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  1. Jeremy I. M. Carpendale, Stuart Hammond & Charlie Lewis (2010). The Social Origin and Moral Nature of Human Thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):334.
    Knobe's laudable conclusion that we make sense of our social world based on moral considerations requires a development account of human thought and a theoretical framework. We outline a view that such a moral framework must be rooted in social interaction.
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  2. Charlie Lewis & Jeremy I. M. Carpendale (2009). Carruthers' Marvelous Magical Mindreading Machine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):152-152.
    Carruthers presents an interesting analysis of confabulation and a clear attack on introspection. Yet his theory-based alternative is a mechanistic view of which neglects the fact that social understanding occurs within a network of social relationships. In particular, the role of language in his model is too simple.
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  3. Jeremy I. M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis (2008). Mirroring Cannot Account for Understanding Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):23-24.
    Susan Hurley's shared circuits model (SCM) rightly begins in action and progresses through a series of layers; but it fails to reach action understanding because it relies on mirroring as a driving force, draws on heavily criticized theories, and neglects the need for shared experience in our grasp of social understanding.
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  4. Jeremy I. M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis (2004). Constructing an Understanding of Mind: The Development of Children's Social Understanding Within Social Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):79-96.
    Theories of children's developing understanding of mind tend to emphasize either individualistic processes of theory formation, maturation, or introspection, or the process of enculturation. However, such theories must be able to account for the accumulating evidence of the role of social interaction in the development of social understanding. We propose an alternative account, according to which the development of children's social understanding occurs within triadic interaction involving the child's experience of the world as well as communicative interaction with others about (...)
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  5. Jeremy I. M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis (2004). Constructing Understanding, with Feeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):130-141.
    We explore three types of criticisms of our theory on the development of children's social understanding. We reject suggestions that we offer nothing new to traditional theories of development or recent “social” accounts of “theory of mind.” Second, we take the point that there are grounds for improving our account of dyadic interaction in infancy but reject claims that we have not sufficiently accounted for how we incorporate the notions of criteria and structure into the theory. Third, we accept that (...)
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  6. Ulrich Müller & Jeremy I. M. Carpendale (2001). Objectivity, Intentionality, and Levels of Explanation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):55-56.
    Notwithstanding many similarities between Thelen et al.'s and Piaget's accounts of the A-not-B error, we argue that, in contrast to Piaget, they do not explicitly address the issue of objectivity. We suggest that this omission is partly due to the fact that Thelen et al. and Piaget's accounts are pitched at different levels of explanation.
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  7. William Turnbull & Jeremy I. M. Carpendale (1999). Locating Meaning in Interaction, Not in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (2):304-305.
    Pulvermüller's attempt to link language with brain activity appears to depend on the assumption that words have context-independent meanings. An examination of everyday talk contradicts this assumption. The meaning that speakers convey depends not only on word content, but also, and importantly, on the location of a “word” in an ongoing sequence of turns in talk.
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