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Profile: Jeremy Fantl (University of Calgary)
  1. Jeremy Fantl, Knowledge How. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  2. Matthew McGrath & Jeremy Fantl (2013). Truth and Epistemology. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. 127--145.
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  3. Jeremy Fantl (2012). Epistemology and the Regress Problem. By Scott Aikin. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):157-160.
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  4. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2012). Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
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  5. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2012). Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):441-446.
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  6. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2012). Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.
  7. McGrath & Jeremy Fantl (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment: It's Not Just About Knowledge. Episteme 9 (1):27-42.
    There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted enough (...)
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  8. Jeremy Fantl (2011). Ryle's Regress Defended. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):121-130.
  9. Jeremy Fantl (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
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  10. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55 - 66.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I (...)
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  11. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Critical Study of John Hawthorne's Knowledge and Lotteries and Jason Stanley's Knowledge and Practical Interests. [REVIEW] Noûs 43 (1):178-192.
  12. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error--as seems required if (...)
     
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  13. Jeremy Fantl (2008). Knowing-How and Knowing-That. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
    You know that George W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you know how to ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According to intellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge. Anti-intellectualists deny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that something is the case requires a prior (...)
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  14. Jeremy Fantl (2008). Thinking About Knowing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):228–231.
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  15. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2007). On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558–589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving (...)
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  16. Jeremy Fantl (2006). Is Metaethics Morally Neutral? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.
    I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the (quite plausible) moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The (...)
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  17. Jeremy Fantl (2003). An Analysis of the a Priori and a Posteriori. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):43-69.
    I present and defend a unified, non-reductive analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. It is a mistake to remove all epistemic conditions from the analysis of the a priori (as, for example, Alvin Goldman has recently suggested doing). We can keep epistemic conditions (like unrevisability) in the analysis as long as we insist that a priori and a posteriori justification admit of degrees. I recommend making the degree to which a belief’s justification is a priori or a posteriori (...)
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  18. Jeremy Fantl (2003). Modest Infinitism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):537 - 562.
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  19. Jeremy Fantl & Robert J. Howell (2003). Sensations, Swatches, and Speckled Hens. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383.
  20. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2002). Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification. Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
  21. Matthew McGrath & Jeremy Fantl (2002). ``Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification&Quot. Philosophical Review 111 (1):67--74.
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  22. Jeremy Fantl (2000). How We Should Teach Plantinga's Possible Persons. Teaching Philosophy 23 (4):329-342.
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  23. Jeremy Fantl (1997). Arda Denkel, Object and Property Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 17 (3):162-164.
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  24. Jeremy Fantl (1997). DM Armstrong, CB Martin and UT Place, Dispositions: A Debate Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 17 (2):80-82.
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