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  1. James Phillips, Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Scott Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar (2012). The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue. Part 4: General Conclusion. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):14-.
    In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all further (...)
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  2. James Phillips, Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Scott Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar (2012). The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue Part 1: Conceptual and Definitional Issues in Psychiatric Diagnosis. [REVIEW] Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):1-29.
    In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)
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  3. James Phillips, Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar (2012). The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue Part 2: Issues of Conservatism and Pragmatism in Psychiatric Diagnosis. [REVIEW] Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):8-.
    In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)
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  4. James Phillips, Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar (2012). The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue Part 3: Issues of Utility and Alternative Approaches in Psychiatric Diagnosis. [REVIEW] Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):9-.
    In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)
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  5. Jerome C. Wakefield (2011). Darwin, Functional Explanation, and the Philosophy of Psychiatry. In Pieter R. Adriaens & Andreas de Block (eds.), Maladapting Minds: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Evolutionary Theory. Oxford University Press. 43--172.
  6. Jerome C. Wakefield (2010). False Positives in Psychiatric Diagnosis: Implications for Human Freedom. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):5-17.
    Current symptom-based DSM and ICD diagnostic criteria for mental disorders are prone to yielding false positives because they ignore the context of symptoms. This is often seen as a benign flaw because problems of living and emotional suffering, even if not true disorders, may benefit from support and treatment. However, diagnosis of a disorder in our society has many ramifications not only for treatment choice but for broader social reactions to the diagnosed individual. In particular, mental disorders impose a sick (...)
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  7. Jerome C. Wakefield (2009). Mental Disorder and Moral Responsibility: Disorders of Personhood as Harmful Dysfunctions, With Special Reference to Alcoholism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):91-99.
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  8. Jerome C. Wakefield (2008). VIastos on the Unity of Virtue. Ancient Philosophy 11 (1):47-65.
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  9. Jerome C. Wakefield (2006). High Mental Disorder Rates Are Based on Invalid Measures: Questions About the Claimed Ubiquity of Mutation-Induced Dysfunction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):424-426.
    Three reservations about Keller & Miller's (K&M's) argument are explored: Serious validity problems afflict epidemiological criteria discriminating disorders from non-disorders, so high rates may be misleading. Normal variation need not be mild disorder, contrary to a possible interpretation of K&M's article. And, rather than mutation-selection balance, true disorders may result from unselected combinations of normal variants over many loci. (Published Online November 9 2006).
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  10. Jerome C. Wakefield (2006). What Makes a Mental Disorder Mental? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):123-131.
  11. Jerome C. Wakefield (2003). Fodor on Inscrutability. Mind and Language 18 (5):524-537.
  12. Jerome C. Wakefield (2003). The Chinese Room Argument Reconsidered: Essentialism, Indeterminacy, and Strong AI. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.
    I argue that John Searle's (1980) influential Chinese room argument (CRA) against computationalism and strong AI survives existing objections, including Block's (1998) internalized systems reply, Fodor's (1991b) deviant causal chain reply, and Hauser's (1997) unconscious content reply. However, a new ``essentialist'' reply I construct shows that the CRA as presented by Searle is an unsound argument that relies on a question-begging appeal to intuition. My diagnosis of the CRA relies on an interpretation of computationalism as a scientific theory about the (...)
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  13. Jerome C. Wakefield (2002). Broad Versus Narrow Content in the Explanation of Action: Fodor on Frege Cases. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.
    A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily (...)
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  14. Jerome C. Wakefield (2002). Why Specific Design is Not the Mark of the Adaptational. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):532-533.
    Andrews et al.'s analysis suffers from a series of conceptual confusions they inherit from Gould's work. Their proposal that adaptations can be distinguished from exaptations essentially by specific design criteria fails because exaptations are often maintained and secondarily adapted by natural selection and therefore, over evolutionary time, can come to have similar levels of design specificity to adaptations.
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  15. Jerome C. Wakefield (2000). Aristotle as Sociobiologist: The" Function of a Human Being" Argument, Black Box Essentialism, and the Concept of Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (1):17-44.
  16. Jerome C. Wakefield (2000). Spandrels, Vestigial Organs, and Such: Reply to Murphy and Woolfolk's" The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental Disorder". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):253-269.
  17. Jerome C. Wakefield (1995). Dysfunction as a Value-Free Concept: A Reply to Sadler and Agich. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (3):233-246.
  18. Jerome C. Wakefield (1991). VIastos on the Unity of Virtue: Why Pauline Predication Will Not Save the Biconditionality Thesis. Ancient Philosophy 11 (1):47-65.
  19. Jerome C. Wakefield (1991). Why Emotions Can't Be Unconscious: An Exploration of Freud's Essentialism. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 14:29-67.
  20. Jerome C. Wakefield & Hubert L. Dreyfus (1991). Intentionality and the Phenomenology of Action. In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  21. Jerome C. Wakefield (1990). Why Instinctual Impulses Can't Be Unconscious: An Exploration of Freud's Cognitivism. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 13:265-88.
     
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