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  1. Jennifer Smalligan Marušić (2014). Hume on the Projection of Causal Necessity. Philosophy Compass 9 (4):263-273.
    A characteristically Humean pattern of explanation starts by claiming that we have a certain kind of feeling in response to some objects and then takes our having such feelings to provide an explanation of how we come to think of those objects as having some feature that we would not otherwise be able to think of them as having. This core pattern of explanation is what leads Simon Blackburn to dub Hume ‘the first great projectivist.’ This paper critically examines the (...)
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  2. Jennifer Smalligan Marušić (2014). Propositions and Judgments in Locke and Arnauld: A Monstrous and Unholy Union? Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (2):255-280.
    Philosophers have accused locke of holding a view about propositions that simply conflates the formation of a propositional thought with the judgment that a proposition is true, and charged that this has obviously absurd consequences.1 Worse, this account appears not to be unique to Locke: it bears a striking resemblance to one found in both the Port-Royal Logic (the Logic, for short) and the Port-Royal Grammar. In the Logic, this account forms part of the backbone of the traditional logic expounded (...)
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  3. Jennifer Smalligan Marušić (2013). Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume and Reid. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):800-803.
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  4. Jennifer Smalligan Marušić (2012). Refuting The Whole System? Hume's Attack on Popular Religion in The Natural History of Religion. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):715-736.
    There is reason for genuine puzzlement about Hume's aim in ‘The Natural History of Religion’. Some commentators take the work to be merely a causal investigation into the psychological processes and environmental conditions that are likely to give rise to the first religions, an investigation that has no significant or straightforward implications for the rationality or justification of religious belief. Others take the work to constitute an attack on the rationality and justification of religious belief in general. In contrast to (...)
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  5. Jennifer Smalligan Marušić (2011). Belief and Introspective Knowledge in Treatise 1.3.7. Hume Studies 37 (1):99-122.
    In Treatise 1.3.7 Hume offers two distinct arguments for the view that the difference between believing a matter of fact and simply conceiving of it consists in a difference in the manner of conception.1 For convenience, I will call the two arguments in Treatise 1.3.7 the “No-new-idea Argument” and the “Argument from Disagreement.” Both arguments have an eliminative structure: Hume argues against other possible accounts of belief and concludes that the only hypothesis left standing is the view that the difference (...)
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  6. Jennifer Smalligan Marušić (2010). Does Hume Hold a Dispositional Account of Belief? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):155-183.
    Philosophical theories about the nature of belief can be roughly classified into two groups: those that treat beliefs as occurrent mental states or episodes and those that treat beliefs as dispositions. David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature seems to contain a classic example of an occurrence theory of belief. Hume defines 'belief' as 'a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression' (Treatise 1.3.7.5 96).1 This definition suggests that believing is an occurrent mental state, such as judging, (...)
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  7. Jennifer Smalligan Marusic (2009). Comments on Michael Jacovides “How Berkeley Corrupted His Capacity to Conceive”. Philosophia 37 (3):431-436.
    The manuscript includes comments on Michael Jacovides’s paper, “How Berkeley Corrupted His Capacity to Conceive.” The paper and comments were delivered at the conference “Meaning and Modern Empiricism” held at Virginia Tech in April 2008. I consider Jacovides’s treatment of Berkeley’s Resemblance Argument and his interpretation of the Master Argument. In particular, I distinguish several ways of understanding the disagreement between Jacovides and Kenneth Winkler over the right way to read the Master Argument.
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