subject. Drawing on both philosophical thought and up-to-date empirical research, Jennifer Mather Saul provides lucid arguments for a variety of feminist positions but avoids advocating any particular position so that students will be motivated to think critically. The chapters are organized around key topics including pornography, abortion, sexual harassment, and the politics of work and (...)
     
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  13.  90
    Jennifer Saul (2013). Scepticism and Implicit Bias. Disputatio 5 (37).
    Saul_Jennifer, Scepticism and Implicit Bias.
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  14. Jennifer Mather Saul (2006). On Treating Things as People: Objectification, Pornography, and the History of the Vibrator. Hypatia 21 (2):45-61.
    : This article discusses recent feminist arguments for the possible existence of an interesting link between treating things as people and treating people as things. It argues, by way of a historical case study, that the connection is more complicated than these arguments have supposed. In addition, the essay suggests some possible general links between treatment of things and treatment of people.
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  15.  71
    Jennifer M. Saul (1998). The Pragmatics of Attitude Ascription. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):363-389.
  16. Jennifer M. Saul (1993). Still an Attitude Problem. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (4):423 - 435.
  17.  46
    Jennifer Saul (2012). Women in Philosophy. The Philosophers' Magazine 59 (59):38-43.
  18. Jennifer Hornsby, Louise Antony, Jennifer Saul, Natalie Stoljar, Nellie Wieland & Rae Langton (2011). Subordination, Silencing, and Two Ideas of Illocution. Jurisprudence 2 (2):379-440.
    This section gathers together five reviews of Rae Langton?s book Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification followed by a response from the author.
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  19.  4
    Jennifer Saul (2006). Ix*-Pornography, Speech Acts and Context. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):227-246.
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  20. Jennifer Saul (2006). Gender and Race. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):119–143.
  21.  85
    Jennifer M. Saul (2001). Wayne A. Davis, Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory. Noûs 35 (4):631-641.
  22. Jennifer M. Saul (1999). Substitution, Simple Sentences, and Sex Scandals. Analysis 59 (262):106–112.
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  23. Jennifer Saul, Feminist Philosophy of Language. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Much of feminist philosophy of language so far can be described as critical—critical either of language itself or of philosophy of language, and calling for change on the basis of these criticisms. Those making these criticisms suggest that the changes are needed for the sake of feminist goals — either to better allow for feminist work to be done or, more frequently, to bring an end to certain key ways that women are disadvantaged. In this entry, I examine these criticisms. (...)
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  24.  44
    Jennifer Saul (2012). The Best of Intentions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):29-47.
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  25.  91
    Jennifer Saul (2010). Enlightened? As If! International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (4):547-549.
  26. Jennifer Mather Saul (2003). Feminism: Issues and Arguments. OUP Oxford.
    A stimulating and accessible introduction to feminist philosophy. The chapters are organised around key issues of practical significance. Clear arguments are provided for a variety of feminist positions, drawing upon up-to-date empirical research. No background in feminism or philosophy is needed, and the clarity of the narrative ensures that Feminism: Issues and Arguments will appeal to a wide audience.
     
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  27.  65
    Jennifer M. Saul (1997). Reply to Forbes. Analysis 57 (2):114–118.
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  28.  30
    Jennifer Saul (2014). Stop Thinking So Much About ‘Sexual Harassment’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (3):307-321.
    This article explores two related widespread mistakes in thinking about sexual harassment. One is a mistake made by philosophers doing philosophical work on the topic of sexual harassment: an excessive focus on attempting to define the term ‘sexual harassment’. This is a perfectly legitimate topic for discussion and indeed a necessary one, but its dominance of the literature has tended to prevent philosophers from adequately exploring other topics that are of at least equal importance, particularly that of bystanders' responsibilities. The (...)
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  29.  57
    Jennifer M. Saul (1999). The Road to Hell: Intentions and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Mind and Language 14 (3):356–375.
  30.  32
    Jennifer Saul (1999). The Best of Intentions: Ignorance, Idiosyncrasy, and Belief Reporting. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):29 - 47.
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  31.  48
    Jennifer M. Saul (2002). Intensionality: What Are Intensional Transitives? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):101–119.
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes. In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon or an immortal (...)
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  32.  9
    Jennifer Saul & Simple Sentences (2008). And Intuitions. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 15 (4):541-545.
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  33.  12
    Jennifer Saul (1996). Language In the World. Philosophical Review 105 (2):262-264.
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  34.  1
    Jennifer M. Saul (2006). On Treating Things as People: Objectification, Pornography, and the History of the Vibrator. Hypatia 21 (2):45-61.
  35. Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.) (2016). Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press Uk.
    There is abundant evidence that most people, often in spite of their conscious beliefs, values and attitudes, have implicit biases. 'Implicit bias' is a term of art referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely outside conscious awareness or control. These evaluations are typically thought to involve associations between social groups and concepts or roles like 'violent,' 'lazy,' 'nurturing,' 'assertive,' 'scientist,' and so on. Such associations result at least in part from common stereotypes found in contemporary liberal societies about (...)
     
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  36. Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.) (2016). Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. Oxford University Press Uk.
    There is abundant evidence that most people, often in spite of their conscious beliefs, values and attitudes, have implicit biases. 'Implicit bias' is a term of art referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely outside conscious awareness or control. These evaluations are typically thought to involve associations between social groups and concepts or roles like 'violent,' 'lazy,' 'nurturing,' 'assertive,' 'scientist,' and so on. Such associations result at least in part from common stereotypes found in contemporary liberal societies about (...)
     
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  37. Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.) (2016). Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Implicit Bias and Philosophy brings the work of leading philosophers and psychologists together to explore core areas of psychological research on implicit bias, as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions on implicit bias, including the effect of implicit bias on scientific research, gender stereotypes in philosophy, and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics explores the (...)
     
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  38. Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.) (2016). Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2: Metaphysics and Epistemology; Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. [REVIEW] OUP Oxford.
    Most people show unconscious bias in their evaluations of social groups, in ways that may run counter to their conscious beliefs. Volume 1 addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions on this kind of implicit bias, while Volume 2 turns to the themes of moral responsibility and injustice.
     
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  39. Jennifer Mather Saul (2003). Feminism: Issues and Arguments. Oxford University Press Uk.
    A stimulating and accessible introduction to feminist philosophy. The chapters are organised around key issues of practical significance, such as pornography, abortion and sexual harassment. Clear arguments are provided for a variety of feminist positions, drawing upon up-to-date empirical research. No background in feminism or philosophy is needed, and the clarity of the narrative ensures that Feminism: Issues and Arguments will appeal to a wide audience.
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  40. Jennifer Saul (2006). Gender and Race. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):119-143.
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  41. Jennifer M. Saul (2002). II—Jennifer Saul: What Are Intensional Transitives? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):101-119.
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  42. Jennifer Mather Saul (2012). Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Jennifer Saul presents a close analysis of the distinction between lying to others and misleading them, which sheds light on key debates in philosophy of language and tackles the widespread moral preference for misleading over lying. She establishes a new view on the moral significance of the distinction, and explores a range of historical cases.
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  43. Jennifer M. Saul (2010). Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The phenomenon of substitution failure is a longstanding focus of discussion for philosophers of language. Jennifer Saul presents the first full-length treatment of this puzzling feature of language, and explores its implications for the theory of reference and names, and for the methodology of semantics.
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  44. Jennifer Mather Saul (1996). The Problem with Attitudes. Dissertation, Princeton University
    In this dissertation, I argue that no account of propositional attitude reporting which does not include a significant degree of context-sensitivity can succeed in accommodating our intuitions about the truth conditions of such reports. Next, I argue that there are two general problems to be faced by any context-sensitive theory of attitude ascription, whether semantic or pragmatic. First, any theory which preserves our intuitions about which inference schemas are valid will violate our intuitions about truth conditions of particular attitude reports. (...)
     
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