Online research in philosophy

[D. H. Mellor] Kant's claim that our knowledge of time is transcendental in his sense, while false of time itself, is true of tenses, i.e. of the locations of events and other temporal entities in McTaggart's A series. This fact can easily, and I think only, be explained by taking time itself to be real but tenseless. /// [J. R. Lucas] Mellor's argument from Kant fails. The difficulties in his first Antinomy are due to topological confusions, not the (...) tensed nature of time. Nor are McTaggart' s difficulties due to the tensed nature of time. The ego-centricity of tensed discourse is an essential feature of communication between selves, each of whom refers himself as 'I', and is required for talking about time as well as experience and agency. Arguments based on the Special Theory are misconceived. Some rest on a confused notion of 'topological simultaneity'. In the General Theory a cosmic time is defined, as also in quantum mechanics, where a natural present is defined by a unique hyperplane of collapse into eigen-ness. (shrink)

This article is the text of an interview with D. H. Mellor conducted by Andrew Pyle and first published in the Spring 1993 issue of the philosophical journal Cogito.

This text brings together a collection of new essays by a number of philosophers to honor Hugh Mellor's contribution to philosophy. The collection stands as an original exploration of some of the most central issues in philosophy.

Two kinds of difficulties, which should be made explicit, face a researcher undertaking empirical work in an institution. First, he must explain how he chooses his theoretical framework, in so far as what he sees and the information he obtains will depend far more than is often admitted on the type of questions he asks. Secondly, he must try to clarify the way in which he adapts his original intentions in the light of the practical difficulties that occur in the (...) actual research situation, and how he interprets the evidence he finally decides is relevant. These points are illustrated by the study of an 'open' Borstal for girls. The aim of the study was to try to understand the workings of the institution, to outline the process which led to the Borstal sentence, and to attempt to discover the way the girls looked at the situation. The research was motivated by Matza's guiding principle, 'to be true to the phenomena', but even this, as this paper tries to show, does not lead to an unambiguous body of facts which can be presented unequivocally as 'findings'. (shrink)

This is a study of the nature of time. In it, redeploying an argument first presented by McTaggart, the author argues that although time itself is real, tense is not. He accounts for the appearance of the reality of tense - our sense of the passage of time, and the fact that our experience occurs in the present - by showing how time is indispensable as a condition of action. Time itself is further analysed, and Dr Mellor gives answers (...) to most of the metaphysical questions it provokes, concerning the relation of time to space, the dissection of time, and its relation to change and causation. (shrink)

Real Time II extends and evolves D.H. Mellor's classic exploration of the philosophy of time, Real Time . This wholly new book answers such basic metaphysical questions about time as: how do past, present and future differ, how are time and space related, what is change, is time travel possible? His Real Time dominated the philosophy of time for fifteen years. This book will do the same for the next twenty years.

The Facts of Causation grapples with one of philosophy's most enduring issues. Causation is central to all of our lives. What we see and hear causes us to believe certain facts about the world. We need that information to know how to act and how to cause the effects we desire. D. H. Mellor, a leading scholar in the philosophy of science and metaphysics, offers a comprehensive theory of causation. Many (...) questions about causation remain unsettled. In science, the indeterminism of modern physics and genetics have made such questions considerably harder for philosophers to answer. While progress has been made, a complete account of the nature and cosequences of causation is long overdue. This major study provides that account. (shrink)

Haack, S. Is truth flat or bumpy?--Chihara, C. S. Ramsey's theory of types.--Loar, B. Ramsey's theory of belief and truth.--Skorupski, J. Ramsey on Belief.--Hookway, C. Inference, partial belief, and psychological laws.--Skyrms, B. Higher order degrees of belief.--Mellor, D. H. Consciousness and degrees of belief.--Blackburn, S. Opinions and chances.--Grandy, R. E. Ramsey, reliability, and knowledge.--Cohen, L. J. The problem of natural laws.--Giedymin, J. Hamilton's method in geometrical optics and Ramsey's view of theories.

[D. H. Mellor] Kant's claim that our knowledge of time is transcendental in his sense, while false of time itself, is true of tenses, i.e. of the locations of events and other temporal entities in McTaggart's A series. This fact can easily, and I think only, be explained by taking time itself to be real but tenseless. /// [J. R. Lucas] Mellor's argument from Kant fails. The difficulties in his first Antinomy are due to topological confusions, not the (...) tensed nature of time. Nor are McTaggart' s difficulties due to the tensed nature of time. The ego-centricity of tensed discourse is an essential feature of communication between selves, each of whom refers himself as 'I', and is required for talking about time as well as experience and agency. Arguments based on the Special Theory are misconceived. Some rest on a confused notion of 'topological simultaneity'. In the General Theory a cosmic time is defined, as also in quantum mechanics, where a natural present is defined by a unique hyperplane of collapse into eigen-ness. (shrink)

The article is derived from the accompanying radio portrait. It was published in 1995 in Philosophy 70, 243-262, and is reproduced here by permission of the Editor. Page numbers after quotations from Ramsey refer to F. P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers, edited by D. H. Mellor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

This paper compares a number of ethical management practices of firms in two different economies. The recent behaviour of firms, described in terms of industry, size, international involvement and ownership, in a developed, western economy (Australia) are contrasted with the behaviour of similar firms in an emerging, eastern economy (Sri Lanka). This paper extends an earlier empirical study by Batten, Hettihewa and Mellor (1997) on the relationship between key firm-specific variables and firm ethical management practices in Australia by drawing (...) on similar survey data from Sri Lanka to facilitate an international comparison. The importance of this study is that it provides a valuable insight into the impact the level of economic development may have on ethical management behaviour and practice. (shrink)

The paper looks at the semantics and ontology of dispositions in the light of recent work on the subject. Objections to the simple conditionals apparently entailed by disposition statements are met by replacing them with so-called 'reduction sentences' and some implications of this are explored. The usual distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is criticised and the relation between dispositions and their bases examined. Applying this discussion to two typical cases leads to the conclusion that fragility is not a real (...) property and that, while both temperature and its bases are, this does not generate any problem of overdetermination. (shrink)

The paper argues that very different part-whole relations hold between different kinds of entities. While these relations share most of their formal properties, they need not share all of them. Nor need other mereological principles be true of all kinds of part–whole pairs. In particular, it is argued that the principle of unrestricted composition, that any two or more entities have a mereological sum, while true of sets and propositions, is false of things and events.

This volume is a collection of original essays by eminent philosophers written for R. B. Braithwaite's eightieth birthday to celebrate his work and teaching. In one way or another, all the essays reflect his central concern with the impact of science on our beliefs about the world and the responses appropriate to that. Together they testify to the signal importance of his contributions in areas of philosophy bearing on this concern: the philosophy of science, especially of the statistical sciences, theories (...) of belief and of probability, decision theory and games theory. This book, which includes a full bibliography of Professor Braithwaite's work, will interest advanced students and professionals in the fields of philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

This lecture will last less than twenty four hours. I know that, and so do you. And you knew it before I said so. How? Because you knew that lectures don't last twenty four hours. How do you know that? You haven't heard this one, and 'for all you know' (as the saying is) I could go on all night. But you know I won't. And the 'all you know' which tells you that, without entailing it, is the fact that (...) none, or almost none, of the many lectures, on all subjects, which you've heard or heard of, have lasted that long. If many of them had, you wouldn't have known that this one won't; but as it is, you do know that. (shrink)

Together they form a complete modern metaphysics. The book starts with the mind: the subjectivity of the self, consciousness, how like computers we are, and how psychology relates to physics.

This book deals not so much with statistical methods as with the central concept of chance, or statistical probability, which statistical theories apply to nature.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 747-749, December 2011.

Focus of animal welfare -- Agricultural sciences and animal welfare : crop production and animal production -- Veterinary science and animal welfare -- Genetics, biotechnology, and breeding : mixed blessings -- Animal welfare, grading compromise, and mitigating suffering -- Standardised behavioural testing in non-verbal humans and other animals -- Human-animal interactions and animal welfare -- Environmental enrichment : studying the nature of nurture -- Societal contexts of animal welfare -- Integrated perspectives : sleep, developmental stage, and animal welfare -- The (...) wider context of animal welfare science. (shrink)

This is a series of six five-minute radio talks on the use of words in philosophy broadcast on BBC Radio 3 between 5 February and 16 March 1978.

The article shows how McTaggart’s distinction between A- and B-series ways of locating events in time prompted and enabled the twentieth century’s most important advances in the philosophy of time. It argues that, even if the B-series represents time as it really is, because having A-series beliefs when they are true is indispensable to the causation of timely action, the A-series represents ‘the time of our lives’.

The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically in 1930 at the age of 26, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show its (...) ongoing relevance to present-day concerns. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Isaac Levi's principle of direct inference, from an agent's knowledge of a chance to that agent's corresponding credence, is central to his account of chance. He holds moreover that this principle shows the 'gratuitous, diversionary and obscurantist character' of frequency, propensity and other metaphysical theories of what chances are. In this contribution to Levi's Festschrift, I argue that, on the contrary, his direct inference principle commits him to just such a theory, the propensity theory.

There is a long-standing claim within feminist literature that women speak with a 'different voice' (Gilligan 1982), that it is both possible and desirable to have an ethics from the standpoint of women (Noddings 1990), that the standpoint of women is a better starting point for adequate knowledge of the world (Harding 1993). This claim is central to ecofeminist politics, that women have a particular perspective on the relationship between humanity and nature and have a moral/political calling to reweave the (...) world (Diamond and Orenstein 1990) or heal the wounds of an ecologically destructive social order (Plant 1989). In this essay I will not be making the claim that women per se have a superior vision or a higher moral authority, but that an ethics that does not take account of the gendered nature of society is doomed to failure as it will confront neither the material structure of human society or the way in which that structure impacts on the materiality of the relationship between humanity and nature. (shrink)

We do not know whether there are other universes. Perhaps we never shall. But I want to argue that 'do other universes exist?' can be posed in a form that makes it a genuine scientific question. Moreover, I shall outline why it is an interesting question; and why, indeed, I already suspect that the answer may be 'yes'.

Abstract The paper develops a unified account of both deterministic and indeterministic laws of nature which inherits the merits but not the defects of the best existing accounts. As in Armstrong's account, laws are embodied in facts about universals; but not in higher?order relations between them, and the necessity of laws is not primitive but results from their containing chances of 0 or 1. As in the Ramsey?Lewis account, law statements would be the general axioms and theorems of the simplest (...) deductive theory of everything; but because laws are not so defined, simplicity of statement is not a criterion of law?hood. (shrink)

This book: * assumes no mathematical background and keeps the technicalities to a minimum * explains the most important applications of probability theory to ...

SUSAN HAACK . . . if we believe pq to the extent of iand pq to the extent of i, we are bound in consistency to believe p also to the degree of i . . . but ...

The view is advocated that to preserve a deductivist account of science against recent criticism, it is necessary to incorporate experimental error, or imprecision, in the deductive structure. The sources of imprecision in empirical variables are analyzed, and the notion of conceptual imprecision introduced and illustrated. This is then used to clarify the notion of the acceptable range of a functional law. It is further shown that imprecision may be ascribed to parameters in laws and theories without rendering the deductive (...) structure untestable. It is claimed that this analysis explicates the relation between laws and theories in a way that invalidates certain arguments against its deductive nature. (shrink)

This paper addresses a number of important issues regarding the ethical practices and recent behaviour of large Australian firms in nine industries. These issues include whether firms have a written code of ethics, whether firms have a forum for the discussion of ethics, whether managers consider that their firm's activities have an environmental impact and whether there are any statistical relationships between the size, industry class, ownership, international involvement and location of the firm and its ethical management practices. These questions (...) are examined by using data collected from a sample of 136 large firms operating in Australia. (shrink)

The paper discusses the problems raised by the inexactness of experiential concepts for a deductivist account of theoretical explanation. The process of theoretical explanation is explicated in terms of the devising of exact forms of inexact concepts. Analysis of the adjustments of concepts and their exact forms to each other reveals an implicit criterion of adequacy for theories which is related to the principle of connectivity.

The paper, analyses the role of measurable concepts in deductive explanation. It is shown that such concepts are, although imprecise in a defined sense, exact in that neutral candidates to them do not arise. An analysis is given of the way in which imprecision is related to generalisation, and it is shown how imprecise concepts are incorporated in testable deductive explanations.