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Profile: Jennifer Wang (Stanford University)
  1. Jennifer Wang (2015). The Modal Limits of Dispositionalism. Noûs 49 (3):454-469.
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    Jennifer Wang (2016). The Nature of Properties: Causal Essentialism and Quidditism. Philosophy Compass 11 (3):168-176.
    Properties seem to play an important role in causal relations. But philosophers disagree over whether or not properties play their causal or nomic roles essentially. Causal essentialists say that they do, while quidditists deny it. This article surveys these two views, as well as views that try to find a middle ground.
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  3. Jennifer Wang (2015). Actualist Counterpart Theory. Journal of Philosophy 112 (8):417-441.
    Actualist counterpart theory replaces David Lewis’s concrete possible worlds and individuals with ersatz worlds and individuals, but retains counterpart theory about de re modality. While intuitively attractive, this view has been rejected for two main reasons: the problem of indiscernibles and the Humphrey objection. I argue that in insisting that ersatz individuals play the same role as Lewisian individuals, actualists commit the particularist fallacy. The actualist should not require stand-ins for every Lewisian individual. Ersatz individuals should instead be construed as (...)
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    Jennifer Wang (2014). Review of Ulrich Meyer's The Nature of Time. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Review 1:1.
  5. Jennifer Wang (2013). From Combinatorialism to Primitivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):535-554.
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    Jennifer Wang, Modal Primitivism.
    Modal primitivism is the view that there are modal features of the world which cannot be reduced to the non-modal. Theories which embrace primitive modality are often rejected for reasons of ideological simplicity: the fewer primitive notions a theory invokes, the better. Furthermore, modal primitivism is often associated with the view that all modal features of the world are irreducibly modal, which appears unsystematic and unexplanatory. As a result, many prefer modal reductionism. This work is an articulation and defense of (...)
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