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Profile: Jeremy Fantl (University of Calgary)
  1.  48
    Jeremy Fantl (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
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  2. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2002). Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification. Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
  3. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2007). On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558–589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving (...)
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  4. Jeremy Fantl (2008). Knowing-How and Knowing-That. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
    You know that George W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you know how to ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According to intellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge. Anti-intellectualists deny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that something is the case requires a prior (...)
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  5.  93
    Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2012). Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
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  6. Jeremy Fantl (2011). Ryle's Regress Defended. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):121-130.
  7.  89
    McGrath & Jeremy Fantl (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment: It's Not Just About Knowledge. Episteme 9 (1):27-42.
    There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted enough (...)
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  8.  28
    Jeremy Fantl (2015). What Is It to Be Happy That P? Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    This paper offers a new argument that your reasons for believing or acting need not be true. It proceeds indirectly through an account of what it takes to be happy that p. To be happy that p is for p to be among your reasons for being happy. That’s because questions about why you’re happy and what you’re happy is the case are interchangeable. But, I argue, it is possible to be happy that p even when p is false. In (...)
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  9.  16
    Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55-66.
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  10.  48
    Jeremy Fantl (2003). Modest Infinitism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):537 - 562.
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  11. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55 - 66.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I (...)
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  12.  81
    Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2012). Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.
  13. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Critical Study of John Hawthorne's Knowledge and Lotteries and Jason Stanley's Knowledge and Practical Interests. [REVIEW] Noûs 43 (1):178-192.
  14.  43
    Jeremy Fantl, Knowledge How. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  15.  96
    Jeremy Fantl (2006). Is Metaethics Morally Neutral? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.
    I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The argument generalizes (...)
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  16.  46
    Matthew McGrath & Jeremy Fantl (2013). Truth and Epistemology. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer 127--145.
  17.  71
    Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2012). Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):441-446.
  18.  86
    Jeremy Fantl & Robert J. Howell (2003). Sensations, Swatches, and Speckled Hens. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383.
  19. Jeremy Fantl (2003). An Analysis of the a Priori and a Posteriori. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):43-69.
    I present and defend a unified, non-reductive analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. It is a mistake to remove all epistemic conditions from the analysis of the a priori (as, for example, Alvin Goldman has recently suggested doing). We can keep epistemic conditions (like unrevisability) in the analysis as long as we insist that a priori and a posteriori justification admit of degrees. I recommend making the degree to which a belief’s justification is a priori or a posteriori (...)
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  20.  13
    Jeremy Fantl (2015). Human Knowledge/Human Knowers: Comments on Michael Williams' “What's so Special About Human Knowledge?”. Episteme 12 (2):269-273.
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  21. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error--as seems required if (...)
     
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  22. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (eds.) (2008). Epistemology: An Anthology. Wiley-Blackwell.
    New and thoroughly updated, _Epistemology: An Anthology_ continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in the theory of knowledge. Concentrates on the central topics of the field, such as skepticism and the Pyrrhonian problematic, the definition of knowledge, and the structure of epistemic justification Offers coverage of more specific topics, such as foundationalism vs coherentism, and virtue epistemology Presents wholly new sections on 'Testimony, Memory, and Perception' and 'The Value of Knowledge' Features modified sections on (...)
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  23. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Knowledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error - as seems (...)
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  24. Jeremy Fantl (2013). A Defense of Dogmatism. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:34-57.
    Dogmatism is the view that it is often legitimate to flatly dismiss counterarguments to a belief: your belief can count as knowledge even if you can’t figure out what’s wrong with the counterargument. Hume defended a version of dogmatism restricted to testimony in favor of miracles. Moore defended a dogmatism restricted to arguments for skepticism. In this paper it is argued that Hume’s and Moore’s dogmatisms should be generalized to all controversial matters. Dogmatism about controversial matters is true if you (...)
     
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  25.  9
    Jeremy Fantl (2000). How We Should Teach Plantinga's Possible Persons. Teaching Philosophy 23 (4):329-342.
    While it is often undesirable and difficult to introduce highly complex arguments in large introductory philosophy classes, it is important to do so at least once in the semester as it challenges students, shows how philosophical debates often go beyond one’s initial intuitions, and illustrates how meaningful answers often turn on close attention to logical minutiae. This paper provides an example of an advanced debate on the free-will response to the problem of evil that can be used in introductory courses (...)
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  26.  14
    Jeremy Fantl (2012). Epistemology and the Regress Problem. By Scott Aikin. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):157-160.
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  27. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (eds.) (2008). Epistemology. John Wiley & Sons.
    New and thoroughly updated, _Epistemology: An Anthology_ continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in the theory of knowledge. Concentrates on the central topics of the field, such as skepticism and the Pyrrhonian problematic, the definition of knowledge, and the structure of epistemic justification Offers coverage of more specific topics, such as foundationalism vs coherentism, and virtue epistemology Presents wholly new sections on 'Testimony, Memory, and Perception' and 'The Value of Knowledge' Features modified sections on (...)
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  28. Jeremy Fantl (1997). DM Armstrong, CB Martin and UT Place, Dispositions: A Debate Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 17 (2):80-82.
     
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  29.  15
    Jeremy Fantl (2008). Thinking About Knowing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):228–231.
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  30. Jeremy Fantl (1997). Arda Denkel, Object and Property Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 17 (3):162-164.
     
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  31. Jeremy Fantl (1997). Arda Denkel, Object and Property. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 17:162-164.
     
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  32. Jeremy Fantl (1997). D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin And U.T. Place, Dispositions: A Debate. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 17:80-82.
     
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  33. Jeremy Fantl (2016). Mary Shepherd on Causal Necessity. Metaphysica 17.
    Lady Mary Shepherd’s critique of Hume’s account of causation, his worries about knowledge of matters of fact, and the contention that it is possible for the course of nature to spontaneously change relies primarily on three premises, two of which – that objects are merely bundles of qualities and that the qualities of an object are individuated by the causal powers contributed by those qualities – anticipate contemporary metaphysical views in ways that she should be getting credit for. The remaining (...)
     
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  34. Jeremy Fantl (2000). Revisability and the a Priori. Dissertation, Brown University
    I argue in favor of the possibility of real a priori justification. Some writers have claimed that, to adequately defend against the naturalist, we should grant that a priori justification can be defeated by further experiential evidence. Such writers generally view a priori faculties as on a par with empirical faculties but with different proper objects. While perceptual objects are the contingently existing things with which we are in causal contact, a priori objects are either necessarily true propositions or necessarily (...)
     
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  35. Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (eds.) (2008). Epistemology. John Wiley & Sons.
    New and thoroughly updated, _Epistemology: An Anthology_ continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in the theory of knowledge. Concentrates on the central topics of the field, such as skepticism and the Pyrrhonian problematic, the definition of knowledge, and the structure of epistemic justification Offers coverage of more specific topics, such as foundationalism vs coherentism, and virtue epistemology Presents wholly new sections on 'Testimony, Memory, and Perception' and 'The Value of Knowledge' Features modified sections on (...)
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