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Profile: Jeremy Koons (Georgetown University)
  1. Jeremy Randel Koons (2013). Reasons From Within: Desires and Values, by Alan H. Goldman. Mind 122 (488):1086-1091.
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  2. Jeremy Randel Koons (2011). Plantinga on Properly Basic Belief in God: Lessons From the Epistemology of Perception. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):839-850.
    Plantinga famously argues against evidentialism that belief in God can be properly basic. But the epistemology of cognitive faculties such as perception and memory which produce psychologically non-inferential beliefs shows that various inferentially justified theoretical beliefs are epistemically prior to our memory and perceptual beliefs, preventing the latter from being epistemically basic. Plantinga's analogy between the sensus divinitatis and these cognitive faculties suggests that the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis cannot be properly basic either. Objections by and on behalf of (...)
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  3. Jeremy Koons (2010). Natural Evil as a Test of Faith in the Abrahamic Traditions. Sophia 49 (1):15-28.
    This paper critically examines what I call the ‘testing theodicy,’ the widely held idea that natural evil exists in order to test our faith in God. This theodicy appears numerous times in the scriptures of all three Abrahamic faiths. After examining some of these scriptural passages, we will argue that in light of these texts, the notion of faith is best understood as some type of commitment such as trust, loyalty or piety, rather than as merely a belief in (...)
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  4. Jeremy Randel Koons (2010). Disenchanting the World. Journal of Philosophical Research 29:125-152.
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  5. Jeremy Randel Koons (2006). An Argument Against Reduction in Morality and Epistemology. Philosophical Investigations 29 (3):250–274.
    Many naturalistically-minded philosophers want to accomplish a naturalistic reduction of normative (e.g. moral and epistemic) claims. Mindful of avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, such philosophers claim that they are not reducing moral and epistemic concepts or definitions. Rather, they are only reducing the extension of these normative terms, while admitting that the concepts possess a normative content that cannot be naturalistically reduced. But these philosophers run into a serious problem. I will argue that normative claims possess two dimensions of normativity. I (...)
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  6. Jeremy Randel Koons (2006). Sellars, Givenness, and Epistemic Priority. In Michael P. Wolf (ed.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. 147-172.
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  7. Jeremy Koons (2005). Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification. Episteme 2 (3):203-218.
    Discussions of conservatism in epistemology often fail to demonstrate that the principle of conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations. In this paper, I hope to show two things. First, there is a defensible version of the principle of conservatism, a version that applies only to what I will call our basic beliefs. Those who deny that conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations do so because they fail to take into account the necessarily social, diachronic and self-correcting nature of our epistemic (...)
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  8. Jeremy R. Koons (2004). Disenchanting the World: McDowell, Sellars, and Rational Constraint by Perception. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):125-152.
    In his book Mind and World, John McDowell grapples with the problem that the world must and yet seemingly cannot constrain our empirical thought. I first argue that McDowell’s proposed solution to the problem throws him onto the horns of his own, intractable dilemma, and thus fails to solve the problem of rational constraint by the world. Next, I will argue that Wilfrid Sellars, in a series of articles written in the 1950s and 60s, provides the tools to solve the (...)
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  9. Jeremy Randel Koons (2003). Consensus and Excellence of Reasons. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:83-103.
    It is plausible to suppose that the normativity of evaluative (e.g., moral and epistemic) judgments arises out of and is, in some sense, dependent on our actual evaluative practice. At the same time, though, it seems likely that the correctness of evaluative judgments is not merely a matter of what the underlying practice endorses and condemns; denial of this leads one into a rather objectionable form of relativism. In this paper, I will explore a social practice account of normativity according (...)
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  10. Jeremy Randel Koons (2003). Why Response-Dependence Theories of Morality Are False. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):275 - 294.
    Many response-dependence theorists equate moral truth with the generation of some affective psychological response: what makes this action wrong, as opposed to right, is that it would cause (or merit) affective response of type R (perhaps under ideal conditions). Since our affective nature is purely contingent, and not necessarily shared by all rational creatures (or even by all humans), response-dependence threatens to lead to relativism. In this paper, I will argue that emotional responses and moral features do not align in (...)
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  11. Jeremy R. Koons (2002). How to Avoid the Twin Perils of Anti-Empiricism and the Given. In Perspectives on Coherentism. Aylmer, Québec: Éditions Du Scribe.
     
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  12. Jeremy R. Koons (2002). Perspectives on Coherentism. Aylmer, Québec: Éditions Du Scribe.
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  13. Jeremy Randel Koons (2002). Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism? Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
    Most philosophers now concede that libertarianism has failed as an account of free will. Assuming the correctness of this concession, that leaves compatibilism and hard determinism as the only remaining choices in the free will debate. In this paper, I will argue that hard determinism turns out to be a form of compatibilism, and therefore, compatibilism is the only remaining position in the free will debate. I will attempt to establish this conclusion by arguing that hard determinists will end up (...)
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  14. Jeremy Randel Koons (2001). Emotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts. Philosophy 76 (4):585-604.
    Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions and (...)
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  15. Jeremy Randel Koons (2000). Do Normative Facts Need to Explain? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246–272.
    Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse (by which I mean our practice of evaluating beliefs as justified or unjustified, and so forth) are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotent as well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not serve (...)
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